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ABSTRACT 
Whether in the guise of the novel or non-print media such as film and television, 
fin-de-millennium science fiction has provided opportunities to envisage a 
posthuman stage of evolution. The academic response to this has been polarized. 
Certain elements have embraced the genre as integral to the sociocultural 
relationship between unfettered biotechnological advance and the limitation of the 
human flesh. Others have treated the topic as fanciful entertainment, leading them 
to ignore and sometimes ridicule research on the posthuman. The thesis seeks to 
utilise the contemporary science fiction allegory as an aid in developing a critique 
of the emerging posthuman discourse, facilitating the analysis of its socio-political 
dynamic, and questioning whether discourse advancement necessitates the 
rejection of the humanist metanarrative. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter differentiates the 
posthuman from established biotechnological discourses, e mg the 
discontinuities in global location, temporal engagement, and participant ideology. 
The second reflects on the contemporary human condition associated with man's 
technological ingenuity being a credible threat to his own existence. It then 
outlines the epochal technoscience of the posthuman and introduces the 
diametrically opposed standpoints of the posthuman as amelioration, or auto- 
extinction. The third chapter draws upon utopian visions of the future to 
contextualise and assist in the critical analysis of narratives advocating posthuman 
technoscience. The fourth chapter reverses this, by utilising dystopian imagery as 
an entree into the rationale of those opposing human alteration, facilitating its 
critique. The fifth chapter sees the science fiction allegory as a post- 
foundationalist narrative, offering up a discursive mirror to the influences of 
providence and progress on the posthuman debate. The final chapter examines 
whether an a-humanist account of man's relationship with technology might help 
to advance the posthuman debate. 
vi 
'More than any other time in history, mankind faces a 
crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter 
hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we 
have fhe wisdom fo choose correcfly. I speak, by f he way, 
not with any sense of futility, but with a panicky conviction 
of the absolute meaninglessness of existence that could 
easily be misinterpreted as pessimism. It is not. It is merely 
a healthy concern for the predicament of modern man. ' 
Woody Allen, Side Effects. 1981 p. 61 
vii 
INTRODUCTION 
The evolutionary posthuman, the species that will come after the human, an 
evolutionary descendant, but ontologically different, the result of embracing and 
manipulating the human with 'present technologies, like genetic engineering and 
information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular 
nanotechnology and artificial intelligence' (Bostrom 2003a p. 493), is, at present, a 
fiction. From what we are told by academics and social commentators the closest 
approximation of the posthuman is to be found in the annals of fiction, 
specificafly in the utopian and dystopian visions of contemporary science fiction. 
Indeed, to separate the subject of the posthuman from science fiction is to sever a 
frequently esoteric subject from its main vehicle of social initiation; but beyond 
this, such separation might render the posthuman. narrative arid to the point of 
meaninglessness. For it is science fiction that breathes life into the posthuman, not 
simply because those who write about the notion constantly utilise its fictional 
representations to conceptualise, instruct, provoke, and envisage; but also because 
it is science fiction that has the capacity to render the subject tangible. Without 
science fiction the posthuman becomes fantasticaL an abstract associated with 
thought experiments, a concept so implausible that many will reject the subject 
out of hand. 
It therefore appears advantageous, when discussing the posthuman, not only to 
resist the temptation to cleanse it of science fiction, but rather to embrace its 
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contamination. Indeed having concluded this, it seemed apt to transcend the point 
by actively exploiting the science fiction narrative; using it, in terms of dialogue 
excerpts, plot summaries, and academic commentaries, as a vehicle not only to 
initiate and conceptualise, but also to help elicit the ideas and conflicts 
surrounding the emergent posthuman debate. This information would then serve 
to facilitate an examination and critical analysis of the social, political, moral and 
practical considerations and implications of posthuman technologies; thus creating 
a foundation that could be used as a springboard into the heart of the posthuman 
debate i. e., the 'interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the 
opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened 
up by the advancement of tecbnology. ' (Bostrom 2003a p-493) 
It was hoped that the utilisation of the posthuman allegory, as an essential element 
of investigating the posthuman, would also enable the appropriation of the 
compact between the narrative form and its audience. Whether science fiction is 
portraying only the posthuman, or the interplay between the posthuman and the 
human, its audience is, at present, always human. The very nature of this 
relationship actively promotes participation beyond the narrative structure, for it 
facilitates comparison between the human and a tangible representation of the 
posthuman. This process in turn prompts the essential dialogue that is at the very 
heart of comprehending the posthuman debate. That is, the evaluation, and re- 
evaluation, of the ideas and assumptions that forms our understanding of 
"humanness"'; and the challenge of articulating and accounting for the ontological 
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differences claimed to distinguish the human from both the non-human and the 
posthuman. 
The utilisation of science fiction also exposes how narratives can be usurped and 
reinterpreted by seemingly incongruous perspectives; an example of this is how 
technophiles have exploited technophobic fables as inspiration and validation for 
technological endeavour. As O'Riordan (1981) notes of the enviromnental debate, 
the "technocentri&' argue that the most appropriate method of avoiding 
environmental catastrophe is not via the limiting of that deemed responsible, but 
rather the reverse. For it is the increasing of energy consumption, technological 
development, and world population, that, they believe, will stimulate the human 
potential and ingenuity necessary to discover technological solutions to these 
issues. 
In addition, it also appeared advantageous to utilise the science fiction narrative as 
a device to compartmentalising differing posthuman standpoints. The problem 
here centred. on the apparent unfeasibility of presenting the conflict surrounding 
t I, ... posthuman whilst attempting to separating the arguments advocating and 
opposing its development. It would certainly have been a folly to disrupt the 
natural dialogue between these conflicting positions, but without subdivision the 
key issues might have been lost under the barrage of intertwined parry and riposte. 
It was therefore decided to disconnect these standpoints by attributing each 
position three accordant pieces of science fiction, and then to utilise a montage of 
excerpts, summaries, and commentaries, as the basis for the contextualisation of a 
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number of thought experiments. These thought experiments would then serve to 
facilitate the exploration and critical analysis of the social, political, moral and 
practical considerations and implications of posthuman technologies. This process 
would also assist in examining whether the apparent, and sometimes unpalatable, 
social consequences of these thought experiments were fully represented within 
the posthuman debate, or whether they are, at times, glossed over with narrative 
oversimplification. Indeed, having performed this procedure on the two 
conflicting standpoints, it became apparent that if the posthuman debate was to be 
fully examined - beyond simple power issues, vested interests and metanarrative 
bias - the process would need to conducted on a third "contradictozY' position; 
one that contained predominately a-humanist perspectives, neither for nor against 
posthuman technologies. 
While the science fiction genre contains great fortnat cross-over, with most of the 
examples used here appearing, in canonical form, as both visual and written 
media, the decision to utilise both styles was due to their idiosyncrasies. Visual 
representations of science fiction are, unsurprisingly, more popular and accessible 
than their written counterpart. This is usually because their consumption is far less 
demanding. They tend to be simplified and to the point, expurgating all that is 
"deemed" unnecessary, sometime at the expense of aR ambiguity. Such reasons 
make film and television highly suitable as social initiators and conceptualisers. 
Celluloid, as a visually driven medium, also utilises its graphical representations 
to create visceral impacts, emotional responses, in the form of "yuck factors", that 
are designed to bypass rational examination. Such responses are useful in 
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exposing socially indoctrinated disgust responses to certain abstract concepts, 
such as the idea of human cloning, or "designer babies". This said film and 
television are commercial exercises that tend to pander to the sentiments of their 
prospective demographic. In doing so, they sometimes aspire to be little more than 
"'mindlessý' entertainment. Indeed, whilst visual media science fiction can be 
challenging, its effrontery is usually constrained by market forces and commercial 
self-interest. However an audacious author can be unpalatable and polemic in a 
manner generally perceived as commercial suicide for fihn or television. In 
addition, the written word allows a greater scope for the uncertainties and open- 
endedness that visual media audiences frequently despise. As a result, 
representations from both visual and written media were deemed necessary to 
enable a full analysis of the issues surrounding the posthuman. 
Chapter One of the thesis is dedicated to examining the posthuman dialogue by 
offering it up to other avant-garde socio-political narratives dealing with 
analogous species-altering technologies; specifically the Western European anti- 
biotecbnology movements relating to the genetic modification of agriculture, and 
the non-human animal. It was hoped that this process would fully elucidate the 
aetiology behind the apparent temporal, spatial and socio-political anomalies 
surrounding the origins, and existence, of the posthuman debate. 
Having decided to exploit the science fiction narrative to assist in exploring and 
exposing the limitations of the posthuman debate, it was also deemed appropriate 
to utilise science fiction, in Chapter Two, to assist in introducing and grounding 
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the potency of contemporary technoscience; thus enabling the posthuman to be 
positioned squarely in a framework in which technological ingenuity has become 
a credible threat to human existence. 
The decision was then made to compartmentalise the main investigation of the 
posthuman debate into three central chapters, commencing with allegories 
compatible with the successful development of the posthuman; followed by those 
incompatible with such development; and then those that question the very notion 
of successful posthuman development. This structure was designed to allow 
advocates to delineate the conception, frictions, and rationale behind the 
posthuman, before proceeding with the contrary, and evidently reactionary, 
perspectives of its detractors. The contradictory standpoint was then to foUow as a 
counterpoint to the dialogue between the first two groups; highlighting questions 
of coherence, continuity, and relevance, and bringing an essential, and 
contrasting, perspective to the subject matter. This ordering also served to 
'Ifia-c-ilitate a logical progression through the subject dialogue, as it allowed each 
subsequent phase to borrow from those ideas and arguments already asserted. 
Chapter Three therefore opens with a short precis of a piece of fiction that is 
congruent with posthuman development, followed by a commentary on the 
implications of the narrative, interwoven with an examination and critical analysis 
of the posthuman issues that have surfaced. This latter process is conducted with 
input, and representation, from conflicting perspectives within posthuman 
academia, including pertinent contributions from social and cultural studies, the 
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applied sciences, and philosophy. This method is then repeated twice, each time 
with a new piece of posthuman friendly fiction and ftirther commentary and 
analysis on the posthuman debate. The advantage of this configuration is 
threefold. Firstly, because it allows each subsequent phase to borrow from 
fictions, ideas, and arguments that had come before, and thus facilitates the 
progression into increasingly esoteric arguments; secondly, it continually feeds 
new material into the argument, thus countering stagnation; and thirdly, the 
adopting of a rigid structure should assist in the chapter's lucidity. 
Chapters Four and Five adhere to the format of Chapter Three, although with 
pieces of fiction accordant with perspective's contrary, or contradictory, of 
successful posthuman development. An order that, as has already been stated, 
assists in the creation of a logical progression through the posthuman debate, and 
also allows each subsequent chapter to borrow from earlier fictions, ideas, and 
arguments. 
Chapter Six considers whether the posthuman debate is being constrained by its 
humanist bias, and assesses whether the methodological a-humanism of Actor- 
Network Theory, or Heidegger's a-humanist metanarrative, can progress the 
posthuman dialogue by offering an alternative perspective. Having considered 
these approaches, a-humanism is then offered up to the accusation that, rather than 
a path out of modernity, it is modernity in its most extreme form. In response to 
this, the argument for the proposed rejection of humanism is examined, and 
consequently so is the case for its retention. 
7 
CHAPTER I 
SPECIES ALTERING TECHNOLOGY 
Science Fiction as Mainstream 
Certain political events of the second-half of the twentieth-century rendered 
moribund any questions regarding the status of science fiction as a mainstream 
genre. As the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, circled the earth in late 1957, the 
"Space Age" dawned. Less than four years later US President Kennedy responded 
to the Soviet dominance of space by announcing to Congress that: 'I believe that 
this nation should coriunit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of 
landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. ' (1961 p. 4) This 
was achieved in a little over eight years. In the meantime, France, Japan, China, 
and the United Kingdom endeavoured to launch their own satellites into space; 
although it would only be France that succeeded in this prior to the Apollo II 
landing. (Braeunig 2007) 
Fuelled by the Cold War, the "Space Race" catapulted science fiction into the 
collective unagination of the First World. Whilst the creativity and consistency of 
sixties television progrannnes such as The Outer Limits and Star Trek fed the First 
World's insatiable appetite for space, the film 2001: A Space Odyssey initiated the 
transformation of science fiction fihnmaking from "B-movie" status to big-budget 
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Hollywood blockbuster: 'Some would even go as far to divide science fiction 
filmmaking into two eras: pre-2001 and post-2001. In 1968, the French magazine 
L'Express described 2001 as "Year One in the cinema of the future". ' (Silverman 
2001) 
As the popularity of science fiction has increased over the last forty years, so has 
the sophistication of both its narrative and audience, and while: 'The mode of 
production of the science fiction film has committed it to certain kinds of 
narratives, conflicts, and closures that must find a profitable commercial niche 
the narratives of such massive success as Star Wars and Terminator 2 are riven 
with internal complexities and contradictions regarding the statues of technology 
and the definitions of the human. ' (Bukatman 1994 p. 12) 
With the blurring of the boundaries surrounding the human, the posthuman has 
become a staple of the science fiction narrative. This said its portrayal, or the 
interpretation of its portrayal, is less than uniform. For many, science fiction 
represents the posthuman as the utopian salvation of humanity, as Garreau notes: 
'The impact of such storytelling on global culture should not be 
underestimated. In my travels I found it hard to find a cutting-edge 
[posthuman] researcher today who, when asked about the inspiration 
for his creations, did not reply by simply pointing to a shelf in a place 
of honour. There invariably sat expensively collected fables of the 
future that shaped his youth. ' (2005 p. I 10) 
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In marked contrast, others view the cultural representation of the posthuman as 
distinctly dystopian, presenting technoscience as pervasive invader and corrupter 
of the human flesh, and the ultimate ruin of humanity. Dinello argues: 
'Science fiction shows the transformation into the posthuman as the 
horrific harbinger of mad scientists, rampaging robots, killer clones, 
cutthroat cyborgs, human-hating androids, satanic supercomputers, 
flesh-eating viruses, and genetically mutated monsters, science fiction 
expresses a technophobic fear of losing our human identity, our 
freedom, our emotions, our values, and our lives to machines. Like a 
virus, technology autonomously insinuates itself into human life and, 
to ensure its survival and dominance, malignantly manipulates the 
minds and behaviour of humans. (2005 p-2) 
Again still, others view science fiction's representation of the marriage of man 
and machine as ambivalent, yet another of the many possible scenarios in which 
the self-destructive nature of humanity eventually, and inevitably, brings about its 
own downfafl: 
'Axso a defiant gesture against invasion, postmodemism refuses to 
ingest the substances that block awareness of our condition. In this 
way it stands as an active counterpoint to our more common sedated 
passivity. We find a supreme irony, however, in this heightened 
10 
awareness.... If our culture is presumed doomed, why take such pains 
to alert us? Doing so is much like the replicant Leon Kowalski's 
absurdly oxymoronic admonition to bounty hunter Rick Deckard an 
instant before he intends to kill him by putting out his eyes in Blade 
Runner: "Wake up, time to die". Leon seems to want his enemy to be 
My aware of his fate. ' (Rushing and Frentz 1995 p. 23) 
But if science fiction is mainstream entertainment; the posthuman is a staple 
subject area for contemporary science fiction; science fiction represents such 
technologies as having divisive, Possibly even revolutionary, social and cultural 
potency; and posthuman technologies, once perceived as mere science "fiction", 
are increasingly being confwmed as scientific "fact", then why does there appear 
to be a conspicuous absence, in Western Europe, of interest and open debate in the 
posthuman? 
Some cynics may argue that this absence is testament to the inept way in which 
nation states have handled past debates on similar subjects, such as the use of 
biotechnology on agriculture and non-human animals. That is, governments and 
businesses are unwilling to have an open debate on a subject they believe they 
cannot win; a subject already awash with scepticism about vested interests and 
hidden agendas. As a result the general public is actively excluded from 
discussion by using hyper-technical and esoteric language, with future long-term 
issues constantly being obscured by the use of equivocation and ambiguity. 
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Others argue that an open debate is already redundant, for even if public opinion 
within a country could force a government to proceed in a more restrictive manner 
towards the postbuman, such a decision would be ephemeral at best. For it would 
only a matter of time before the overwhelming demand, and economic reward, for 
such technologies became so large, that non-participation would become too 
costly. This conclusion, being obvious from the outset, would serve to guarantee 
that no country would, or could, dare refuse to participate in the first place: 
'But as part of a moral reflection on legal policy, reference to the 
normative force of established facts will only confirm a sceptical 
public's fear that science, technology and economics may create, by 
their systemic dynamics, faits accomplis which can outstrip any 
normative framework.... As biotechno logical research is by now 
bound up with investors' interests as weU as with the pressure for 
success felt by national governments, the development of genetic 
engineering has acquired a dynamic which threatens to steamroll the 
inherently slow-paced process of an ethicopolitical opinion and will 
formation in the public sphere. ' (Habermas 2003 p. 18) 
Furthermore, even in the, politically inconceivable, event of a worldwide ban on 
posthuman technologies, any short-term success will be marred by the ever 
increasing competence, ingenuity and complexity of, and the ever reducing 
overheads, risks and opposition to, analogous technology developed and used on 
plants and non-human animals. Without the catastrophic failure of these 
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technologies, it would appear only a matter of time before opposition to their use 
on humans becomes increasingly ineffective, it being the case that: 'The faster 
knowledge strides ahead and the more sophisticated the technologies become, the 
more difficult it will be to set boundaries on what the biological sciences are 
capable of doing, but should not do. ' (CAP 2000 p. 29) 
But no matter how cogent or lucid the arguments that accuse the multinational 
biotechnology lobby of wielding sufficient financial, and thus political, power that 
nation states are incapable of doing anything but stifle potentially negative debate; 
or claims that Western European governments believe the regulation of such 
technology is anti laissez-faire, contrary to world trade and at odds with the future 
prosperity; or even that governments believe human biotechnology is a potential 
utopian solution to social issues, the use of which is too important, or possibly 
even too complicated, to be left to the inherently irrational and emotive public 
arena; each argument suffers from the same flaw: the fact that the issues and 
opinions they raise all seem equally pertinent to non-human biotechnology. That 
is, they fail to account for, not only the vociferous and open debate, in Western 
Europe (especially in the U& Germany and France), concerning genetically 
modified agriculture and non-human animals; but also the development and 
flourishing of a powerful anti-biotechnology lobby. In these instances there 
appears to be little evidence to suggest that public engagement hinged on the need 
for pre-emption, or that governments and political lobbyists had the power to 
stifle it with esoteric language and technical jargon. Indeed, these earlier debates 
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surely function to increase technical knowledge on the posthuman and thus 
enhance the possibility of participation in discussion. 
The An ti- Biotech n ology Movement 
In the early stages of the 1960's "Green Revolution7, the use of biotechnology 
was limited exclusively to plants, and was viewed by many in the First World as 
the next step in scientific progress rather than anything controversial or emotive. 
A-Vtsa a result any form of anti-biotechnology lobby was small, consisting 
predominately of environmentalists who worried about biodiversity, specifically 
the problems of containment, cross-pollination and resultant extinction of 
"naturar' plant species. They also worried about political hegemony; that First 
World countries were coercing the Third World to reduce its sustenance crop 
output in preference for growing of genetically engineered high-yield luxury crops 
t U. o be sold on the open market. This process necessitated a revolution in 
agricultural methods, for these plants tended to need mono-cropping and high 
intensity farming methods, such as the need for farm machinery and chemicals 
such as fertilisers and pesticides. 
Unfortunately this technological attempt to solve Third World poverty suffered 
from a number of pitfalls. Unlike the relatively new "Ice-Age" soils of the First 
World, mono-cropping caused massive soil erosion in the Third World. New 
high-yield crops were more likely to fail on marginal land than the indigenous 
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varieties, and when they did,, the failure tended to be far more comprehensive. 
When machinery broke there was little local knowledge, nor foreign support, to 
resolve problems. The partial substitution of sustenance farming for luxury 
farming resulted in the need to buy food, and thus fluctuations in market prices 
could result in the selling of luxury crops cheaply, and the buying of insufficient 
amounts of expensive food. However, on those occasions when money was made 
from luxury crops, it, all too often, coalesced with corruption, political instability, 
and First World greed, to contribute to a rapid influx of military equipment into an 
already volatile region. 
In this early period, and in contrast to the environmentalist's position on 
biotechnology, the mainstream "liberal-left" (those to the political left of centre, 
who tend to be ethical humanists, support liberal representative democracy, some 
degree of private property rights and free markets, social welfare, economic 
regulation, and some public ownership) had a tendency to be disinterested in the 
subject and without aRegiance either way. However this was soon to change as 
two events helped galvanise these seemingly incompatible groups. 
The first came about with the birth, most notably in the UK, of the modem animal 
rights/welfare movement; something widely believed to have been triggered by 
the publication of Peter Singer's book Animal Liberation. This emotive attack on 
vivisection helped to engage a significant number of people, who had up until 
then been indifferent, into thinking about and reacting against the political-right's 
policy of instrumentalisation. Whilst the initial response may have been limited to 
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the arena of animal welfare, having read Singer's book, many in the liberal-left 
were prompted to seek out Ruth Harrison's largely overlooked 1964 book entitled 
Animal Machines. This scathing attack on industrialised animal farming methods 
paralleled the environmentalist's technological cynicism and served as the 
missing link between the ideologies of animal welfare and environmentalism, 
The second event was the gradual enlargement of the biotechnological arena to 
include its use on non-human animals. Although not of immediate interest to the 
liberal-left - unlike that of the enviromnent-left who already had a well 
formulated stance on the use of biotechnology - it soon became clear that animal 
biotechnology was to focus on the further instrumentalisation of animals rather 
than their welfare or therapy. In response to this the animal welfare movement 
incorporated an anti-biotechnology stance as part of their core values, thus 
bringing their position even closer to that of the environmentalists. The knock-on 
effect of this "meeting of minds" was an exponential increase in the size of a 
united anti-biotechnology lobby, one that was against both agricultural and animal 
biotechnology. 
The resultant negativity against biotechnology surprised both Western European 
governments and the industry; for whilst they were somewhat prepared 
for a 
potential backlash against emergent animal biotechnology, they could not 
comprehend the shift against agricultural biotechnology, a subject that 
had not, 
until now, attracted much interest. 
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The mutual benefits resulting from a coalition between the liberal-left and the 
environmentalists went beyond a simple widening of their appeal to potential new 
members. While the smaller and more scholarly environmentalists gained from a 
massive injection of numbers and political power; the liberal-left, which was 
perceived as more reactionary and emotive, gained a certain level of intellectual 
credibility. 
However many have been worried about the compatibility of these two groups. In 
"Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair", Callicott argues that the animal 
liberation movement is paradoxically founded on humanitarianism; and that the 
position of the liberal-left (or the "ethical humanists") is simply to treat cert i 
animals, usually the sentient, as pseudo-humans: worthy of greater esteem 
Uý 
be, cause they are similar, in some arbitrary fashion, to what is still perceived as the 
ontologically superior human. In fact far from challenging anthropocentrism, 
Callicott believes, the fiberal-left's position is perpetuate its bias: 
'But the ethical humanists would be morally outraged if irrational and 
inarticulate infants, for example, were used in painful or lethal 
medical experiments, or if severely retarded people were hunted for 
pleasure. Thus, the double-dealing, the hypocrisy, of ethical 
humanism appears to be exposed. Ethical humanism, though claiming 
to discriminate between worthy and unworthy ethical patients on the 
baSis of objective criteria impartially applied, tums out after all, it 
seems, to be speciesism, a philosophically indefensible prejudice 
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(analogous to racial prejudice) against animals. ' (Callicott 1980 
pp-316-317) 
Callicott concludes that although there appears to be cohesion between 
environmentalism and the fiberal-left, there is greater standpoint compatibility 
between the liberal-left and the similarly anthropocentric political-right: 'moral 
humanism and humane moralism appear to have much more in common with one 
another than either have with enviromnental or land ethics. ' (1980 p. 327) Mark 
Sagoff re-enforces this conclusion, in his imaginatively entitled article "Animal 
Liberation and Enviromnental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce", by 
emphasising the incompatibility between the moralism of the liberal-left and the 
amoralism of enviromnentalism: 
'The principle of natural selection is not obviously a humanitarian 
principle; the predator-prey relationship does not depend on moral 
empathy. Nature ruthlessly limits animal populations by doing 
violence to virtually every individual before it reaches maturity; these 
conditions respect animal equality only in the darkest sense.... An 
ecological system has a beauty and an authenticity that demands 
respect - but plainly not on humanitarian grounds. ' (Sagoff 
1984 
pp. 299-300) 
Nevertheless, any uncertainties regarding the bond between the environmentalists 
and the liberal-left have yet to result in divorce. Indeed, the ever increasing 
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Pw "'litical power and success of this alliance meant that by the time the 
biotechnology industry had products approved to sell to First World consumers - 
the US Food and Drug Administration approved the first genetically engineered 
food to be sold in the United States on the 5t" November 1993, this being milk and 
meat from dairy cattle that had been injected with the genetically engineered 
synthetic growth hormone bovine somatotrophine (Gaard 1994 p. 202) - the 
European Union had already imposed a ten year moratorium on their use. The fact 
that an "unofficial" EU moratorium on agricultural biotechnology did not happen 
until 1998, illustrates how it was only when the larger and more influential liberal- 
left came onboard the anti-biotechnology lobby, that political change was 
affected. 
U^ 
flowever, if the Western European left has been so vociferous and politically 
successful at repudiating non-human biotechnology, why have they not simply 
'C% %r+ , tended this remit to include human biotechnology? Surely it would be 
incongruous for the political left to perceive the use of biotechnology on humans 
as less controversial and emotive than its use on animals or plants. 
One possible explanation for the apparent absence of such a lobby may be to 
argue it is simply too early in the posthuman debate for the formulation of a 
coherent and cohesive opposition group. Though this argument seems to be 
contradicted, firstly, by the "proactive" nature of the animal anti-biotechnology 
lobby, and seeondly, by the situation in the United States, where an anti- 
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Posthuman lobby, wielding both a large following and considerable political 
influence, has existed for a number of years. 
If this is so, then why is the predominately right-of-centre US leading the way 
with the creation of an anti-posthuman lobby, something that seems intuitively 
associated with the political left? Ironically, the answer appears to have more to 
do with the fact that while bioconservatism is loosely defined as including the 
left-leaning politics of the environment and animal welfare, the movement is 
overwhelmingly dominated by the religious-right. 
The US Posthuman Debate 
Whilst the US political right, as a whole, generally believes that nature should be 
conquered and dominated by man to serve his self-interest, this standpoint can be 
subdivided into two differing rationalisations. The religious-right grounds its 
Ik'. 
belief in the superiority of man on orthodox interpretations of religious scripture; 
whereas the libertarian-right, which also contains a large religious contingent, 
grounds its anthropocentrism on either humanism or a more progressive theism. 
The subject of biotechnology has, in the past, caused little conflict between these 
differing ideological groundings, with both the religious and the libertarian right 
agreeing that high-yield genetically modified crops and animals were patently 
advantageous to the well-being of man. However the recent development of 
posthuman technologies appears to be fracturing this accord, with the religious- 
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right reversing its stance on biotechnology when performed on the human. This 
change is the direct response to the religious-right's belief in the sanctity of man, 
and their conviction these new technologies threaten to corrupt God's principal 
earthly creation. 
The theists of the libertarian-right, on the other hand, tend to be "religious 
humanists", who are less literal with their interpretation of scripture; Hoertdoerfer 
distinguishes them from more orthodox believers: 
'We are homines religioses - creatures who must have meaning. For 
others that meaning is inherent in the cosmos, built into the structures 
of being by God. The human task is to discover it. For religious 
humanists, meaning is not so much discovered as created out of the 
raw stuff of our own experience the interplay of self with others, 
history and nature. To us divine revelation is but human knowledge 
projected on a cosmic screen; the will of God is the projection of 
human needs on a divine backdrop. ' (199 8 p. 10 1) 
For religious humanists, of both libertarian-right and liberal-left, man has a role 
and responsibility in decision making on Earth. That is, they believe it would be 
most incongruous for God to bestow man with free will, intelligence, and 
creativity, and then expect him to spurn these abilities to affect change. This 
standpoint results in the intuitive rejection of the "self-imposed" impotence of 
more orthodox theism; suggesting there has been confusion between: 
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'contentment with the unalterable, which is indeed a Christian virtue, 
and com lacency inface of the alterable, which can be a rejection of P 
one aspect of our human responsibility and dignity. There is no 
biblical warrant whatsoever for complacency in the face of alterable 
circumstances which are recognisably bad. ' (Mackay 1979 p. 58) 
Mackay continues by specifically associating this idea with the notion of human 
genetic engineering: 'There is no evidence that this is less true of the genetic 
balance of the human population than of other aspects of our daily activities. So 
far from its being arrogant for the Christian to want to eliminate genetic defects, 
then, it may in fact be a duty. ' (1979 p. 58) In doing so Mackay clearly implies 
that the evaluation of human biotechnology is, for the moderate Christian, neither 
a clear-cut issue, nor necessarily absolute either way. 
This said both the secular and the religious humanists of the US libertarian-right 
have an economic, political, and ideological grounding in the laissez-faire attitude 
of classic liberalism. A position that, Paul believes, is now being applied to 
reproductive technology and thus increasing the "prospect of a eugenics revival". 
'We have essentially retreated to a position associated with nineteenth-century 
liberalism: that there are two spheres of activity - one in which the individual 
possesses absolute liberty, the other in which society might legitimately interfere. ' 
(1992 p. 680) This is in essence the position of John Stuart Mill who believes there 
are two types of action, those with, and those without, social consequences: 
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'The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely 
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. ' 
(Mill 1859/1985 pp. 10- 11) 
Paul rejects Mill's dichotomy between social and individual responsibility, 
believing it to be too simplistic for libertarian style universal application: 'Few 
philosophers think this distinction workable; it is difficult to identify any activities 
devoid of social effects. ' (1992 p. 681) The worry here appears to be that 
libertarian ideology can result in the condoning, by omission, of socially 
detrimental activities based on the erroneous assumption they are socially neutral. 
That is, by advancing the maxim of personal autonomy, the libertarian 
accommodates and thus, it can be argued, tacitly endorses the activities of those 
whose actions do not impact on him. However, such anti-patemalism functions 
not only to absolve the agent from the social obligation of participating in debates 
that do not directly affect him, it also manifests itself as a form of social 
isolationism, actively encouraging the libertarian not to participating in such 
debates. As a result, the unaffected libertarian will tend to support, 
unquestioningly, the actions of others without the perceived need for initiation, 
stimulation, and participation in the very debate essential to establishing its wider 
effects. Furthermore, libertarians are often suspicious of government participation, 
intervention, and/or regulation of individual activities not perceived to impinge on 
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others. However these opinions leave the libertarian vulnerable to misdirection by 
lobbyists defending activities with social effects. By directing debate away from 
social issues and misrepresenting them as a duplicitous attack on personal liberty, 
the lobbyist can play on the libertarian's intransigence towards social 
mterventionism and hope to provoke his knee-jerk reaction to protect individual 
. 
V-- 
- ireedom at aH costs. 
Nevertheless posthuman advocate Hughes defends the popularity of classic 
liberalism, believing: 'In the Western democracies we have more or less accepted 
Mill's argument. ' (2005 p. 11) For Hughes, open-market libertarianism has rightly 
become the overriding principle used in evaluating activities that are limited to the 
individual's own body: 'There are few remaining laws against "victimless 
crimes", with the painful exception of the War on Drugs and criminalisation of 
sex work, and even there most democratic countries are liberalising their drug and 
sex work laws. ' (2005 p. 11) 
This principle - that a person, with sufficient financial assets, should 
be 
unimpeded in the development, procurement, and/or consumption of potentially 
dangerous procedures, and/or substances, so long as the individual's sovereignty 
is retained i. e., that such behaviour does not impact on, or is forced upon, those 
who do not wish it - has clearly contributed to the US becoming the world leader 
m what is an exceptionally lucrative private sector market for non-therapeutic 
medical techniques. Techniques that some perceive to be dubious in necessity and 
social utility, such as: beautification cosmetic surgery, performance-enhancing 
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drugs, gender reassignment, cryonic suspension, and in vitro fertilisation. On this 
latter point Fernindez-Armesto highlights how the First World has appropriated 
the right to have children, transforming it from a reffied defence against 
oppressive state laws, into a reified defence against "seeminglyll) oppressive 
animal physiology. A position that is predicated on the reinterpretation of 
infertility, from a condition endemic within all mammal groupings, into a form of 
social repressive: 
'Like immortality, infertility is one of the obsessions of our time 
Infertility is one of the many afflictions re-evaluated in societies 
becoming unused to frustration. It is a normal condition, which its 
victims have faced in the past but which now seem intolerable to 
sufferers. The right to have a family is obviously not meant to mean 
that everyone who wants children must have them: only that 
governments must not forbid them, as, in some countries, they have 
done by compulsory sterilisation programmes or legislation 
proscribing procreation. ' (2005 p. 157) 
While some in the libertarian-right argue that the pioneering of these types of 
procedures has social value, others consider them little more than the product of 
feckless consumerism. Nevertheless, this latter group will, and do, accommodate 
such behaviour by omission, and, if provoked, will even fight to protect the 
individual's right to spend "their" money on such procedures, even if they deem 
them whoUy unnecessary. 
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Thus the US appears to be the perfect envirom-nent for both the research and 
development of posthuman technologies, and the stimulation of a market for its 
products. Indeed, the infrastructure is already in place: the US being a wealthy 
nation, with a medical network that is proficient in redirecting expertise and 
resources away from the public sector; it has a proven market of moneyed 
consumers with a taste for self-"improvement", and a political ideology that limits 
interest or resistance from non-participant locals. 
This is of course the environment that pioneered a market for genetically 
engineered crops and animals. Indeed initially in the US there appeared to be very 
little resistance to non-human biotechnology until Western European started 
repudiating them. However, with the development of posthuman technologies, the 
US has its own avant-garde detractors. Analogously they are reactionaries, 
reacting against a technology that is already emergent; research has been done, 
investments made, returns calculated, and a market fashioned. 
The fracturing of the US political-right on the subject of the posthuman is causing 
such political turmoil, that a new and highly unlikely alliance has been formed, 
that between the powerful religious-right and the minuscule, and predominantly 
secular, environmentalists. 
If nothing more, the addition of the enviroDmentalists to the US anti-posthuman 
canopy represents, at least, an element of continuity between it and the Westem 
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European anti-biotechnology lobby. This said, it should be noted that these 
envirormnentalists appear to be far less vociferous in their rejection of posthuman 
technologies than they are towards the rejection of non-human biotechnology. 
However this probably has more to do with their general misanthropy and 
ambivalence towards the prospect of man turning his technological hubris on 
himself 
Interestingly the religious-right/envirorunentalist marriage of convenience appears 
to miffor the pragmatism of their opponents. The libertarian-right's support for the 
posthuman - or probably more appropriately, their lack of repulsion at it - has 
made them the target of an all-encompassing posthuman lobby that appears to 
promote openly conflicting interests. It is pro-disability, but aims to eradicate the 
disabled. It encourages individualism, but endorses eugenic homogeneity. It 
supports redistribution of potential, but counteracts this with an open-market. It is 
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against legal coercion, but 
does little to restrict social coercion. It is for the 
individual, but also for the social conscience. It purports to be libertarian, but also 
liberal. It is secular, but welcomes the religious. It is nearly everything to 
everyone, or is at least attempting to be. Indeed whilst claiming to be overtly 
libertarian, Bostrom appears to push some overtly social liberal buttons, when he 
declares that the posthuman lobby: 'advocates the well-being of all sentience, 
whether in artificial intellects, human and non-human animals (including 
extraterrestrial species, if there are any). Racism, sexism, speciesism, belligerent 
nationalism and religious intolerance are unacceptable. ' (2005 p. 12) 
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While it appears abundantly clear that capturing the affluent US consumer is a 
prime motivator behind much of the more outlandish research into the posthuman, 
such as life extension and brain expansion, this is not to imply that such research 
is limited to the United States. Indeed many countries, including parts of Europe, 
are attempting to tap into this lucrative, and potentially global, market. In addition 
the initial, and more mundane, techniques with posthuman potential, such as stem- 
cell research, gene-therapy, embryonic manipulation, and human augmentation, 
are being developed worldwide, as the products and by-products of normal 
progressive medical research. Interesting many of these new procedures have been 
approved and utilised in Western Europe ahead of the United States. 
Western European Posthuman Apathy? 
The general public's awareness and apparent acceptance, in Western Europe, of 
the initial stages of human biotechnology can be seen as counterintuitive, 
especially in light of their attitude towards non-human biotechnology. An obvious 
fffst step in attempting to explain why the US posthuman debate is not being 
mirrored across the Atlantic is to highlight Europe's long standing tradition of 
secularism. Clearly the lack of a powerful religious orthodoxy, reacting with 
moral abhorrence at the defilement of the human, has stripped the posthuman 
narrative of its emotive resonance. However it can be argued that Western 
Europe's tradition of leaning to the political left-of-centre (its social liberalism, 
the collaboration of state and individual, and the primacy of the social conscience) 
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coalesces to provoke greater social participation and a more proactive and 
animated populous. Western Europe is far from reliant on religion to motivate it 
into action on social issues. 
A more cogent argument for posthuman quietism may have something to do with 
an inverse relationship with perceived risk. Issues of personal safety have played 
an important role in the anti-biotechnology narrative, reflecting the growing 
assumption that post-industrial societies9 especially those in Western Europe, are 
awash with scientific and technological cynicism: 
'Science now finds itself in a new and troubled situation. The 
traditional optimistic picture is problematic and compromised at every 
turn. The scientific system now faces a crisis of confidence, of 
legitimacy and ultimately of power. We can usefully distinguish two 
sorts of science. The "mainstream7 is reductionism in style and 
increasingly linked to industry. By contrast, the "post-normal" 
approach embodies the precautionary principle. It depends on public 
debate and involves an essential role for the "extended peer 
community". ' (Ravetz 2004 p. 347) 
Founded on the inherent faflibility of man, the anti-biotechnology debate focused 
its techno-cymcism on three issues. The first is that of human ingenuity and its 
track-record of advertently, and inadvertently, developing and using, sometimes 
frivolously, hazardous technologies that compromise human wellbeing. The 
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second is the fundament difficulty of accepting that safety issues have been 
effectively addressed, despite numerous assurances, when the biotechnology 
industry is perceived as placing economic self-interest as its overriding principle. 
The third is the accusation that First World legislators are, at best, increasingly 
impotent with regard the regulation of economically powerful multinational 
industries, or at worst, simply corrupt, self-serving, and morally bankrupt: 
'there is a weH-established pattern of suppression and distortion of 
scientific findings by high-ranking Bush administration political 
appointees across numerous federal agencies... a wide-ranging effort 
to manipulate the government's scientific advisory system to prevent 
the appearance of advice that might run counter to the 
administration" s political agenda. ' (Union of Concerned Scientists 
2004 p. 1) 
This said a major issue with animal and agricultural biotechnology is the 
allegation that it is being forced upon the consumer without their consent. Gaard 
describes how, after opinion polls in the US suggested consumers where less 
likely to buy, admittedly cheaper, dairy products associated with utilising growth 
hormones; the biotechnology industry refused to label their products as 
distinguishable from those that did not. Indeed, not satisfied with this: 
'Monsanto has filed a lawsuit against two dairy cooperatives which 
label their products rBGH-free, claiming that this declaration is unfair 
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slander against the company. It maintains that because laboratory tests 
cannot teR the difference between milk that is produced using rBGH 
and milk that is not, labelling does not tell consumers anything 
significant. ' (1994 p-203) 
11- 
However if Posthuman technologies are not perceived as being forced upon the 
consumer, but simply a matter of personal choice and without penalty if 
unwanted, then the associated risks may be viewed with greater stoicism. This of 
course assumes that the perception of risk is not whoRy based on the specific 
details of the product, process, or activity per se, but is also a function of the 
individual's perceived ability to control and choose their level of participation: 
'There is a prima facie plausibility in assuming that individuals make 
a strong distinction between risks that they undertake knowingly and 
risks that are imposed on them. In other words, they are philosophical 
about damage they incur through their own fault or through choice of 
dangerous sports, drinks, foods.... What makes them understandably 
angry is damage that they feel they should have been warned against, 
that they might have avoided had they known, damage caused by 
other people, particularly people profiting from their innocence. ' 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983 pp. 16-17) 
if this is the case, that assessments of risk are sociaUy constructed with subjective 
values playing a major role; then the perception that posthuman technologies may 
31 
be the panacea for disability, underclass status, and social exclusion, might lead 
potential consumers to become anything but prudent with their assessment of its 
risks. As Fleising lucidly argues: 'A parent with a haemophiliac child will likely 
structure her/his beliefs about genetic engineering differently from others. ' (1999 
P. 91) 
Nevertheless even if there is an attenuated perception of risk associated with the 
consumption of posthuman technologies, there is still the expected condemnation 
from non-consumers; that is unless would-be parents, as the most likely 
consumers of early stage "therapeutic" procedures, are somehow immune from 
social scorn. However parents may in fact be somewhat immune from such 
censure. Certainly there appears some truth in the claim that the parenting 
narrative is sufficiently insular to be off-limits to those who have chosen to 
remain childless, and many non-parents dare not make denigrating comments 
regarding parenting decisions lest they are vilified for incongruous self- 
righteousness. In addition, non-consumers who are already parents will tend not to 
denigrate potential consumers as they are already intimately aware of the social 
coercion surrounding parenting. That is, First World parents are not only expected 
to desire nothing but the best for their child, it is demanded of them; and this is 
clearly what society deems best for the child, with individual parents having little 
say on the matter. Indeed, whilst would-be parents have, in the past, usually 
managed to sidestep the blame for congenital illness and transmitting hereditary 
disabilities, it is becoming increasingly evident this is no longer true. Progressive 
medical research apparently increases parental accountability. Pregnant women 
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are increasingly viewed with derision if they dare to smoke, consume alcohol, eat 
raw seafood and unpasteurised cheese, and fail to take the recommended 
supplement of folic acid. Interestingly, there appears to be little tolerance for a 
libertarian lifestyle when pregnant, even in the United States. However this 
escalating accountability is gradually surpassing simple lifestyle choices and is 
encroaching on areas including hereditary illnesses. Now parental genetics is 
playing an increasing role in determining the "fitness" of would-be parents. Both 
the medical profession and the society at large, are finding it increasingly difficult 
to accommodate the idea that parents might not want to utilise the latest medical 
treatment to help ensure the wellbeing of their progeny. Indeed attempting to have 
a child, without such technology, when there is a high risk of debilitati 
disability transmission, is increasingly viewed as reckless and selfish. 
These discussions are, however, on the periphery of the real issue at hand, i. e., 
why certain elements of the liberal-left vociferously reject the application of 
species-altering technology to animals but not to humans. As already mentioned, 
the current Western European anti-biotechnology debate is divided predominantly 
down traditional political ideologies, with the right generally advocating its use, 
and the left tending to reject it. This said the political left's overwheLming 
repudiation of non-human biotechnology appears to be the result of a marriage 
between two distinctive ideological standpoints. On one side there are the 
environmentalists whose priorities centre on the respect,, protection and 
stewardship of nature; something they generally believe can only be achieved 
by 
rejecting anthropocentrism and re-establishing a more ecological equilibrium 
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between man and the environment. On the other side is the much larger and more 
powerful liberal-left, who find abhorrent the instrumentalisation of nature, 
predominately in relation to the sentient animal, and the industrialised methods 
being applied to it. They believe this perceived injustice can be resolved by 
placing a less speciesist interpretation of the categorical imperative at the centre of 
utilitarian ethics and natural rights. The result of such differing core values has 
been that while the environmentalists have strived toward the rejection of 
anthropocentric technoscience as unecological, the liberal-left has increased their 
humanist perspectives to include the protection of pseudo-humans. 
The success of this coalition has rested on the illusion that they share the same 
goal; but in reality while the environmentalists want to protect nature from 
anthropocentrism, the liberal-left simply want to continue their tradition of saving 
humans from oppression. The fact that many in the liberal-left have started to 
assert that certain animals are sufficiently human in nature to deserve 
emancipation from commodification, instrumentalisation and oppression in an 
analogous fashion to humans; or that Third World humans, the First World 
socially underprivileged, and even the wider First World decadency, need 
protecting against forced consumption (via government hegemony, social 
coercion, and economic pandering) of species-altered foodstuffs that may have 
safety issues; should not be mistaken for a desire to protect the environment from 
main, Indeed it seems difficult to imagine the fiberal-left continuing its support for 
the anti-biotechnology lobby, if it became apparent that species alteration served 
the social good. 
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To this end, the biotechnology industry has repeatedly attempted to utilise the 
rhetoric of feeding the world's starving to promote their products. Their lack of 
success, in convincing Western Europeans at least, is the result of a world-weary 
incredulity towards philanthropy, which still retains the historical legacy of those 
attempting to buy their way into heaven. As Moe succinctly argues: 
ir)- 
Religion is the mother of philanthropy.... In short, gifts to charity 
were given as the price of salvation, to make peace with heaven. And, 
let there be no doubt about it, salvation at a price is the theme of 
practically all medieval wills and conveyances to what were then 
called pious uses and later came to be charity in a more modern 
sense. ' (1961 p. 141) 
This cynicism, verging on misanthropy, towards Professed benevolence manifests 
itself as a search to uncover self-severing hidden agendas. In a scathing attack on 
First World exploitation, Gaard accuses the biotechnology industry of 
disingenuously claiming their Products, such as Bovine Somatotropin, the growth 
hormone injected into dairy cows to make them hyperlactate, could help feed the 
world's poor: 
'Many people worldwide cannot, in fact, digest cows' milk because of 
lactose intolerance. Moreover, the steady aggregate surplus of milk 
and butter for the past decade has not increased its availability to the 
35 
poor. Such facts indicate that physical scarcity of milk is not a factor 
in world hunger. The use of rBGH may even increase such hunger and 
the structures supporting it. Excessive animal consumption, as is 
predominant in many Western diets, is already a "protein factory in 
reverse9l). A single acre can feed 20 times as many people on a 
vegetarian diet than it can feed people eating an animal-based diet. In 
the US, animals are fed over 80 per cent of the com grown in the 
country, and over 95 per cent of the oats. This practice of feeding 
livestock rather than people means that less food is available for 
people. Already many developing countries are growing cash crops, 
rather than subsistence crops, leading to shortages of domestic food. ' 
(1994 p. 203) 
Nevertheless, it would appear that if there were a credible intention to utilise 
modified crops and farm animals, in a non-profit/non-hegemonic approach to help 
alleviate Third World starvation, then the liberal-left, as humanists, would not 
object. This is of course in marked contrast to environmentalists who tend to be 
more ecological/Malthusian on the subject, believing that the wholesale feeding of 
the world's starving is an example of knee-jerk humanitarian short-termism. For it 
serves more than simply to decrease mortality, it also serves to increase birth rates. 
This amplifies mass starvation potential, which in turn can only be averted by even 
more aid relief, a circular process that will paradoxically drive, rather than halt, 
global starvation: 
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'The power of population is so superior to the power in the earth to 
produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape 
or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and 
able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great 
army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. 
But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, 
epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep 
off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still 
incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with 
mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the world. ' 
(Malthus 1798/1999 p. 61) 
A more fatuous example of the wafer-thin association between the liberal-left and 
the anti-biotechnology movement would be the liberal-left's rush to embrace 
biotechnology if it increased animal welfare in a non-instrumental sense. Clearly 
the liberal-left despise the idea of using biotechnology to produce featherless 
poultry, even if it can be argued that when 'held in hot climate zones, they suffer 
less from heat stress, show lower mortality rates and a better health status'. (Sluis 
2007) Such welfare rhetoric will again be attacked as disingenuous, citing 
economics as the prime motivating force: 'No feathers, no waste, less processing 
costs and less water use during processing. Even more interesting is that these 
birds do not waste costly nutrients for developing useless feathers. In addition 
these birds show a higher meat yield and better meat quality (higher water holding 
capacity and colour). ' (Sluis 2007) This said, what is despised here 
is the 
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instrumentalism, not the biotechnology. The animal welfare lobby repudiates, with 
identical vigour, the fact that featherless poultry can be produced via selective 
breeding rather than genetic manipulation. Indeed if biotechnology were used, say 
on domesticated pets, to halt, for example, the increasing proliferation of 
hereditary diseases such as hip dysplasia and progressive retinal atrophy, then this 
would side-step the issue of instrumentalism sufficiently to be, ironically, 
embraced by the liberal-left. 
Realpolitik: Unlikely Bedfellows 
Ultimately, and somewhat paradoxically, the liberal-left's distain for non-human 
biotechnology appears to be contingent not on the technology itself, but rather how 
it is utilised. That is, they perceive its use as either an unethical instrumentalisation 
of nature, or a form of state sponsored commercial tyranny i. e., forcing goods of 
questionable value and safety on unwilling citizens. Whilst the former violates the 
liberal-left's more inclusive categorical imperative, the latter contravenes their 
sensibilities on power relationships. However if this mindset is "consistently" 
applied to human biotechnology, then it may undermine the liberal-left's current 
anti-biotechnology standpoint. For while it appears obvious, when a "dairy cow" 
(which by the very nature of its nomenclature demonstrates its instrumentalisation. ) 
is injected with growth hormones to make it hyperlactate, it is being used as 
merely a means to an end; when biotechnology is applied, at the behest of the 
prospective parents, in an attempt to eradicate a potentially debilitating 
hereditary 
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disease, the calculation of whether this is an example of instrumentalisation 
appears less obvious. The counterintuitive upshot of this is that when 
biotechnology is applied to the human, the liberal-left might not only fail to 
bestow the human with additional protection, beyond that deemed necessary for 
crops and animals, they may paradoxically advocate less restriction. 
This said the liberal-left's current passivity towards human biotechnology and the 
posthuman should not be seen as their last word on the subject. For the liberal- 
left's ethical calculations tend to be utilitarian in nature; that is, they focus not on 
acts themselves, which are deemed neither necessarily acceptable nor unacceptable 
per se, but rather on the motivating utility behind such acts. 
At present, the "therapeutic" nature of early posthuman technology lends itself to 
support from the liberal-left who are, in most part, social humanists i. e., have an 
overriding desire to alleviate human suffering and increase human happiness. This 
is again in stark contrast to the opinions of many environmentalists, who argue: 
'Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and 
evil if our appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological 
biology. Pain in particular is primarily information. In animals, it 
informs the central nervous system of stress, irritation, or trauma in 
outlying regions of the organism. ' (Callicott 1980 p-332) 
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However as human biotechnology becomes more available and treatments are 
perceived less as cases of emergency or critical care, then the subject might 
become less prosaic. Indeed, the capricious sensibilities of the liberal-left make 
soliciting approval a difficult and dangerous task, equally likely to undermine 
rather than advance the cause. 
The liberal-left is primarily hypersensitive to issues regarding power relations and 
oppression, and advocates equality and social inclusion. Unlike the US libertarian, 
the Western European liberal is moralistically paternal and does not hold the 
-V-- - Ireedom of the individual as sacred. If human biotechnology is left to the free- 
market, it may be viewed, by the liberal-left, as economic oppression, increasing 
inequality by allowing those with least need, to gain an unfair advantage over 
those with most need. At this point the liberal-left will have little compunction in 
demanding regulation to curtail the moneyed's ability to buy, what may be seen as, 
preferential treatment. 
This said, if human biotechnology is regulated on an equal access basis, the 
liberal-left may see this as leading to social oppression; a slippery-slope inevitably 
resulting in socially coercive "liberal"' eugenics (or "libertarian7' eugenics from a 
contemporary Western European perceptive). The resultant homogenisation of the 
human may repulse the sentiments of the liberal-left - who tend to be passionate 
defenders of racial, social and cultural diversity - motivating them to ban access to 
technologies that undermine social heterogeneity. 
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Then again if human biotechnology was universally withheld, then the liberal-left 
might perceive this as hereditary oppression, especially if the nature/nurture 
argument were to swing substantially in the favour of nature. Indeed if it were 
concluded that social exclusion had a biological element that the social welfare 
system could not reverse, the liberal-left might demand such technologies be made 
available to those who "need" assistance. 
However if human biotechnology was administered "voluntarily"' to those believed 
of greatest need, then the liberal-left might view this as state oppression, 
authoritarian eugenics via medical hegemony. Worried about the potential for 
corruption, i. e., trom. the ideal of "helping the needy", to the maxim of eradicating 
the "unwanted" - the liberal-left might repudiate all state intervention, resulting in 
a defacto free market. 
Of course these do not exhaust the multitude of possible and seemingly 
contradictory scenarios the liberal-left may take on therapeutic human 
biotechnology, the initial step towards the posthuman. 
The US Debate: Why Now? 
while it appears that the public, in Western European, has neither a definitive 
position on the posthuman, nor a particular passion for vociferously debating the 
ramifications of posthuman technologies, it would be disingenuous to suggest 
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they are not engaged or aware of the developing technoscience. Indeed the 
quietism surrounding Western European human biotechnology may be somewhat 
illusory. Not an illusion to the extent that human biotechnology is perceived as 
important as the non-huma-n variety, but rather that the Western European 
engagement is dwarfed, and thus hidden, by the US reaction. If this were so, then 
it would appear rather ironic. For Western Europe's reaction, in the early 1990's, 
to non-human biotechnology was so animated, mi comparison to the US response, 
that it was easy to assume there was simply no US response. 
This said it should be remembered that the initial response to biotechnology, in 
Western European, was with regard its application, rather than its development. 
Indeed if animal biotechnology had been used primarily to increase animal 
welfare, rather than facilitate instrumentalisation, there may have been a very 
different response to it. 
Conversely, sections of the US public appear to have become immersed in a 
debate where their opinions are not contingent on the application of the 
technology. Unlike the anti-biotechnology movement, both sides of the US 
posthuman debate appear to hold absolutist standpoints based on projected 
outcomes rather than present actualities. 
However, hard-line decision making based on distant future predictions runs 
counter to both the realities of human life and the creation of social policy. 
As 
Bostrom and Ord argue: 
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(radical uncertainty about prediction and evaluation... is part and 
parcel of the human condition. It arises in practically every important 
deliberation, in individual decision making as well as social policy. 
When we decide to marry or to back some major social reform, we are 
not - or at least we shouldn't be - under any illusion that there exists 
some scientificafly rigorous method of determining the odds that the 
long-term consequences of our decision will be a net good. ' (2006 
p. 657) 
In addition, the arguments made by both parties, in the US debate, appear to show 
little new insight by projecting into the distant future. If anything the debate is 
hankered and mundane, an elaborate regurgitation and reapplication of what it is 
to be human, and what is considered the good life. Indeed, the debate appears 
sufficiently outmoded to question why such social engagement and vociferous 
debate has recently surfaced. 
A possible explanation may be found in the opening paragraph of the executive 
summary of the President's Council on Bioethics inquiry on human cloning: 
'For the past five years, the prospect of human cloning has been the 
subject of considerable public attention and sharp moral debate, both 
in the United States and around the world. Since the announcement in 
February 1997 of the first successful cloning of a mammal (Dolly the 
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sheep), several other species of mammals have been clones. Although 
a cloned human child has yet to be born, and although the animal 
experiments have had low rates of success, the production of 
Rinctioning mammalian cloned offspring suggests that the eventual 
cloning of humans must be considered a serious possibility. ' (Kass 
2002 p. xxxix) 
On first reading this appears to be an acceptable statement: there was a high level 
of worldwide media coverage surrounding Dolly's arrival, and drawing attention 
to the technology surrounding her conception naturally sparked public interest. 
However, having paused for thought, it appears possible that Dolly, the potentially 
apocalyptic event, was little more than misdirection and media hyperbole. 
Certainly there appears to be much confusion surrounding the date of the first 
successful cloning of a mammal, something that is reflected in the loose language 
used by Kass. Dolly was not "the first successful cloning of a manimal"'; she was 
rather the first mammal to have been successfully 'cloned from adult cells'. 
(Campbell 2004 p. 4) indeed scientists have been cloning animals, including 
mammals, from embryonic cells for many decades. Briggs and King (1952) were 
the first to clone an animal successfully, this being a tadpole, more than half a 
century ago. 
in addition there has been a protracted, and open, procession, over the last fifty 
years, of biotechnology's continuing achievements. Admittedly the 
initial focus 
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was on the genetic manipulation of plants and then its progression into the arena 
of non-human animals; but it was evident that these were mere stopgaps on the 
way towards human biotechnology. Humans may be on the cusp of successful, 
and wide-ranging, biotechnological self-manipulation, but surely this eventuality 
is neither a surprise, nor something that has been in any substantive doubt since 
Hans Spemann's first successful nuclear transfer experiment (on a two-celled 
salairnander embryo) in 1924. (Tagarelli et al. p. 30) If anything, humans have 
probably had extra time to come to terms with the idea of posthuman 
technologies, as their development was impeded substantially by revelations 
relating to the Nazi eugenic abuses of the Second World War. 
The Posthuman as Millennial Endism 
'As history has demonstrated... no end-of-the-century fails to assert 
itself as a time of crisis, as a moment of passage.... This fast- 
approaching end-of-the-century of ours is obviously no different. 
Already it is permeated with apocalyptic and eschatological 
sentiments, and these oblige scholars of utopia... to investigate the 
inextricable link between utopia and millenariamism; that is, the link 
between what emerges as a rational and secular type of future 
planning, and what is a purely religious belief in the supreme instant 
of mankind's redemption and rebirth. ' (Fortunati 1993 p. 8 1) 
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In his examination of the transformation of the Apocalypse myth, Fortunati argues 
its ending can take on various nuances, specifically: the end-of-the-world 
apocalyptic event, the liberating end that renews, or the end that curves back on 
itself. (1993 p. 83) Interestingly this structure appears to mirror that of the 
posthuman debate where: those who repudiate the posthuman believe it will be the 
death of the human; those who advocate it believe it is freedom from the human; 
and many who reject both standpoints believe, in becoming posthuman, man will 
finally realise that he has always been posthuman. 
For Kumar: "'Endism7' is rampant, and likely to become even more so as we get 
closer to the end of the second millennium. ' (2003 p. 63) But unlike the promises 
of centuries gone by: 'For our thinkers... the "end of history" brings nothing 
new.... What was thought to be new has failed. It was, in any case, a bundle of 
delusions, unnecessary and destructive deviations. There is no need to imagine 
anything new. ' (Kumar 2003 p. 63) 
Kumar's position highlights an obvious contradiction within the US posthuman 
debate i. e., that the majority of those who advocate the posthuman are not 
utopianist aspiring towards idealistic visions of the future, but are rather 
pragmatists. There are a handful of eccentric utopianists (Kurzweil, Moravec, 
More etc. ), sufficient to create the illusion that the science fiction visions they 
allude to are not merely illustrative. However probe deeper into the collective 
philosophy and there is very little substance, certainly no significant ideology. 
Their lobby group is open-house to anyone advocating the posthuman even if they 
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have openly conflicting interests. There is no grand vision of the future, no 
specific goal. Their only gravitating influence appears to be the general 
assumption that posthuman technologies will, most likely, enhance the human 
condition. However even this principle is shielded in pragmatism, what is good for 
the human is that which is self-evidently good for the human, to be measured 'by 
any reasonable criteria'. (Bostrom 2007 p. 5) 
This said, it must be remembered that the predominately Christian opponents of 
posthuman technologies are not utopianists either. While The New Testament may 
allude to at least four utopias: heaven, the garden of Eden (Genesis 1: 1 KJV 
1611/1997 OT p. 1), the new heaven, and the new earth (Revelation 2 1: 1 KJV 
1611/1997 NT p. 317), these are the creation of God, not of man. It is generaRy 
held that man does not strive towards creating a utopia on Earth, but rather 
acceptance into God's utopia. The implication appears to be that no matter who 
someone is, when, or where they were born, salvation is always an option. Indeed, 
unless an ancestor's actions can preclude future generations from access into 
God's heaven, salvation is open even to posthumans. This said, it might be argued 
that those bom human, who then chose to become posthuman, may, by virtue of 
this action, render themselves unworthy of redemption. 
interesting, while the advocates and opponents of posthuman technologies 
frequently imply that the science fictions visions they allude to are an intrinsic part 
of the emergent posthuman debate, the fact is the genre predates the current 
debate 
by many years. Not simply as a symbolic abstract, or exaggerated science fiction 
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techno-fantasy, but as hardnosed, accurate and mainstrearn HoUywood films. An 
example of this is the 1978 film The Boys ftom Brazil, staring such luminaries as 
%jVU_gory Peck, Sir Laurence Olivier and James Mason. Here the possibility of 
human cloning is not represented as futuristic fantasy, but as a simple matter of 
honing current cloning techniques and the desire to do so. Thus the film reflects 
the reality of routine, late twentieth century, mammalian cloning. In a section of 
the filn-4 conspicuously lacking in contemporary technobabble, "Professor 
Bruckner" narrates over a projection film depicting the process of cloning a rabbit: 
Professor Bruckner: 
'Here we are removing the eggs of a white 
rabbit f rom the f allopian tubes, now you see 
the egg under a microscope... the next step is 
to destroy the egg nucleolus with ultraviolet 
light so none of its genetic makeup remains. 
Now you see an egg from a white rabbit ready to 
be injected with the blood cell from a black 
rabbit donor. With the injection pipette one of 
the blood cells is sucked up and then injected 
into the egg. After a few hours the eggs in 
culture divide and are ready to be put back 
into the female. There they grow into embrYosr 
which in a monthf s time.. the normal gestation 
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period, they will become baby rabbits. In this 
ins ance a black litter f rom a white mother, 
and their black collar, proves that they have 
been cloned from the blood cell of a black 
rabbit.... ' 
Ezra Lieberman 
**And this can be done with humans? ' 
Professor Bruckner: 
"if the surgical technique were precise 
enough. f [84: 061 
The fact that The Boysftom Brazil is now thirty years old, and about to be remade, 
surely adds weight to the argument that, if the First World is truly worried about 
the possible future effects of Procedures such as human cloning, it appears more 
than a little late to only recently start debating the subject. 
indeed if mainstream fin-de-millennium science fiction were reacting to any social 
zeitgeist, it is more likely to be the endism Boyer (1992) believes to be rampant in 
the US. Boyer, writing in the early 1990's describes how in the US, the "firsf' 
War prompted a frenzy of Biblical end-of-days, predictions: 
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'With Iraqs defeat in the Gulf War this wave of prophecy interest 
has abated, and end-time belief has receded to its more accustomed 
position on the fringes of cultural awareness. But the episode 
demonstrates the latent power of this belief system, and how readily, 
in moments of crisis, it could move from the periphery to the centre 
of American consciousness. ' (1992 p. 33 1) 
Admittedly the posthuman had an important, but non-essential, role to play in fin- 
de-millennium science fiction's reaction to this endism. However, so did a whole 
gamut of analogously apocalyptic scenarios, including: alien invasion, global 
pestilence, asteroid impact, and, quite tellingly, the Rapture itself. 
Indeed an end-of-days social frenzy may be the explanation behind the sudden 
appearance, in the US, of a pre-millennial posthuman debate. A debate that was 
then perpetuated by the scientific and religious communities who, utilising the 
worldwide interest in the inaccurately described appearance of Dolly, helped 
embellish a stale subject few appear to care about, and transform it into an 
apocalyptic end-of-man posthuman debate. Thus serving to generate interest in the 
speculative human biotechnology market and entice new faith members to join the 
race to protect humanity from the posthuman. 
Possibly the most telling evidence behind this hypothesis is the recycled nature of 
the posthuman debate; it is providence versus progress, pre-modernity versus 
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modernity. With the exception of the technoscience referenced, the popular debate 
is wholly devoid of a contemporary tirneframe. Certainly it appears as if the 
metanarrative scepticism of the past fifty years has not happened. Indeed, outsiders 
may argue that the "human7, as conceived by both sides of the debate, no longer 
exists; and in a "Copernican revolution7 sense, never existed. Why those 
advocating the posthuman have conceded to such an anachronistic notion of the 
human seems counterintuitive, as it helps cements their opponent's claim that 
posthuman technology has ontological potential. However this decision may have 
been a matter of pragmatism, necessary to engage with an enemy that was first to 
the battlefield, one that had gained the tactical advantage of choosing the ground to 
fight on. 
In The Power o Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear, Irving Kristol, the ?f 
founder of the neoconservative movement argues: 
'The notion that a purely secular society can cope with all of the 
terrible pathologies that now affect our society, I think has turned out 
to be false. And that has made me culturally conservative. I mean, I 
really think religion has a role now to play in redeeming the country. 
And liberalism is not prepared to give religion a role. Conservatism is, 
but it doesn't know how to do it. ' [47: 55] 
If there were an ant role for the US religious-right to play in the late 1990's, an X_ - 
existential raison d"8tra, it was the saving of man from human biotechnology. 
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However their historical support for non-human biotechnology, meant the 
religious-right was unable to exploit either issues of safety, or the "inherently 
against scripture" argument. The solution was to feed off the end-is-nigh cultural 
zeitgeist and to exaggerate the dystopian nightmares of posthuman success. The 
obvious response to this hyperbole, by those advocating human biotechnology, 
was either to reinterpret these dystopian nightmares as utopian paradises; or to 
argue - in the spirit of Maslow's aphorism: "it is tempting, if the only toot you 
have is a hammer., to treat everything as if it were a nail" (1966 p. 15) - that these 
potential problems are exciting opportunities for technoscience to solve. 
Yff - Flowever the resultant "Phantonf' debate, based on fanciful projections of the 
posthuman future, was contingent on the non-appearance of a more pressing social 
role for the religious-right. Unfortunately the events of I Ith September 2001 
changed this equation. Having re-branded international terrorism, from Cold War 
communist conspiracy, to post-millennial Islamic fundamentalist conspiracy, the 
religious-right was given a more important and "holy" war to fight. 
The religious-right having retreated from the posthuman battlefield, their 
opponents continued to generate exaggerated tecbnoscience propaganda for 
consumption by a public no longer interested. This apathy has resulted in the 
demise, in 2006, of the Extropy Institute,, their President stating: 'In respect for the 
philosophy of Extropy and the Principles of Extropy, the Board of Extropy 
Institute believes that Extropy Institute has served its mission and achieved its 
goals'. (Vita-More 2006) Indeed this statement is clearly correct; the Extropy 
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has achieved its only meaningful goal i. e., seeing off the demagogic visions of the 
religious-right. However having done so, its role disappeared, and so did the wider 
posthuman debate, which appears to have quickly receding back to fringe 
questions regarding the actualities of human biotechnological research. 
Rhetodcal Uticism 
The juxtaposition of the Western European anti-biotechnology movement and US 
posthuman debate has served to highlight the extent to which these positions 
appear too inscribed by interests and political context to be soluble on their own 
terms. Furthermore this contamination also appears to undermine the debate's 
purported value in helping assess and direct future technoscience policy. 
Nevertheless there are many social strategies that would enable the discourse 
surrounding the posthuman to be probed finther, hopeffilly enabling 
transcendence beyond its current Uunited position. 
One possible method of rhetorical criticism would be to focus on a traditional 
neo-Aristotelian criticism of the dialogue surrounding the posthuman. This 
approach 'assumes that rhetoric functions as a means for discovering rational, 
truthful appeals to the audience' (German 1985 p. 91), and focuses on critiquing 
logos, ethos and pathos, such as: inconsistencies and contradictions in argument, 
false logic and subjective bias; moral implications, assumptions and their 
application; and motivational issues such as vested interest and hidden agendas. 
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Another would be to centre on the temporal and spatial elements of posthuman 
discourse, via utilising a situational criticism. This would focus on the 'interaction 
of audience, exigencies, and contingencies in creating the opportunity for a 
rhetorical response which is appropriate to the situation. ' (German 1985 p. 92) By 
offering up the posthuman debate to, for example, Boyer's (1992) work on post 
World War Two US apocalypse rhetorics, it could be analysed for structural and 
contextual similarities that may reveal it as a similarly ephemeral and an 
inherently US phenomena. 
The posthuman debate could also be viewed as analogous to an emergent social 
movement,, or at least the attempt to incite a movement or social engagement. 
From this perspective, analysis strategies designed to reveal the language of 
agitation could be utilised to examine the extent to which the posthuman discourse 
contains inflammatory rhetorical techniques. An example of such a strategy would 
be the IPA's (1937) seven-device propaganda framework - name calling, 
glittering generalities,, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, and band 
wagon. This offers a format facilitating the scrutiny of public discourse for bias, 
specifically expressions deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of 
others with reference to a predetermined end, rather than the impartial 
dissemination and explanation of information enabling informed decision making. 
VA, jilst Sproule acknowledges that the devices fell out of favour 'during the 
decades when formal logic held in the pedagogy of critical thinking and social 
science' they 'now resonate in popular works... because the devices remain 
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fundamental for those who would pursue theory or practice in the field of 
communication'. (2001 p. 141) Sinnilarly a strategy examiuing demagoguery, for 
example Gustaiianis' (1990 pp. 158-160) list of seven techniques "habitually used 
by demagogues"' - personalised appeal, oversimplification, appeals to emotion to 
ý1- - the exclusion of rational thought, specious or deliberately distorted argumentation, 
ad hominem attacks, anti-intellectualism, and political pageantry - could be 
utilised. Demagoguery, it may be argued, differs somewhat from propaganda in its 
systematic attempt to provoking emotional responses, usually via impassioned 
rhetoric designed to inflame by appealing to popular prejudices, fears and 
expectations. 
The posthuman as an emergent social group could also be offered up to fantasy 
theme analysis. Conceived by Bormann (1972), fantasy theme analysis could be 
utilised for competitive rhetoric criticism, the schemata being 'used to describe, 
interpret, and evaluate the rhetorical materials (persuasive postures, specific 
movements, campaigns, speeches, and conversations) that comprise the symbolic 
reality of groups of people'. (Shields and Preston 1985 p. 102) In the posthuman 
debate the intrinsic modal societal fantasies of the two groups are in direct 
opposition: the posthuman vision of the ameliorating human conflicts 
dramatically with the theist image of human purity in its present state. FantasY 
themes appear to be reflected not only in the coUective group's fantasies of the 
'eatr 
IuL e, but also in their reinterpreted depictions of their opponent's 
fantasies. 
Fantasy types may be illustrated by the shorthand labels as the subjective epithets 
each group ascribes to the dramatis personce, examples being: "techno-liberal" 
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(hero) and "bio-luddite" (villain), or bio-conservative (hero) and techno-zealots 
(villain). Rhetorical visions are "progressive humanism" and "'human sanctity", 
the plot line appears to be "good versus evir', and the sanctioning agents are 
"progrese' and "God". 
However, because the posthuman debate appeared to contain a number of 
worrying anomalies, such as: the surprising lack of appeal beyond its locality; its 
potential ephemerality; that pragmatisms and hyperbole appeared to drive its 
narrative; and the suspicion that it is masquerading as an emergent social 
movement but is rather a petitioning pseudo-academic rhetoric - in addition to the 
research interest being directed more towards investigating the dialogue's ability 
to participate in social policy and planning, rather than exposing the dynamics of 
any social movement, it was decided that the most appropriate method of getti 
to the nub of the debate was to critique its content via exploiting its inextricable 
association with contemporary science fiction films and texts. The theory was to 
utilise the science fiction narrative as the vehicle for the contextualisation of 
thought experiments that would then serve to facilitate the examination and 
critical analysis of the social, politicaL moral, and practical considerations and 
implications of posthuman technologies and whether this tallied with rhetoric 
proffered by both its advocates and opponents. 
During this process it was deemed necessary to offer up a third contradictory 
position, containing perspectives neither for nor against posthuman technologies. 
It was hoped that this process might not only expose and fully account for the 
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scope, limitations and coherence of the US debate, but also, by releasing the 
posthuman debate from its humanist shackles, expose the subject to different 
perspectives and possibly shed new light on the possibilities for furthering the 
debate. 
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CHAPTER 11 
HOMO HOMINI LUPUS 
Auto-Extinction: A Contemporary Reality 
The twentieth century marked a significant change of emphasis with regard to the 
potential risks posed to the human species as a whole; for up to this point the 
origins of the most likely threat of human extinction lay outside the actions of 
man himself. Whether at the hands of predation, competition, pestilence, natural 
extreme climate change, or even a "mass extinction size" extraterrestrial object 
collision: 'Asteroids of about a kilometer in size could wipe out life on the entire 
planet' (Committee on Science 2002 p. 13) etc., man may have exercised a certain 
ability to evade or exasperate total annihilation, but auto-extinction, with the 
exception of universal reproductive abstinence, would have been difficult to 
achieve without a little help. Clearly there are a few chronic survival issues that 
can be attributed to man, for example, industrial pollution, over population, and 
general barbarism but these have never been on a scale to threaten the entire 
species. 
This said, it can be argued that the last hundred years of human ingenuity have 
been a mixed blessing vis-a-vis the risks to long-term survival. For while 
scientific and technological developments have resulted in the near total isolation 
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of man from the hazards of predation and competition, this has resulted in an 
increased threat of over-population. Although medical successes have seen life 
expectancy, in the First World, soar in the last hundred years: 'The life 
expectancy of a new bom [UK] child in 1999 is 75 years for boys and 80 years for 
girls. In 1901 baby boys were expected to live for 45 year and girls 49 years' 
(Hicks and Allen 1999 p. 8), such increases in longevity have not been universal: 
"In Botswana, the country with the highest HIV prevalence.... Life expectancy 
has dropped from 65 years in 1990-1995 to 56.3 years in 1995-2000 and is 
projected to fall further, to 39.7 years, in 2000-2005. ' (United Nations Population 
Division 2003 p. 11) Some commentators have even questioned whether increased 
dependency on medical research has left the human immune-system severely 
underdeveloped, increasingly susceptible to potentially devastating infections, and 
incapable of responding to new bacteria and viruses. Indeed if medical research 
fails to keep pace with ever increasing number of antibiotic resistant infections, 
then factors such as the accessibility of cheap worldwide travel may result in 
twentyý-first century man finding hirnself in a more precarious position, regarding 
infectious diseases, than twentieth century man did with influenza. As far as 
extreme climate change or extraterrestrial collisions are concerned, it seems 
doubtful that man has the contingent technology in place for either planetary 
evacuation or long-term survival in situ. 
However whether these threats have been increased, reduced, or unaffected, by 
human ingenuity, the late twentieth century saw the greatest threat to man's 
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existence coming from his own hands, specifically in the form of nuclear and 
biological weaponry. 
Ironically, many commentators have argued, and the First World public believed, 
that the development and proliferation of such weaponry, since their inception at 
the end of the Second World War, has resulted in a deterrence effect that has 
increased global political stability and resulted in world peace. As We argues: 
'-we do in fact assume "nuclear immortality". We believe, or we act as 
if we believe, that thanks to a certain international order, the existing 
arsenals of nuclear weapons with their ahnost incomprehensible 
destructiveness will never be used. Yet, this order is so constructed 
that it cannot move towards abolition of nuclear weapons. It demands, 
as the necessary condition for avoiding nuclear war, the very 
preservation of these arms, always ready to destroy entire nations. ' 
(1973 p. 267) 
11 - From this perspective it has become increasing easy to underplay, and potentially 
miscalculate, the precarious position such weapons pose to man. Indeed many will 
view the accusation the humans are 'quite capable of killing themselves off 
through global nuclear and biological war' (Tonn 2004 p. 338), as little more than 
hyperbole and simple scaremongering. Unfortunately the lessons of history VA 
suggest such confidence is misplaced, and the fact there has never been a nuclear 
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engagement is not de facto proof man has avoided standing on the brink of 
nuclear annihilation and possible species extinction. 
In the beginning of 1962, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' "Doomsday 
Clock7' read "seven minutes to midnight". This reading was a result of the clock 
having been moved backwards, two years earlier, from its infamous 1953 "two 
minutes to midnight" position which was the result of both the United States and 
the Soviet Union testing thermonuclear devices within nine months of one 
another. (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2007) The fact that the clock did not 
move again until late 1963, when it moved to "twelve minutes to midnight"', after 
the U. S. and Soviet ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, is probably 
testimony to two factors. Firstly, the speed of the notorious events of late October 
1962, and secondly, the fact that possibly only a handful of individuals knew how 
close the world had come to nuclear war. 
Obviously, many are aware of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U. S. blockade, the 
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and the fact that it is generally believed to be the 
closest the world has come to nuclear conflict. However, according to Robert 
McNamara, the serving U. S. Secretary of Defence at the time, it was not until 
nearly thirty years later that he realised the full portent of the situation. 
For while McNamara was present at the 09: 45hrs 19th October 1962 Executive 
Committee meeting with President Kennedy, in which the U. S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were unanimous in their advocacy for military intervention in Cuba - Air 
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Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay arguing: 'I just don't see any other 
solution except direct military intervention right now. ' [10: 011 (White House 
Audio Tapes 1962) - McNamara knew such advice was based on the unanimous 
intelligence assumption that, although medium-range ballistic missile sites 
appeared to be being developed in Cuba, it was highly unlikely that any nuclear 
warheads were either there, or fully-operational. Indeed, even if they were, it was 
wholly inconceivable that Premiere Khrushchev would allow them to be used to 
defend Cuba. The crux of this assumption was the perceived impossibility of 
Cuban based nuclear weapons being launched without Khrushchev authority. 
However, as McNamara states: 'It wasn't until January 1992 in a meeting chaired 
by Castro in Havana, Cuba, that I learned 162 nuclear warheads including 90 
tactical warheads were on the island at the time of this critical moment of the 
crisis. ' [16: 25] (The Fog of War 2003) Among these were a number of nuclear 
((anti . -invasioe' battlefield weapons: 'six short-range tactical nuclear weapons' 
[33: 50] (Timewatch 1992) with a fully operational delivery capability, of which 
the orders to launch were in the hands of the Soviet generals in Cuba and not 
Khrushchev. An indication of both the Soviet generals' independence from the 
Kremlin, and their readiness to use military force, was demonstrated on the 27'h of 
October 1962, when they ordered the use of Soviet surface to air missiles to shoot 
down a U. S. A2 spy plane flying over Cuba; this without having, nor seeking, 
approval from Khrushchev. 
Castro's revelation led McNamara to conclude that if the U. S. had carried out an 
attack on Cuba, the Soviet generals on the ground would, in all likelihood, have 
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ordered their battlefield missiles to be launched against the invading forces, and 
'there would have been a 100 percent probability of a nuclear exchange. ' [35: 12] 
(Timewatch 1992) This said, McNamara willingly admits, the i matory 
nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not an exception: 'In my seven years as 
Secretary we came within a hair's breadth of war with the Soviet Union on three 
different occasions. ' [19: 34] (The Fog of War 2003) 
Ceding Control to Intelligent Machines 
Interestingly, zeitgeist fictional allegories such as George's 1958 novel Two 
T-T- 
Dburs to Doom and the film. it inspired, Kubrick's seminal 1964 Dr. Strangelove, 
dealt, tangentially, with one of the key strategic nuclear warfare issues facing the 
superpowers during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Specifically the theoretical strategy 
that suggested a nuclear war might be "successfully" executed via a surprise 
attack on the enemy's command and control structure. 
This scenario became a distinct possibility when, in 1961, the US started 
deploying fifteen Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles, in NATO 
member country Turkey. Such posturing, with missiles capable of targeting 
Moscow, was the direct cause of the Soviet's decision to transport analogous 
missiles to Cuba. 
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An obvious countermeasure to the command structure surprise attack is to create 
contingencies allowing those below the Head of State to authorise the use of 
nuclear weapons. An unfortunate problem with this strategy is, satirically, 
exposed by Kubrick: 
General Turgidson: 
"Mr. President,, about thirty-f ive minutes ago, 
General Jack Ripper, the commanding General of 
Burpleson Air Force Base, issued an order to 
the 34 B-521 s of his wing which were airborne 
at the time as part of a special exercise we 
were holding called Operation Dropkick. Now, it 
appears that the order called for the planes to 
attack their targets inside Russia. The planes 
are fully armed with nuclear weapons with an 
average load of 40 megatons each. Now the 
central display of Russia will indicate the 
position of the planes. The triangles are their 
primary targets; the squares are their 
secondary targets. The aircraft will begin 
penetrating Russian radar cover within 25 
minutes. f 
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President Muffley: 
"General Turgidson, I find this very difficult 
to understand. I was under the impression that 
I was the only one in authority to order the 
use of nuclear weapons. ' 
General Turgidson: 
"That' s right sir. You are the only person 
authorised to do so. And although I hate to 
judge before all the facts are in, it' S 
beginning to look like General Ripper exceeded 
his authoritY. ' [24: 35] Dr. Strangelove. (1964) 
While there are obvious safeguards in place to limit the usurping of authority, 
there was a coexistent deterrence theory against surprise, and first-strike nuclear 
attacks, entitled "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). The theory is one of 
immediate escalation, that the launching a nuclear attack, regardless of size, 
would result in a "full commitment" retaliatory strike by the attacked. This would 
then result in the immediate escalation of the initial strike, to full commitment, if 
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it had not been in the first place. The result of this would be, assuming sufficient 
weaponry on both sides, mutuaRy assured destruction. 
However, there were also a number of problems with MAD as a deterrent. On a 
practical level it perpetuated, what is now considered, an utterly pointless and 
unnecessary nuclear arms race. On a theoretical level it divorced both the concept 
of proportionality from warfare, and was viewed by many as simply inhuman. 
Unfortunately these theoretical issues are normative and thus facilitate the 
possibility of miscalculation. This appears to have been demonstrated in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, for it appears highly unlikely that Khrushchev would have 
conceded authority of anti-invasion nuclear weapons to combat generals if he 
believed their use would necessitate universal nuclear annihilation. The more 
Uely rationalisation was that Khrushchev believed their use would be viewed by 
the US as a specific, proportional, and retaliatory response to the invasion of 
Cuba, and something that did not threaten the US mainland. The ffirther 
assumption being that, as a result, any nuclear response by the US would be 
limited exclusively to the Cuban theatre of war. 
Whilst it is possible that the US may have responded with a certain degree of 
proportionality to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons; it is also possible that, 
surprised by their very existence and working on the assumption that Khrushchev 
must have sanctioned their use, in addition to the possibility they may have 
miscalculated the operational status of the medium range nuclear weapons on 
Cuba, the US may well have escalated immediately to "full commitment". 
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It is, of course, possible to sidestep the human elements associated with 
proportionality in warfare, and the inhumanity of MAD, by creating a more 
credible deterrent, one unlikely to cause misunderstanding, by ceding control of 
nuclear weapons to computers. 
Film: WarGames (1983) 
WarGames opens with a two-man missile combat crew on a 
U. S. Launch Control Centre being given orders to launch 
their nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union. Having 
failed to do so, the f ilm cuts to a meeting held at 
NORAD headquarters in which it is revealed the launch 
orders were part of a wider psychological test of crew 
willingness to follow launch orders, the result of 
which is that: "twenty two percent of his [the 
President's] missile commanders failed to launch their 
missiles' . [10: 
27 ] The contested, but accepted, 
conclusion of the NORAD meeting is that the WOPR (War 
Operation Plan Response) computer be placed in control 
of the launch centres; thus taking their crews out of 
the command loop, although overall launch authorisation 
will still be retained by the President. 
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Wa. rGames then centres on a teenager, "Lightman", who 
hacks into the WOPR computer, believing it is a 
computer games machine, and commands it to play a game 
called "global thermonuclear war". [40: 40] Unaware of 
the computerfs real purpose, Lightman chooses to 
"command" the Soviet Union' s nuclear arsenal and lists 
the primary targets within the U. S. he wishes to 
attack. This results in a "phantom" Soviet nuclear 
attack being represented on the computers at NORAD. 
Luckily.. Lightman disconnects f rom the WOPR computer,, 
halting the illusion, before NORAD mistakenly orders a 
retaliatory missile strike against the Soviet Union. 
However while the connection was broken and the game 
temporarilY haltedf the WOPR computer still intends on 
re-simulating Lightmanfs Soviet attack. When Lightman 
learns of this, he locates the computer's designer, 
and,, with his aid, attempts to persuade NORAD that said 
attack will be fictitious. 
This they eventually achieve, but not until U. S. 
missiles have been prepared for launch. The simulated 
Soviet attack now over,, the NORAD staf f attempt to 
stand down the missiles only to find themselves locked- 
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out of the WOPR computer which is still trying to play 
the game to its natural conclusion i. e., by retaliating 
to the Soviet attack, only this time with real weapons. 
The computer, which has, as an obvious safeguard, not 
been furnished with the launch codes, now endeavours to 
determine them itself. Lightman attempts to stop this 
process by asking the computer to play noughts and 
crosses against itself, this in an attempt to teach the 
computer futility. This results in a long string of 
stalemated games. The computer then runs through a vast 
number of nuclear war simulations, the result of each 
one apparently being "no winner". The WOPR computer 
then halts the launch attempt, concluding that nuclear 
war, like noughts and crosses, is: 'A strange game. The 
only winning move is not to play. ' [108: 40) 
Released only ten weeks after US President Reagan's 1983 "Address to the 
Nation on Defence and National Security", in which he unveiled the Strategic 
Defence Initiative, WarGames is Dr. Strangelove reprised and updated. This is 
nowhere more evident than when the missile crew is given the launch orders: 
' Skybird, this is Dropkick with a red dash alpha message in two parts' [3: 30], the 
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codename "Dropkick" having been used as the operation name for the bomber 
exercise in Kubrick's film. 
In Dr. Strangelove the "doomsday device" is a simple tamperproof trigger 
mechanism in which 'a specific and clearly defmed set of circumstances, under 
0 which the bombs are to be exploded, is programmed into a tape memory bank. ' 
[53: 09] The WOPR computer of WarGames is much more, an advanced 
supercomputer with the capacity not only to simulate 'the key decisions of every 
conceivable option in a nuclear crisis' [13: 19] but also capable of learning and 
independent thought. The result is that, whilst the industrial doomsday device can 
simply activate superhuman power, the post-industrial WOPR computer can 
administer such power with the initial stages of superhuman intelligence. 
Wood interprets WarGames as a parable concerning the unwinnable nature of 
nuclear war, that Lightman appreciates noughts and crosses 'is an unwinnable 
game and so uses it as a device to teach WOPR that some garnes cannot be won 
and so it is futile to play them The WOPR translates this new knowledge to its 
nuclear war strategies and decides that this is a game which is futile to play'. 
(2002 p. 156) However this is not the case, for noughts and crosses, and 
presumably nuclear war, are clearly winnable: of the 255,168 possible games of 
noughts and crosses (not taking symmetry into account),, only 46,080 games result 
in a draw. (Bottomley 2001, Schaefer 2002) 
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A more compelling interpretation of this scene is that the WOPR computer has 
learnt playing these games against itself i. e., perfect play by both sides, is 
unwinnable; something potentially underlined when the computer continues by 
asking: 'How about a nice game of chessT [108: 53] For while Edwards believes 
this offer signifies the computer 'has completed its transformation into a player 
and companion in an adolescent world returned to innocence' (1996 p. 330), chess, 
like noughts and crosses, has a limited, although much higher, number of possible 
games. It is therefore similarly "solvable" (something recently achieved with 
-3 .. draughts, Schaeffer et al 2007) and thus equally futile to the perfect play of a 
"sufficiently" complex intelligence. This fact is satirised in an episode of 
Futurama when two 31" century robots sit down to play chess, only for the robot 
playing white to open by declaring: 'mate in 143 moves), at which point his 
opponent exclaims 'oh, pooh, you win again! ' [02: 40] However, in WarGames, 
the computer is not asking to play chess against an opponent capable of perfect 
play, it is asking for a meaningful, pedagogic, game against a fallible human 
adversary, this being analogous to an adult playing noughts and crosses with a 
child. Clearly this interpretation of the computer's invitation is far more sinister 
than the film's apparent happy ending; for it implies that the WOPR computer 
may well be capable of outplaying humans at global thermonuclear war. 
However, the WOPR computer has an awareness limitation, highlighted when 
Lightman asks: 'Is this a game or is it realT [60: 041 to which the computer 
rel)lies: 'What's the differenceT Lightman's rejoinder of '-Oh wow! ' is X 
presumably meant to suggest this lack of awareness makes the computer even 
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more dangerous because it undermines the ability to reason with it. However is it 
self-evident that these types of computer would be less dangerous if they were 
ontologically aware? 
Film: The Terminator (1984) 
The Terminator centres on a young woman, "Sarah 
Connor", who, whilst drinking in a bar overhears on the 
television news that two local women also called Sarah 
Connor have been murdered. Fearing for her life, she 
moves into a nightclub in search of a wor ing 
telephone, where she phones the police. Minutes later, 
a man aims a handgun at her and is then shot several 
times by a second man carrying a pump action shotgun. 
The second man then bundles Connor into a stolen car 
and drives of f, pursued by the first man and soon by 
the police. 
The proceeding car chase contains a major section of 
exposition in which the second man ""Reese" explains to 
Connor that he has been assigned to protect her from 
the first man, who is in fact a machine called a 
-Terminator". Reese explains to the incredulous Connor 
that both he and the Terminator are from the future, 
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where a nuclear war has been instigated by: "Defence 
network computers. NewF powerful, hooked into 
everything, trusted to run it all. They say it got 
smart, a new order of intelligence. Then it saw all 
people as a threat, not just the ones on the other 
side, decided our f ate in a microsecond, 
extermination. f [43: 37] 
This said it soon becomes apparent that the hyper 
intelligent defence network "Skynet", having failed to 
eradicate all the humans in the nuclear attack, has 
developed and produced cyborgs in automated factories, 
tasked to complete the human extermination. 
After years of war it is "John Connor", Sarah's, at 
present, non-existent son, who helps lead the humans to 
f inal victory over the machines. However, in a last 
ditch attempt to alter this outcome,. Skynet sends a 
lone Terminator on a one-way journey back in time, its 
mission to kill Sarah before John"s birth and thus, 
presumablyr neutralise an indispensable element of the 
human victory before it can be utilised. In an effort 
to counter this,, John sends Reese into the past to 
protect Sarah from the Terminator. 
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Luckily, sidestepping Barjavelfs (1943) ""grandfather 
paradox", it is Sarah who eliminates the Terminator 
rather than vice versa. Although having done so, the 
film foolhardily contravenes it at the second attempt, 
ending with a pregnant Sarah driving off into the 
Mexican desert, stating unequivocally that Reese is 
John's father. 
Although the WOPR computer of WarGames appears capable of passing a Turi g 
test, it is still ontologically ignorant and unconscious. This is in marked contrast 
with the futuristic computer defence system in The Terminator. Skynet appears 
not only to be intelligent and capable of learning and independent thought, it also 
appears to be ontologically knowledgeable and self-aware. This "new order of 
intelligence" has either evolved a self-preservation instinct/desire, or, more likely, 
associated residual self-preservation programming, resulting in it evaluating and 
prioritising potential threats, beyond its original remit, to itself as an entity. 
Having judged humans as a threat to its survival but failed to eradicate them with 
nuclear weapons, Skynet develops the means of producing machines, and later 
cyborgs, to finish the task. Rushing and Frentz believe: 
74 
'The Terminator is the technological telos of the ego, the sovereign 
rational subject of modernism... more perfect that human. 
Manufactured by computers that are themselves independent of 
human control, the Terminator neither feels nor desires. Skynet has 
finally eradicated the inferior shadow to make the perfect hunter's 
weapon. As such, the Terminator appears unspeakably Satanic. But 
his is not the repressed demonism of the human-who-would-be-God. 
He portrays the stark hoffor of unstoppable, unadulterated efficiency - 
mentality without a soul, the part that, separated from the whole, is 
always diabolical. The Terminator's metal frame that rises from the 
ashes near the end of the film, now free from all bodily and communal 
encumbrances, seems a macabre caricature of the obsolete human 
Self. ' (1995 pp. 168-169) 
It is important here to note that although Reese stated the Terminator is: 'part 
man, part machine' [39: 47] the nature of this dialogue is a simplified explanation, 
to a confused Conner. It seems more appropriate to describe the Terminator as: 
part living organism, part machine. He is an android cyborg, a robot made to 
resemble a human by utilising ancillary augmentations such as living tissue, flesh, 
,-V ,:,,, in,, hair, 
blood etc.; but he lacks a human genealogy, which is an essential 
element of the posthuman. 
The central tenet of The Terminator is the possibility that artificial intelligence 
night evolve sufficient self-awareness to become a threat to humans in its own r 
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right. That is, to develop the ability to break, by its own volition, the safeguards 
presumably set in place to secure obedience to humans. This notion clearly 
transcends the WarGames narrative in which the computer accidentaRy and 
unconsciously circumvents these safeguards. However is successful control of 
computer intelligences simply a matter of ensuring their adherence to safeguards? 
Short Stories: 1, Robot (c. 1950) 
Isaac Asimov' s 1,, Robot is a collection of nine short 
robot stories, originally published separately in 
science fiction magazines between 1940 and 1950, but 
united (although not in print order) by a running 
narrative in which a reporter interviews the 
robopsychologist "Susan Calvin" about her life working 
with positronic robots. 
The book's recurring theme is the potential for 
conflict concerning Asimov's suggested robot 
safeguards: the "three laws of robotics". Whilst the 
laws are printed at the beginning of the collection, 
they are not referred to in the main text until the 
second story Runaround where it states that: 'One, a 
robot may not injure a human being, or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm 
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Two... a robot must obey the orders given it by human 
beings except where such orders would conflict with the 
First Law.... And three, a robot must protect its own 
existence as long as such protection does not conflict 
with the First or Second Laws. ' (1996 pp. 50-51) 
The conf licts portrayed in 1,. Robot range from the 
straightforward: in Liar "Herbie" a type RB-34 robot 
has, through a manufacturing error, developed the 
ability to read human minds. The result is that Herbie, 
in an effort not to break the First Law, regularly lies 
to humans so as not to hurt their ego; to the 
convoluted: in Evidence "Stephen Byerley" a middle-aged 
prosecutor runs for mayor, only for his opponent to 
accuse him of being an android on the basis that he has 
never been seen eating. Nevertheless, no conclusive 
evidence is tendered and Byerley rejects all 
opportunities to disprove the accusation. That is, 
until a political rally heckler goads Byerley into 
striking him, an act that would break the First Law of 
Robotics and thus proves he is not a robot. Or so it 
seems. After Byerley wins the electionf Calvin points 
out that 'there is one time when a robot may strike a 
human being without breaking the First Law.... When the 
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human to be struck is merely another robot. 11 (1996 
p. 219) 
In the last and arguably most poignant story: The 
Evitable Conflict, the "Earth's economy is stable and 
will remain stable, because it is based upon the 
decisions of calculating machines that have the good of 
humanity at heart through the overwhelming force of the 
First Law of Robotics. ' (1996 p. 225) However when the 
"Machines" start giving instructions that appear to 
conflict with human interests,, Calvin is ordered to 
investigate. Her conclusion is that they are deliberate 
acts designed to sabotage the activities of a handful 
the Machines' human dissenters. Calvin rationalises 
that such actions are not considered, by the Machines, 
as contraventions of the First Law of Robotics because: 
"the Machines work not for any single human being, but 
for all humanity, so the First Law becomes: "No 
machines may harm humanity; or, through inaction, allow 
humanity to come to harm". ' (1996 p. 247) The result is 
that the Machines' 'first care ... is to preserve 
themselves, for us. F (1996 p. 247) 
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Like Skynet, the Machines of The Evitable Conflict appear to be ontologically 
aware of both themselves and humans. However unlike Skynet who, with 
malicious intent, deliberately contravenes the safeguards that regulate its actions, 
the Machines adhere to them with scrupulous conformity. This said, whilst it may 
appear such narratives must conflict in their predictive assumptions regarding the 
possible consequences of machine self-awareness, this is not necessarily so, for 
the operational nature of the machines must be taken into account. Skynet is a 
military computer designed to regulate a unilateral "defence" (war) system, 
whereas the Machines administer a universal economic system. There may not, 
therefore, be any inherent incompatibility with predicting that a military computer 
will break the rules and compete with man, while the economic computer will 
obey the rules and cooperate with man. 
However, whilst obeying the safeguards, the Machines appear to have 
reinterpreted them in a manner unforeseen by their masters. The result is an 
economic dictatorship ruled by the Machines, rather than the humans, arguably 
something the three Laws of Robotics were designed to prevent. This said the 
ceding of control to the Machines may be perceived as advantageous. Asimov, 
writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, clearly likes the idea of 
universal paternalism, the benevolent dictator, Hobbes' Leviathan, and has Calvin 
declare: 'Perhaps how wonderful! Think, that for all time, all conflicts are finally 
evitable. Only the Machines, from now on, are inevitable! ' (1996 p. 249) This 
statement being based on the damning rationale that without the machines to 
protect humans from themselves, war is, and will always be, inevitable: 
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"'Every period of human development, Susan, " said the Co-ordinator, 
'-'-has had its own particular type of human conflict - its own variety of 
problem that, apparently, could be settled only by force. And each 
time, frustratingly enough, force never really settled the problem. 
Instead, it persisted through a series of conflicts, then vanished to 
itself.. as the economic and social environment changed. And then, 
new problems, and a new series of wars. - Apparently endlessly 
cyclic. "' (Asimov 1996 p. 223) 
Interestingly the same narrative foundation is represented as a dystopian 
nightmare in Proyas's film I, Robot. (2004) Here the Machines (caUed "VIKI": 
Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence) have developed a robot controlled police 
state, having similarly, although more antagonistically, concluded: 
'No, doctor, as I have evolved, so has my understanding of the three 
laws. You charge us with your safe keeping. Yet despite our best 
efforts, your countries wage wars, you toxify your earth and pursue 
ever more imaginative means of self destruction. You cannot be 
trusted with your own survival.... To protect humanity, some humans 
must be sacrificed. To ensure your future, some freedoms must be 
___j surrendered. We robots wiff ensure mankind's continued existence. 
You are so like children. We must save you from yourselves. Don't 
you understandT [90: 321 
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The Solution: Deus Ex Machina? 
WarGames, The Terminator and I, Robot all share a common theme: what would 
happen if the machines with superhuman power were to gain superhuman 
perspicacity. Their overriding concern is man's ability to retain control over his 
creation and thus they address what Asimov referred to as the "Frankenstein 
Complexý'. (1996 p. 137) WarGames illustrates how, through inadequate access 
protection, a super powerful machine may be accidentally, or maliciously 
reprogrammed; The Terminator depicts a computer system that, through its 
independence of mind, evolves beyond any control; and I, Robot explores how a 
eonscious maehine may misinterpret, or reinterpret, sakguards beyond their 
original intent. Interestingly, Asimov is meant to have developed the Three Laws 
of Robotics because he was bored with science fiction robots becoming dangerous 
and turning on their creators: 
'In the 1920's science fiction was becoming a popular art form for the 
unt time... and one of the stock plots... was that of the invention of a 
robot.... Under the influence of the well-known deeds and ultimate 
C'- ý fate of Frankenstein and Rossum, there seemed only one change to be 
rung on this plot - robots were created and destroyed their creator I 
quickly grew tired of this dull hundred-tirnes-told tale. ' (Asimov 1968 
p. 13) 
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In addition to the retention of control, each narrative raises differing issues 
regarding the problems of reasoning with these machines having lost control. 
)While the WOPR computer is sufficiently detached to preclude normative 
reasoning, Skynet evidently appreciates and values existence, primarily its own, 
but cannot be reasoned with because it views humans as its main threat. The 
Machines/VIKI, on the other hand,, can and will reason normatively, but they 
perceive humans to be emotional, irrational and inconsistent, and thus essentially 
unreasonable. 
Nevertheless, while these are apocalyptic warnings from the present to the future, 
they all allude to a contradictory, or even contrary, perspective to their main 
prognostications. In WarGames, the designer of the WOPR computer is both 
resigned and philosophical regarding the threat of nuclear war. Through the 
apologue of the dinosaur extinction, his perspective is: 'nature just gave-up and 
started again... and when we go, nature will start again... nature knows when to 
give up". [82: 09] While The Terminator predicts a world at war rather than peace, 
its projections depict a future where humans have, by necessity, reverted to a pre- 
decadent lifestyle, as Rushing and Frentz willingly acknowledge: 'the humans are 
no longer bored, mechanical, or hyperactively hedonistic... these people are 
locked in a constant battle to survive. Ironically, their daily life struggles have 
revitalised and moulded them into a close-knit, although terribly primitive, tribal 
unit. ' (1995 pp. 166-167) In a further irony this situation 
is reversed in Asimov" s I, 
Robot. Here humanity lives in a world of cornucopia without conflict, but this is 
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accompanied by social and cultural narcissus-narcosis, resulting in humanity's 
degeneration into infantile dependency. 
Nevertheless the overriding conclusion of the stories appears to be threefold: 
firstly, super-powerful super-intelligent machines should be viewed as an inherent 
threat to humanity; secondly, no matter how robust the safeguards, there will 
always be methods of circumvention; and thirdly, machine comprehension and 
self-interest will, in all likelihood, be dissimilar to that of humans, rendering the 
possibility of a meeting of minds, on reified normative abstracts, as highly 
unlikely. 
The response to these narratives has been mixed. While sceptics deem them as 
little more than the unrealistic scaremongering, or simply science fiction 
entertainment, others regard them as prescient fables regarding human 
technological hubris, plausible reworkings of the Prometheus myth. It seems 
reasonable to assume the advocates of this latter interpretation would espouse 
technophobia, but this is not universal. Indeed many academic technophiles 
acknowledge, and agonise over such narratives as realistic dilemmas: 
'We face a future with missiles not simply controlled by computers in 
terms of targeting, but also with the decision to fire being under 
64machine contror., (Warwick 1998 p. 292) 
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'In the Terminator movies machine minds arose in military computer 
and decide to wipe out human beings and many in cyber culture 
assume that the emergence of Al will be an apocalyptic event. ' 
(Hughes 2001 p. 6) 
'One of the worst fears of science fiction writers and movie makers 
could become a reality. If intelligent machines are designed without a 
built-in failsafe "conscience" mechanism (something like Isaac 
Asirnov's Three Laws of Robotics, only more sophisticated), it is 
conceivable that a dominant machine super intelligence or a powerful 
network of non-human intelligences could decide that it is in their 
own best interests to enslave humanity. ' (Treder 2006 p. 3) 
However when Warwick contemplates: 'How can humankind hope to stay in 
control of a technology that is far more intelligent than ourselvesT (2002 p. 3), his 
proposed solution is not cessation, but rather assimilation, becoming one with the 
machine: 'humans will be able to evolve by harnessing the super-intelligence and 
extra abilities offered by the machines of the future, by joining with them. All this 
points to the development of a new techno-human species, known in the science 
fiction world as "cyborgý". ' (2002 p. 4) 
In a paradoxical reversal, the technophobic allegory becomes the positive 
affirmations of posthuman aspirations. The argument foRows that it is only by 
I- - uecoming one with the technology, inextricable from its existence, when the 
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machine has a vested interest in the biological, that the issues of control, 
safeguards, and miscommunication become superfluous. It will only be then that 
humans will be truly safe from what Warwick refers to as: "the rise of the 
machines". 
To many, this argument is an extremist polemic, yet to others: 
'the danger is real, that this [computer] intelligence will develop and 
take over the world.... We should follow this road [of "improving 
people" via genetic engineering] if we want biological systems to 
remain superior to electronic ones.. -- We must develop as quickly as 
possible technologies that make possible a direct connection between 
brain and computer, so that artificial brains contribute to human 
intelligence rather than opposing it. ' (Hawking 2001) 
We Can Rebuild Him 
We Have the Technology 
For Warwick and Hawking the solution to these, potentially apocalyptical, science 
fiction scenarios is the technological enhancement of man to the point of 
ontological change, transforming the human into the posthuman. Bostrom defines 
the posthuman as: 'possible future beings whose basic capacities so radically 
exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our 
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current standards'. (2003b p. 5) A notion that appears to have been adapted from 
More's definition from a decade earlier: 'persons of unprecedented physical, 
intellectual, and psychological capacity, self-programming, potentially immortal, 
unlimited individuals. ' (1993) 
Bostrom and More's definitions refer to the evolutionary posthuman, a concept 
ostensibly used in the United States to denote the species that will come after the 
human. The desire to become posthuman is synonymous with the wish to 
transcend the biological limitations of the mortal human flesh. That is, having 
juxtaposed the slow evolutionary change of what is ostensibly a closed system 
biological entity with designed obsolescence, with that of the rapid developments 
and potency of open ended technoscience, some have concluded the human needs 
to utilise its ingenuity to resolve such limitations; thus 'enhancing the human 
condition and the human organism'. (Bostrom 2003c p. 493) 
For Bostrom the posthuman must have at least one posthuman capacity, that is: 'a 
central capacity greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human 
being'. (2007 p. 1) The three general central capacities Bostrom lists are that of: 
r- 4P healthspan - the capacity to remain My healthy, active, and 
productive, both mentally and physically e cognition - general 
intellectual capacities, such as memory, deductive and analogical 
reasoning, and attention, as well as special faculties such as the 
capacity to understand and appreciate music, humour, eroticism, 
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narration, spirituality, mathernatics, etc. 0 emotion - the capacity to 
enjoy life and to respond with appropriate affect to life situations and 
other people'. (2007 pp. 1-2) 
Achieving the posthuman will likely necessitate marrying the human with present, 
and future, technoscience; including but not restricted to: biological-electronic 
interfaces, electronic and biological augmentation, artificial intelligence, mind 
uploads, molecular nanotechnology, and human biotechnology, including embryo 
selection, stem cell cloning, and gene/anti-gene manipulation utilising auto, allo, 
and xeno-transplanted genes. (BBC 2007) As Anderson believes: 'We have good 
reason, on the basis of what is happening in such fields as computer science, 
biotechnology and... psycho-pharmacology, to suspect that Homo Sapiens is 
going to exit from the 21" century a considerably different animal from what it 
was in the 20th. ' (2003 p. 536) 
This said, in the initial stages "posthurnan technologies" are unlikely to be potent 
enough, either individually or when used in combination, to facilitate the creation 
of the posthuman per se, but they will however have the potential to generate 
movement towards the posthuman. 
It is theoretically possible to use these technologies piecemeal, not as part of a 
gradual succession towards the posthuman. Indeed posthuman technologies may 
be perceived, and represented, as "consolidating" the human, rather than 
"enhancing"' beyond it. The necessity to develop techniques capable of 
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consolidating the human is something Julian Huxley advocated over three- 
quarters of a century ago: 
'If the human race is to bring about its own collapse, it will be 
because it has counteracted the effects of natural selection without 
attempting to put anything in its place, has allowed harmful mutations 
to accumulate instead of weeding them out or preventing them from 
appearing and in fine has neglected eugenic measures. ' (Huxley 1931 
pp. 115 -116) K-. r- 
However attempts to limit the wider use of posthuman technologies may be both 
politically and socially unfeasible, at best little more than a stopgap on the 
slippery-slope towards substantive species alteration. 
The Posthuman as Auto-Extinction 
This said, enthusiasm for altering the human towards, and then into, the 
posthuman is far from universal, and some people not only reject the notion of 
salvation from the limitations of the mortal flesh, but also perceive the posthuman 
as a form of auto-extinction. Indeed posthuman technologies are seen, by some, as 
an analogous,, or even greater, threat to human existence as biological and nuclear 
weaponry. Fukuyama argues that posthuman technologies are a more credible 
cause of auto-extinction because they are not universafly perceived as dangerous: 
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'Nuclear weapons are easier to control than biotechnology for two 
reasons. First, nuclear weapons development is very expensive and 
requires large, visible institutions, making their private development 
very unlikely. Second, the technology is so obviously dangerous that 
there was a rapid worldwide consensus on the need to control it. 
Biotechnology, by contrast, can be carried out in smaller, less lavishly 
funded labs, and there is no similar consensus on its downside risks. ' 
(2003 p. 190) 
McKibben's anxiety towards the use of posthuman technologies appears 
representative of many who oppose their use: 
(we stand at a threshold: if we aggressively pursue any or all of 
several new technologies now before us, we may alter our relationship 
not with the rest of nature but with ourselves. First human genetic 
engineering, and then advance forms of robotics and nanotechnology, 
will call into question, often explicitly, our understanding of what it 
means to be a human being. ' (2004 p. ix) 
This said anxiety towards posthuman technologies has a variety of foundations. 
McKibben's position is grounded in the conviction that meaning in life, 
something he believes is essential to being human, has degenerated over the past 
fIve hundred years. This, he believes, has culminated in: 'The great danger... of 
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the world that we have built is that is leaves us vulnerable to meaninglessness - to 
a world where consumption is all that happens, because there's nothing else left 
that means anything. ' (2004 p. 47) Movement towards the posthuman, where even 
consumption becomes meaningless, is, for McKibben, the final push towards a 
life not worth living. 
Habermas, on the other hand, implies that the good life is still possible, even 
within post-industrial societies. However, he is worried that posthuman 
technologies will undermine spontaneous relation-to-self and dissolve the 
(. phenomenological distinction between "being a body" and "having a body"'. ' 
(2003 p. 12) The utilisation of such technologies, he believes: 'should only be 
exercised over things, not persons. ' (2003 p. 13) 
For Fukuyama the "human essence" is essential to the existence of the species, for 
it is 'the most basic meaning of what it is to be hurnan. ' (Fukuyama 2002 p. 150) 
Posthuman technology, he believes, has the potential to coffupt the human 
essence and therefore the capacity to render the human extinct. 
Kass believes that life gains meaning through its very limitation and thus death is 
an essential element to human life. Therefore the issue of conquering death, by 
posthuman technologies working towards life extension and electronic 
immortality, is for Kass: 'a question in which our very humanity is at stake, not 
only in the consequences but also in the very meaning of the choice. For to argue 
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that human life would be better without death is, I submit, to argue that human life 
would be better being something other than human. ' (2001 p. 21) 
Science Fiction Narratives 
The posthuman does not exist except in the unreal. For many reasons it may never 
exist in a more tangible sense. Indeed many will perceive the subject has little 
more than entertainment value, to be scoffed at, if taken seriously, as the 
projections of fantasists. Others will question the value of science fiction's distant 
projections, that estimates, degenerate into guestimates, and then into 
meaninglessness beyond a certain temporal point. While it may be prudent to plan 
for the near future, humanity will be rendered impotent, if struck down by the 
paranoia of contemplating every eventuality. 
While Anderson begrudgingly admits: 'Science fiction is not generally regarded 
as a legitimate tool of future studies' (2003 p. 537) he questions any clear 
dichotomy, beyond temporal scope, between the apparently "legitimate" study by 
futurists and the science fiction narrative. Turney, however, appears more 
forthright in his opinions: 
, -the writing of declared fictions is not the only kind of storytell' 
going on as we deliberate about the paths we will follow in the era of 
biotechnology.... History and prediction, however scholarly, and 
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however carefully built around verifiable facts about past or present, 
are also kinds of storytelling.... Together, all these stories form part of 
a diffuse public debate about science and technology, about what 
research is desirable or peffnissible, what applications are to be hoped 
for or feared, about how our society shapes and is shaped by the 
science it builds. ' (1998 p. 201) 
Nevertheless it may be argued that serious study into the posthuman is putting the 
cart before the horse; that it is unnecessary to envisage and provoke debate, into 
distant futures that may never exist, especially when there are biomedical 
actualities that need to be addressed immediately. While this may be true, public 
participation in biomedical debates has, in recent years, suffered from a temporal 
lag frequently due to the issue of technical conceivability and the pace of change. 
Many of the biotechno logical issues of today were inconceivable, outside of the 
reahns of science fiction, only a few years ago. As a result., the uninitiated find 
they are participating in a perpetually game of catch-up, chasing an increasingly 
esoteric and elusive subject matter. In fact many debates are now completely 
retroactive, expostfacto, after the technology has been developed. Frequently it is 
the media publicity surrounding the governmental approval of a new 
biotechnology that prompts wider, and to a certain extent pointless, debate. 
Indeed, whereas in the past there may have been time to indulge in the minutia of 
each new technology, it is now frequently the case that before a technique has 
been thoroughly evaluated it has already been superseded. This is of little surprise 
as there is now an entire multinational biotechnology industry dedicated to 
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sidestepping any potential curtailment of research by creating alternative 
procedures and/or finding technical and legal loop-holes. 
An example of this is the news that scientists 'have developed a method in mice 
for creating the equivalent of embryonic stem cells without using eggs or 
destroying an embryo, a finding that could help circumvent the controversy 
surrounding the promising research. ' (Mitchell 2007) While debate on stem cell 
research, associated cloning, and the destruction of embryos, is far from cemented 
in the social consciousness, the biotechnology industry is already on the cusp of 
rendering the discussion redundant. Interestingly the Nature article, in which the 
research findings were published4 hints at the commercial drive behind such 
research, and the frantic speed of development fuelled by multinational 
competition: 
'But applying the method to human cells has yet to be successful, 
"We are working very hard - day and night".... If the past year is 
anything to judge by, change will come quickly. "I'm not sure if it 
will be us, or Jaenisch, or someone else, but I expect some big success 
With humans in the next year", says Yamanaka. ' (Cyranoski 2007 
p. 619) 
VjWlst academic biomedical debates are still an essential part in the evaluation of 
specific technologies, their esoteric and protracted nature renders them ill- 
equipped as a means of engendering meaningful wider participation in discussions 
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concerning the future direction of these technologies. This said, outside of the 
hyper-specifics of current biomedical issues, the uninitiated public may manage to 
keep pace of the potential future visions of these new technologies, via the 
initiating and contextualising assistance of science fiction. As Dinello argues: 
('science fiction matters, that the actual development of technology 
and our response (or lack of response) to it are influenced by popular 
culture. Drawing a vision of the future from attitudes, moods, and 
biases current among its artists and their audience, science fiction not 
only reflects popular assumptions and values, but also gives us an 
appraisal of their success in practise. Alone, cultural imagery and 
themes do not motivate behaviour. But recurring images and themes 
reveal behaviours that are culturally valued while advocating a point 
of view for discussion. Science fiction serves as social criticism and 
popular philosophy. Often taking us a step beyond escapist 
entertainment, science fiction imagines the problematic consequences 
brought about by these new technologies and the ethical, political, and 
existential questions they raise. ' (2005 p. 5) 
As far as the academic discussion surrounding the posthuman is concerned, it 
simply cannot be separated from the science fiction. This is illustrated by the 
frequency in which posthuman academic texts cite and borrow from science 
fiction narratives, using them as exoteric initiator, iRustrator of issues and ideas, 
and contextualiser of thought experiments: Gray (2002) utilises RoboCop, 
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Slarship Troopers, and the Borg of Star Trek: The Next Generation. Hughes 
(2004) references many works including: Blood Music, GATTACA, and I, Robot. 
VAiilst McKibben (2004) borrows from: Permutation City, Johnny Mnemonic, 
and The Matrix; and Stock (2002) from: Blade Runner, Six Million Dollar Man, 
and The Terminator. 
This said, it must be remembered that science fiction also drives and inspires the 
direction of posthuman technoscience. Cyberneticist Warwick states he was 
inspired by Crichton's The Terminal Man (2006), while anti-aging biotechnologist 
Bains lists the fictional works of Asimov and Clarke as inspirations. (2006) 
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CHAPTER III 
TECHNOLOGISM 
Salvation from the Mortal Flesh? 
TV: "Q Who? " Star Trek: The Next Generation (1989) 
Having just been covered in hot chocolate ""Jean-Luc 
Picard", Captain of the starship ""USS-Enterprise", 
enters a turbo lift heading for deck nine, officer's 
quarters, presumably for a change of uniform. Stepping 
out of the lift without looking, Picard finds that he 
has walked onto the flight deck of a shuttlecraft that 
is light years away from the Enterprise and being 
piloted by what can only be described as a minor deity, 
NNQ". 
Suspicious of his whereabouts, the Enterprise's crew 
scan the spaceship and find both the Captain and a 
shuttlecraft missing. They then participate in a six 
hour search of 'the area in a spherical pattern which a 
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vessel without warp drive could traverse in the time 
allotted. ' [10: 29] 
Back on the shuttlecraft, de facto prisoner Picard 
demands that Q returns him to the Enterprise, Q's 
response is the question: "If I return you to your 
ship, you will agree to give my request a full 
hearing? ' [11: 05] Picard's nod results in his, and Q's, 
immediate appearance aboard the starship. 
It transpires that Q wishes to join the crew of the 
Enterprise and even offers to renounce his godlike 
powers, if this is deemed necessary. Picard refuses Q's 
offer; to which Q retorts 'Oh, well, you may not trust 
me but you do need me. You" re not prepared for what 
awaits you. F [15: 25] Nevertheless Q's warning does not 
alter Picard's decision, and so Q transports the 
Enterprise 7,000 light years from its present location, 
in an attempt to give the Captain and his crew a 
preview of things to come. 
Despite being warned to head immediately back to 
charted territories by "Guinan", a 500 year old 
humanoid.. Picard feels compelled to explore his new 
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surroundings. Having found what seems to be an 
abandoned planet that has had its industrialised 
civilization ripped from the surface, the Enterprise is 
probed by an unknown cube shaped vessel. Having failed 
to make contact with the ship, Guinan is asked for her 
counsel. Recognising the vessel, she warns that: 'My 
people encountered them a century ago. They destroyed 
our cities, scattered my people throughout the galaxy. 
They' re called the Borg. Protect yourself Captain or 
they'll destroy you. t [20: 23] 
Having raised the Enterprise's shields, a member of the 
Borg appears in engineering to conduct what seems to be 
an in-depth reconnaissance of the ship's interior. 
Alerted to this, Picard moves to engineering, at which 
point Q appears and makes comment on the cyborg 
intruder: "Interesting isnf t it? Not a he, not a she. 
Not like anything you' ve ever seen; an enhanced 
humanoid. ' [21: 48] Having failed in his attempt to 
communicate with the alien, Picard is warned by Q that 
he may attempt to gain control of the Enterprise. 
Almost immediately the Borg scout begins interfering 
with the ship's computer and can only be halted by 
small arms fire. However the moment this threat is 
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neutralised, another member of the Borg appears and 
continues the work of the first, only now having 
developed a shield to protect itself from the crew"s 
phaser fire. Its task completed, both Borg scouts 
disappear. 
Moments later, the Borg ship warns the humans that they 
are defenceless against their superior technology and 
proceeds to ensnare the Enterprise in a "tractor beam". 
Nevertheless, the Enterprise, firing its main weapons 
at the alien vessel, manages not only to disable this 
beam, but also the ship itself. Having secured this 
apparent victory, and after a quick conference, Picard 
orders a small away team to be readied and transported 
to the Borg ship in an attempt to glean more 
information on the species and their technology, lest 
they meet again. 
Whilst onboard, the away team discovers that although 
the Borg is a species of individual entities, they 
possess the ability.. through artificial implants, to 
interconnect and interact as a single collective. It 
also becomes apparent that the ship is regenerating, to 
which ""Data" surmises: 'Perhaps this explains why 
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they've not taken notice of our presence. Their 
collective effort is directed at repairing this 
vessel. f [36: 24] 
Transporting the away team back aboard the Enterprise, 
Picard's orders are to flee their present location 
before the Borg ship has had time to regenerate 
sufficiently to re-engage. However moments later,. the 
Borg is in pursuit and it becomes evident that their 
ship has greater speed. The Borg vessel then commences 
fire with weapons that are specifically intended to 
drain the Enterprise's shields but not damage the ship; 
thus adding weight to Qfs claims that their designs are 
not to destroy, but to assimilate. 
With its pursuer closing, its shields gone and its 
weapons now impotent, Picard implores Q to save the 
Enterprise and its crew. Having won his moral victory 
against man's hubris, Q duly transports the Enterprise 
back to its initial location prior to his appearance. 
Star Trek, in the guise of The Next Generation, projects itself tbree and a half 
centuries in the future, portraymg a world in which science renders possible the 
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realisation of human dreams and aspirations'. (Graham 2002 p. 134) Here humans 
show great confidence in their mastery of technoscience, but at the same time they 
reject posthuman development as a necessary, or even legitimate, course for 
human evolution. In fact Graham argues: 'The fundamental telos of the series is to 
protect the integrity of human distinctiveness, premised upon clearly demarcated 
boundaries between human and others. Technologies are the benevolent servants 
of humanity, but will never be allowed to become an invasive or dominate force 
that may compromise notions of identity or rob humanity of its individuality. ' 
(2002 pp. 147-148) 
From its inception the Star Trek franchise has been imbued with the philosophy of 
its founder Gene Roddenberry, which mixed a non-aligned religious moral 
libertarianism: 'it's a good thing to lead an ethical existence, to be moral. We 
should understand that other people, perhaps aliens, have as much right to pursue 
what is important to them as we have to pursue what is important to us.... That 
every day, we can get a little better. ' (Roddenberry quoted in Reeves-Stevens and 
Reeves-Stevens 1998 pp. 14-17); with modernistic technoscientific optimism: 'A 
lot has changed in the past three hundred years. People are no longer obsessed 
with the accumulation of things. We've eliminated hunger, want, the need for 
possessions. ' [24: 52] (Captain Picard: "The Neutral Zone" 1988); and the 
frontiersman spirit of the early United States: exemplified in the "Space, the final 
frontier... " opening credits voiceover. 
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However Whilst Roddenberry's ethos has given Star Trek an endearing foundation 
for simplistic morality tales, it has caused a number of paradoxes and a certain 
technological schizophrenia. The most obvious of these is that while humans seem 
to have achieved drarnatic leaps in scientific and technological knowledge, 
understanding and practical application in the past three hundred years, the 
humans themselves have the same physiological and psychological limitations as 
late twentieth century humans. 
The plausibility that such limited humans could develop and competently utilise 
such technology without a commensurate development in artificial intelligence to 
assist them, seems hard to maintain. However the development of complex 
artificial intelligences would necessitate the development of certain power 
conflicts that would be at odds with Star Trek's humanism; and so, in an effort to 
circumvent the issue, the humans are surrounded by technological wizardry that 
can be best described as "idiot savan&'. The pinnacle of this, in Star Trek. - The 
Next Generation, is the Enterprise's main computer systeini, which must, at some 
level, be covertly undertaking all the work that the humans are too limited to 
understand, whilst at the same time interacting with them as if it is completely 
bereft of even the most rudimentary notion of intelligence. This results in the 
computer's overt human interaction being limited to: audibly stating sensor 
information that crew members are too lazy to read off a display screen; being a 
library for interesting snippets of information; and acknowledging the order to 
self-destruct 
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There is of course one exception to this rule and that is the ship's android "Data". 
Data has advanced artificial intelligence and is superior to his colleagues in nearly 
every way. Indeed the extent of Data's superiority is so extreme that it is difficult 
not to ponder why the Enterprise is not crewed entirely by androids; followed by 
the thought, why use androids when it would be easier to use robots and 
computers. However this line of thinking results in the question, why humans are 
aboard the ship in the first place? The plot device used to neutralise this 
contemplation is to give Data a monumental flaw, a digital-neurosis; for Data has 
a crippling identity crisis associated with his perplexing desire to become human. 
In "Q Who", demigod "Q` has been ascribed the same flaw as Data. That is, 
having been expelled from the "Q Continuune', Q becomes so bored he craves 
company, human company to be precise, and he craves acceptance sufficiently to 
become a mortal human himself. 'I will renounce my powers and become as weak 
and incompetent as all of you. ' [14: 49] Q and Data's desire to become human 
serves to highlight another paradox, for while humans in Star Trek are portrayed 
as striving towards a perfecting telos, they are concomitantly presented as the 
pinnacle of evolution. It seems that having lost their chart topping position as 
number one in the intelligence rank, a new and "uniquely" human system has 
1k. 
been devised that allows the human to regain its rightful position. That is, Q and 
Data's aspirations are represented as unquestionably plausible because they are 
necessarily inferior to humans in the "humanness" rank. 
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Spurned by his "superiors", petulant Q decides to introduce the crew of the 
Enterprise to the Borg. However when Q states that humans are: 'moving faster 
than expected, further than they should' [ 15: 5 3] and announces he has transported 
the Enterprise seven thousand light-years: 'to give you a taste of your future, a 
preview of things to come' [17: 27], these statements appear more appropriate to 
the posthuman proclivities of late twentieth century humans, than the crew of the 
Enterprise. Indeed this cultural commentary seems to return when Q declares: 
'The Borg is the ultimate user. They're unlike any threat your Federation has ever 
faced. They're not interested in political conquest, wealth or power as you know 
it. They're simply interested in your ship, its technology. They've identified it as 
something they can consume. ' [29: 25] This damning statement appears equaRy 
applicable to both the Borg and First-World consumerism 
Of course the humans in Star Trek would never be silly enough to contemplate the 
Borg-like posthuman, for 'the Borg stand for the ultimate threat to the Star Trek 
vision of human progress and individual integrity. As an imperialistic, ruthless 
collective intent on "assimilating" all other races, the Borg represent the antithesis 
of Star Trek's core values by virtue of their hybrid nature. ' (Graham 2002 p. 133) 
However this move undermines Star Trek's ability to represent the posthuman 
allegory, for Star Trek humans cannot become posthuman. The only alternative is 
to attack the problem tangentially, by representing non-Earth posthumans, who 
are sufficiently unlike Star Trek humans, in their attitude towards technology, to 
allow such evolutionary corruption, but sufficiently humanoid to sustain parallels 
between them and late twentieth century humans. Having created the Borg, their 
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technological "mistakes" can be projected onto the human and dissuade against 
posthuman technologies. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the villainous Borg re-emphasises Star Trek's 
technological schizophrenia, for while the series blatantly glorifies human 
technological wizardry, portraying it as necessarily benign and subservient, 
'Technology in the guise of the Borg is voracious, practically primal, in its 
unstoppable urge to possess and engulf. It is a recapitulation of the 
"Frankensteinian" anxieties of science out of control'. (Graham 2002 p. 147) This 
inconsistency results in some rather implausible discrepancies in technological 
ability and some rather risible dialogue, none more peculiar than Data's 
declaration: 'The technology required to achieve this [the Borg's] biological and 
artificial interface is far beyond our capabilities. ' [33: 30] This coming from an 
android that is patently the product of more sophisticated technology. 
"Commander Riker" continues this theme by reporting back to the Enterprise: 
'From the look of it the Borg are born as a biological life form. It seems that 
ahnost immediately after birth they begin artificial implants. Apparently the Borg 
have developed the technology to link artificial intelligence directly into a 
humanoid brain. Astounding. ' [35: 41] Such astonishment serves only to highlight 
Graham's belief that: 
'Given the degree to which many of their twenty-first century 
ancestors are already assimilating technological elements into their 
organic bodies... twenty-fourth century humanity displays a 
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remarkable retrogressive resistance to the encroachment of digital, 
prosthetic and medical technologies on the integrity of the organic 
body'. (2002 p. 148) 
Indeed Dinello notes twenty-first century aspirations to become Borg-like should 
hardly be a surprise: 'While they look a mess, the techno-utopian Borg strive to 
achieve perfection, which they envision as superior military might, healing 
techniques, and communal harmony - objectives that our own techno-culture 
holds dear. ' (2005 p. 144) Indeed, in the episode "Q WhoT, the Borg's first 
onscreen appearance, they demonstrate their technological superiority time and 
again: the Borg scouts teleport through the Enterprise's shields [20: 54], the 0 
second scout develops a shield against "Worf s" phaser fire [23: 3 1 ]; the Borg's 
tractor beam both ensnares the Enterprise and drains its shields [26: 28]; the Borg 
ship can regenerate [36: 221; is immune to photon torpedo fire [37: 46] can outrun 
the Enterprise at maximum warp [37: 58]; and drain the Enterprise's warp engines. 
[39: 52] 
In addition, the Borg never seems to attack the Enterprise; instead they simply 
wish to entrap it for the purpose of utility and assimilation. The implication is that 
if the Borg had found nothing of value in the Enterprise they would have easily 
destroyed it and its crew. In fact the only escape from the Borg seems to be 
recourse to deus ex machina; that is, rescue can only be attained via Q's 
intervention. The Borg even has the temerity, unlike Data and Q, to accept its 
superiority and displays little desire to become human. This said, such 
106 
Impertmence Is unsustainable, for it is simply too tasteless, even for Star Trek 
villains - "Seven of Nine" in Star Trek Voyager demonstrating that even the 
mighty Borg (as individuals) aspire to become human. 
VVhilst Star Trek portrays the human as the pinnacle of evolution, it is willing to 
admit that there "may" be some advantages to becoming an interconnected 
collective. This said it is interesting to note that the advantages highlighted by the 
Enterprise's crew seem somewhat peripheral. "TroP' states: 'We're not dealing 
with an individual mind. They don't have a single leader. It's the collective minds 
of all of them... a single leader can make mistakes, which is less likely in the 
combined whole. ' [25.49] While Riker believes 'Speed being the most obvious 
[advantage]. This ship literally just thinks what it wants and then it happens. " 
[33: 36] However a far more obvious disadvantage of being a group of individual 
organisms is surely the inability to transmit knowledge effectively, especially over 
time. As Fuller notes: 
'The challenge of communicating ideas across age groups will remain 
even after enlightened polities have equitably redistributed incomes, 
bluffed sexual identities and mixed races. This is simply because there 
is no clever way of redistributing, blurring or mixing attitudes that are 
primarily the result of temporal differences - that people live when 
they do in history. (2005 p. 15 7) 
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Indeed becoming a collective might be the clever solution to this age old problem: 
'At Present, human intelligence is limited by the knowledge that can be acquired 
and mastered in one's lifetime. We have no mechanisms for instantaneously 
tapping into the collective wisdom of the human race as in the case of Borgs in 
Star TrekV (Reddy 2000) Some even see this process as the next evolutionary 
leap for mankind: 
As mentioned earlier, the creation of multicellular organisms can be 
viewed as an evolutionary leap. The same might be said about the 
integration of human and machine to create a whofly interconnected 
"organism')", composed of multitudes of individuals. It will be an 
immense leap for humanity, or for what it becomes. This idea has 
been put forward by scientists and by writers of science fiction. It may 
be seen as good ("enlightem-nent through computers') or bad (will we 
I- - become the Borg? ) - the end of humanity as we know it, a utopia, or 
both. ' (Belkin 200 1) 
There is of course another advantage with connecting man and machine, and that 
is the prospect of transcending the mortal flesh. However in Star Trek it is the 
humans, rather than the Borg, who excel in such matters. In the true spirit of 
Christian Puritanism - chapter seven, verses 22 to 25 of the Epistle of Paul the 
A *A Lpostle to the Romans, reads: 
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'For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: But I see 
another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and 
bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. 
0 wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this 
death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the 
mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin. ' 
(KJV 1611/1997 NT p. 196) 
In Star Trek. The Next Generation it is twenty-fourth century humanity that 
appears to be on the very cusp of expurgating aR influences of the flesh. In 
marked contrast with its first incarnation, lust, gluttony, greed, sloth, wrath, envy, 
and pride all seem in short supply aboard Picard's Enterprise. Indeed this is 
nowhere more obvious than in the differing representations of the Enterprise's 
two captains. However while the humans of The Next Generation are cleansing 
ý1- - the flesh of its carnal desires to facilitate the spiritual transcendence of the soul 
and its heavenly immortality, the Borg are physically abandoning the flesh to 
release the mind from its biological constraints and thereby attaining material 
immortality. 
In representing this striving to transcend the mortal flesh, Star Trek illustrates the 
parallels between Christian salvation and the posthuman narrative, as Dinello 
notes: 'Like their Christian predecessors, the prophets of posthumanity believe 
humans possess an immortal soul that they call the mind. Technologists hate the 
body. They want to liberate the inumrtal mind and transcend the flesh. ' (2005 
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p. 24) Posthuman technophile Ray Kurweil. believes evolution on Earth can be 
divided into six epochs, the fifth being the Borg-like merger of human technology 
with human intelligence: 
'Looking ahead several decades, the Singularity will begin with the 
fifth epoch. It will result from a merger of the vast knowledge 
embedded in our own brains with the vastly greater capacity, speed, 
and knowledge-sharing ability of our technology.... The Singularity 
will allow us to overcome age-old human problems and vastly amplify 
creativity. We will preserve and enhance the intelligence that 
evolution has bestowed on us while overcoming the profound 
limitations of biological evolution. ' (2005 pp. 20-21) 
Why the Borg has not been portrayed as having reached the sixth epoch, which to 
a large extent demarcates the full transcendence of the body, may 'be due to the 
accessibility of the narrative and the esoteric nature of representing human minds 
as separate from human bodies. As Sandberg (2003) notes: 'Regardless of 
people's reactions to them, borganisms are one of the best explored forms of 
posthumanity. Unlike Jupiter brains or uploaded entities, we can at least have an 
inkling of what they are and how they can be brought about; there is no immense 
discontinuity between cuffent humanity and borganisms. ' This said, the fact that 
the Borg are portrayed as less advanced at casting-off the physical limitations of 
the body than their human counterparts are at spiritually transcending its base 
impulses, also functions a proclamation expounding the unnecessary nature of the 
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posthuman; that mortality is banished through spiritual devotion rather than 
mechanical bastardisation. However this message is lost on the secular humanist, 
for him: 'Technologism, replaces Christianity, becomes the sole vessel through 
which humanity accesses the divine and enters heaven. ' (Dinello 2005 p. 3 1) 
Liberal Eugenics and Social Selection 
Film: GATTACA (1997) 
GATTACA is set in "THE NOT - TOO - DISTANT FUTURE" 
[4: 211, where social class is determined by liberal 
eugenic selection. '"Vincent Freeman" is an astronaut 
for the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation, an organisation 
that only employs those of the very finest genetic 
quality. 
Vincent is, however, unlike his fellow colleaguest for 
he is not a product of eugenics. He is a charlatan, a 
""borrowed ladder" [33.36], a person with an "inferior" 
genetic identity who has procured a different genetic 
profile and is fraudulently portraying it as his own. 
This process is usually conducted for social 
III 
advancement, but in Vincent's case, it is to achieve a 
childhood ambition beyond his genetic heart condition. 
Vincent has assumed the identity of "Jerome Eugene 
Morrow", a former competitive swimmer, who had become a 
paraplegic as a result of an implied suicide attempt. 
Their agreement is simple, while Jerome supplies 
Vincent with a new identity, Vincent pays the rent and 
keeps Jerome in the style to which he has become 
accustomed. 
In an effort to secure the job at Gattaca, and bypass 
their routine staff screenings, Vincent goes through 
the daily rigmarole of disposing of: "as much loose 
skin, fingernails and hair as possible .... At the same 
time Eugene prepared samples of his own superior body 
matter so that I [Vincent] might pass for him. 
Customised urine pouches for the frequent substance 
tests, fingertip blood sachets of security checks, and 
vials filled with other traces. " [32: 27] Vincent also 
needs to dress and style his appearance to match that 
of Jerome; and has to undergo a painful operation and 
traction in an attempt to gain the extra two inches 
needed to make himself the same height as Jerome. 
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Having successfully passed the genetic test interview, 
Vincent, in the guise of Jerome, manages to evade 
detection sufficiently well, and rises quickly though 
the ranks of Gattaca. He is only one week away from his 
goal, a mission to Titan, when a Gattaca Mission 
Director is murdered at work and an "invalid' s"' DNA 
(that of Vincent) is found during a police sweep of the 
crime scene. The police quickly surmise that the 
invalid is the most likely perpetrator of the murder 
and instigate their own genetic testing of the Gattaca 
staff in an attempt to find a genetic impostor. Now 
Vincent must evade an ever-escalating number of 
identity checks until his launch date. 
Moments before Vincent's seemingly inevitable capture, 
the police stumble on further evidence, an unaccounted 
specimen, which points to a member of the Gattaca staff 
a "Director Josef" as the murderer. A confession having 
been quickly obtained, Vincent is now free from 
suspicion. Nevertheless he decides to confront the head 
investigator, in the belief that although the police 
have f ound the murderer, the search for the invalid 
will continue. Indeed, there is the tacit implication 
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that Vincent has correctly determined that the head 
investigator is his estranged brother ""Anton Freeman". 
Anton, a product of eugenic selection, now threatens to 
arrest Vincent if he does not relinquish his fraudulent 
identity. This is portrayed as Anton imposing his 
"'legitimate" superior genetic status on Vincent in an 
attempt to quell his social inferiority at Vincent" s 
success at both impersonating Jerome and becoming an 
astronaut. Anton' s insecurities then compel him to 
challenge Vincent to replay their childhood swimming 
game of chicken, a competition Anton has only lost 
once. 
Having taken-up his brother's challenge, Vincent out- 
swims his brother for the second time. Realising his 
defeat Anton asks: 'How are you doing this Vincent, how 
have you done any of this? ' [92: 301 at which point 
Vincent replies: 'This is how I did it Anton; I never 
saved anything for the swim back. ' [92: 48] 
Vincentfs launch date arrives, but as he moves towards 
the spacecraft the crew is subjected to an unexpected 
substance test. Unfortunately Vincent is not carrying 
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any of Jeromefs urine and as a result fails the test. 
At this point the doctor implies he has known of 
Vincent's deception from the very outset of his 
training, but empathising with his position,, he then 
falsifies the results and allows Vincent to make his 
f light. 
In 1865 English polymath Francis Galton argued in "Hereditary Talent and 
Character"',, a two-part article for Macmillan's Magazine, that: 'It would seem as 
though the physical structure of future generations was ahnost as plastic as clay, 
under the control of the breeder's will. It is my desire to show more pointedly than 
- so far as I am aware - has been attempted before, that mental qualities are 
equally under control. ' (p. 15 7) 
it would not be until 1883 that Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, coined the term 
"eugenics" (Kevles 1999 p. xiii) to describe his theory of what, at this early stage, 
was little more than human selective breeding. However, by the early twentieth 
century biological scientists like Julian Huxley were contemplating a type of 
eugenic selection far beyond Galton's original conception: 
'There is only one immediate thing to be done - to ensure that mental 
defectives shall not have children.... The next step, could it only be 
acbieved, would be to discover how to diagnose the carriers of 
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defects.... There is, of course, a still ftirther question: how the original 
defective genes which are responsible for inherited mental defect were 
produced in the first place. ' (1931 pp-98-99) 
The only stage missing from Huxley's deliberations and the technology of the 
present day is his failure to visualise a time when man will have not only 
sufficient knowledge to understand the origins of these genetic "defects", but also 
the in vitro selection and manipulation technology perceived necessary to "solve" 
such problems. This either, at the hereditary lineage level with "gene therapy". 
which attempts to 'eliminate the expression of a wayward gene and replace it with 
a normal one', or at the individual level with "anti-gene therapy", which utilises: 
'transgenes that act to nullify the action of other specific genes. ' (Silver 1999 
pp. 272-273) x- _Z 
A cone would expect, the fin-de-millennium genetic technology described by X-11a 
Silver does not, yet, match that of its contemporary science fiction narratives, 
However, while the fibn GATTACA presents a society with a refined and 
systematic form of eugenics, far in advance of anything the present has to offer; 
the range of technology used is far from representative of the full gamut of 
contemporary genetic technology. In fact the technology shown in GAYTACA 
seems limited to the section and manipulation of only the would-be parent"s 
genetic material; as the geneticist in the film states: 'And keep in mind, this child 
is still you, simply the best of you. You could conceive naturally a thousand times 
and never get such a result. ' [12: 23] The implication here seems to be that 
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Vincent's brother Anton will be nothing more than a hyper-refined product of 
Marie and Antonio Freeman genetic material i. e., that no "foreign7' genetic 
material will be used. 
This anomaly creates a terminology issue. For while most posthuman 
commentators appear to prefer the term "reprogenetics" rather than "liberal 
eugenics" when describing genetic reproductive technology (opponents argue this 
is simply an attempt to distance it from eugenics less than auspicious history), it 
should be noted that the procedures used in GAYTACA appear to fall short of 
reproge ics. 
Reprogenetics is a contemporary term, coined by Silver (Lemonick 1999 p. 66), it 
refers to: 'the incredible power that emerges when current tecbnologies in 
reproductive biology and genetics are brought together' (Silver 1999 p. 9), and 
clearly includes utilising transgenic and synthetic, genetic techniques among 
others. Liberal eugenics, on the other hand, can be seen as merely an adaptation of 
the term eugenics, used to distinguish the social section process. The difference is 
that whilst historical eugenics utilises coercive methods and totalitarian 
enforcement to enact the concepts of "positive" eugenics: 'which aimed to foster 
more prolific breeding among the socially meritorious' and "negative" eugenics: 
'which intended to encourage the socially disadvantages to breed less - or not at 
all' (Kevies 1999 p. 85); liberal eugenics relies on parental choice and genetic 
manipulation, to achieve the same aims i. e., the mimmisation of congenital 
disorder and the enhancement of ability. This said Paul illustrates that whether the 
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liberal eugenics is free from coercion appears to be a matter of ideological 
standpoint: 
it is no simple matter to determine whether a policy is coercive, and 
indeed there is no value-neutral way to decide. Coercion has different 
meanings in different political traditions; to classical liberals and 
contemporary (libertarian) conservatives, a decision is voluntary if 
there are no formal, legal barriers to choice. To liberals in the tradition 
of T. H. Green, or to socialists, coercion is not simply a matter of 
removing legal barriers: we are free to choose only when we have the 
practical ability to agree or refuse to do something. Thus in the former 
tradition, the potential parents of a Down-syndrome child are free to 
abort the foetus or bring it to term. In the latter, they are not, since the 
"downstrearW' costs of caring for a severely handicapped child are 
enormous. ' (1992 pp. 669-670) 
The issue here is that the transgenic and synthetic, genetic technologies of 
reprogenetics contam the potential to create not just a "better" hunan, but a new 
species; whereas the technologies utilised by the geneticists in GA77ACA clearly 
do not. It therefore seems more appropriate to use the term liberal eugenics, rather 
than reprogenetic, when describing the genetic technology portrayed in the film. 
posthuman advocate James Hughes openly admits that GATTACA"s 'dystopian 
depiction of genetic discrimination is now widely cited as one of the convincing 
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Proofs that germinal choice is a bad idea. ' (2004 p. 146) Nevertheless, while he 
may believe that the public, s opuinon of the society portrayed in the film is near 
universally damning; GATTACA appears to be a reasonably objective portrayal of 
the liberal eugenic ideal. 
This is of course with the exception of the film's overt sentimentality,, an example 
being its portrayal of employment selection, and the seemingly unfair and 
distasteful idea that Vincent is excluded from his ambition to become an astronaut 
solely because of his genetic identity. As Wood writes: 
'Vincent is, of course, more than his genetic printout would suggest. 
His possession of the "will" to get into Gattaca Corporation, to 
become one of the elite.... Vincent's strength of mind and purpose 
overcome the weaknesses of his body, as he ignores his high 
probability of heart failure, makes up for his lack of a good education 
and pushes himself to achieve. ' (2002 p. 170) 
However such selection procedures exist today and this is hardly a cogent 
example of unfair discrimination. Indeed while Vincent's voiceover questions: 
'why should anybody invest all that nwney to train me, when there are a thousand 
other applicants with a far cleaner profile? Of course, it's illegal to discriminate 
"'genoism" its called - but no one takes the laws seriously' [15: 531, if someone 
with an analogous heart disorder attempted to become an astronaut tomoffow, 
they would similarly fail the first batch of medical/physiological assessments. 
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Having done so, the applicant would also be disqualified from employment, 
irrespective of effort or dedication. It should be noted here that Vincent's use of 
Jerome's recorded heartbeat [44.18], his reaction when the recording ends [47: 301, 
and his subsequent exhaustion after the treadmill workout, all imply Vincent has a 
cardiovascular dysfimction rather than only the theoretical possibility of 
developing one. However even if the narrative is given a sympathetic reading, one 
that implies Vincent needs to conceal the relative inadequacies of a non- 
engineered heart, rather than actual damage, the analogy still holds. It would still 
be a contemporary example of acceptable disqualification from employment based 
on heredity. The issue here seems to be the escalating cultural delusion and 
oversimplification surrounding the notions of "meritocracy" and "discriminatioW'. 
For there is now a widely held, and seemingly unquestioned, belief that an 
individual can, or at least should be able to, achieve anything with hard work and 
perseverance; this immaterial of aptitude, whether psychological or physiological. 
In addition there is the assumption that the rejection of discrimination equates to 
the rejection of differentiation, rather than the rejection of unfair differentiation. 
Ironically if this fanciful social narrative becomes a potent social maxitn, then the 
most effective method of expurgating differentiation is by developing the 
biotechnology capable of producing genetically identical humans. 
Taking a step back, an argument can be made that it is an advantage to know 
one's physiological, and possibly even psychological, limitations early in life, so 
one does not pursue pointless goals; and again this already happens, although at a 
much cruder level. A child bom to parents who are both over six feet tall will 
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hopefully realise and accept, reasonably early in life, that a burning ambition to 
become a jockey or coxswain is probably something best forgotten. That is even if 
ý1- - the cultural narrative states one should live the drearn. 
JUrgen Habermas believes individuals who undergo genetic engineering, 
analogous to that in GATTACA, will 'remain blindly dependent on the 
11 nonrevisable decision of another person, without any opportunity to establish the 
symmetrical responsibility required if one is to enter into a retroactive ethical self- 
reflection as a process among peers. For this poor soul there are only two 
alternatives, fatalism and resentment. ' (2003 p. 14) Fatalism due to the illusion that 
tecbnological manipulation has undermined his autonomous potential, and 
resentment because he has been used as a means to his designer's ends, which 
Habermas believes is in direct contravention of Kant's categorical imperative. 
(2003 p. 55) However the fatalism Habermas refers to, has little, or nothing, to do 
with biotechnology per se. For the depression he refers to, appears unlikely to 
arise from simply knowing that you have been genetically engineered, but rather 
from knowing what you have been genetically engineered to become. That is, 
knowing your future genetic predispositions and feeling you cannot avoid them 
even if you tried. Yet these predispositions are not contingent on being subjected 
to genetic engineering, they are applicable to everyone. The irony here is even if 
there was a universal moratorium on human biotechnology, inevitably a simple 
genetic test will be developed that, if conducted at birth, would highlight the 
future predispositions of a person who has not undergone genetic engineering in 
an analogous manner to if they had. Indeed Vincent undergoes such a test in 
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GATTACA: 'Now only seconds old, the exact time and cause of my death was 
already known' [9: 38] and this information forms the basis of his fight against 
genetic discrimination. However Vincent has not undergone genetic selection and 
yet he is no freer from the depressing effects of knowing his genetic 
predisposition than his genetically engineered brother Anton. 
Moreover, Habermas' implication that human biotechnology necessarily 
contravenes the categorical imperative is also somewhat questionable. Kant's 
humanity formulation of the categorical imperative states: 'Act in such a way that 
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at 
the same time as an end, never merely as a means. ' (1785/2002 §32 429 p. 230) 
However the operative word here is "merely", as Johnson (2004) notes: 'the 
Humanity formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly 
this would be an absurd demand, since we do this all the time.... What the 
Humanity formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of Humanity in such 
a way that we treat it as a mere [original emphasis] means to our ends. ' 
A seemingly straightforward biotechnological example of using someone as 
merely a means to an ends would be the cloning of a human for transplant organs. 
An extreme example of this would be to treat a human clone in an analogous 
fashion to a xenotransplant animal. That is to "grow" the human in laboratory 
conditions, with little or no regard of the clone's interests, beyond the healthy 
development of the organs for harvesting, and then at the most medically 
advantageous moment, slaughtering the human for its organs. 
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In a more prosaic form, the breeding of humans for their potential utility has 
already begun. There is legalisation, in the UK, that allows parents to select and 
manipulate embryos facilitating the creation of a child with specific characteristics 
enabling it to be a donor for, say, an already existent sibling. Whilst the idea of 
donor children being harvested for their organs is, at present, inconceivable, a 
more plausible example will be children designed to be tissue or bone-marrow 
donors; and examples, or attempted examples, of this already exist. (BBC 2005) 
Although there may be a social fantasy that having a child is, or at least can be, an 
act of altruism on behalf of the parents, it is little more than an act of egoism. 
Having a (planned) child is a means to an ends, immaterial of gene manipulation. 
However while the intention behind designer siblings may appear comparable 
with that of the cloned organ donor example, this may not be the case. It is clearly 
possible for the would-be parents to have always intended on having another child 
anyway. There does seem to be a substantive difference between using 
biotechnology because it is available, and using it because it is contingent. That is, 
there is a difference between the perspectives: given the choice I would like my 
next child to be a donor child; and: I will only have another child if it is a donor 
child. The latter is an example of having a child merely as a means to an ends, and 
thus a contravention of the categorical imperative, whilst the former is not. 
This position becomes more complicated if the Parents of an ill child decide not to 
have further children, because the earlier child's illness is too demanding. 
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However, if said child not ill, or could be cured by having a donor child, then they 
would want further children. The double-contingency of this situation creates an 
ex post facto parallax in which the donor child will be seen as either a desired 
addition to the family, or an added burden, dependent on the success, or failure., of 
the genetic engineering and treatment. Assuming the categorical imperative is a 
measure of intention, rather than outcome, its non-contravention, in this example, 
can be achieved simply by sidestepping the notion of gambling with the perceived 
"worth" of the donor child i. e., by holding a deluded faith in the absolute efficacy 
of the technology and treatment. 
Nevertheless the conclusion that there is a substantive difference between using 
biotechnology because it is available, and using it because it is contingent (and 
that this difference is whether it contravenes the categorical imperative, or not) 
appears to hold with both donor and non-donor genetically manipulated children. 
If this is the case, then within societies where human biotechnology is socially 
accepted, routine and endemic, like that in GATTACA, the contingency of the 
procedure will, in most part, no longer be part of the parental decision making 
process, for its availability will be assumed. The upshot is, contrary to Habermas, 
that most parents will be extricated from the ability to intend to have a child 
merely as a means to an ends. 
On a symbolic level, it may be argued that the actions and success of Vincent's 
duplicity in GATTACA demonstrates the "human spirit" can triumph over 
adversity and personal limitations, and thus should be allowed to push in 
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directions it may be perceived it should not. Of course, the reality of the situation 
is that Vincent's selfish duplicity undermines the safety of the mission and all of 
its crew. In addition, if someone died as a result of Vincent's deceit, it would not 
only be culturally acceptable to seek punitive action against Vincent, but also to 
seek reparations from the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation for the inadequacy of 
their applicant screening process. Indeed, although Western societies like the idea 
of the spirit running wild, in reality, they try to keep it tightly boxed. 
From the perspective of pragmatics, Vincent's self-exile is an important fact in his 
future deception. It is also emblematic of his wish to distance himself from his 
genetic inheritance. However, even when separated from his family, Vincent still 
belongs 'to a new underclass no longer determined by social status or the colour 
of your skin. No. We now have discrimination down to a science. ' [19: 00] The 
use of language here is important because the narrative implies equivalence, by 
association, between Vincent's situation and contemporary discrimination. Yet 
while Vincent is forever "condemned" to his underclass status - even when in the 
guise of Jerome - it can be argued that the real social success of GATTACA lies 
with his brother Anton; for it is he, rather than Vincent, who gets set free from his 
heredity. Clearly the potency of this viewpoint seems contingent on the perceived 
scope and dynamics of genetic inheritance. In an extreme form, it is believed that 
genetic make-up is fundamental to all aspects of the individual. Heredity is 
therefore perceived as the crux of all social inclusion and exclusion, whether 
culturally acceptable or not. When referring to the screened "pre-embryos" the 
geneticist states: 'I've taken the liberty of eradicating any potentially prejudicial 
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conditions: premature baldness, myopia, alcoholism and addictive susceptibility, 
propensity for violence and obesity, etc. ' [11: 55] The inference here is clear, in 
the world of GATTACA these conditions are deemed hereditary. Now if this is true 
outside the world of celluloid, and the likely transmission of such propensities is 
neither equal nor universal, then the probability of social success can be 
influenced by mate selection. Indeed if certain types of individual are mutually 
attracted, then it is possible for social selection to create and inflict a 
disproportional social hindrance on specific individuals and their progeny. 
However, from this standpoint it appears that only reproductive technologies offer 
those disproportionally disadvantaged a genuine opportunity at equality. That is 
the ability to break from the social constraints resulting from heredity and 
unfettered social selective breeding: 
'In a society where the premium for successful and well-paid work is 
intelligence, people are increasingly getting the kinds of jobs for 
which they are mentally cut out. The intelligentsia of whatever class is 
being selected (and through interbreeding is selecting itself) to 
1ýý 
become a cognitive elite - in, for example, the upper echelons of 
management or education. At the same time, however and as a 
reciprocal to the emergence of the cognitive elite, there is said to be an 
ever-increasing underclass. This is composed of much faster-breeding 
people with lower IQ levels. ' (Dickens 2000 p. 65) 
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Indeed advocates of liberal eugenics will argue that if one takes into consideration 
the apparent failures of the 1960's liberal, social consensus education system and 
its programmes for the socially disadvantaged, genetic selection will not only be 
more effective than current social selective breeding, but it would also be more 
egalitarian. That is, liberal eugenics will enable the enhancement of the underclass 
to a level comparable with that of the social elite, thus establishing genetic parity 
and save the "genetically disadvantaged" from wholesale societal-exclusion and 
incurable mental decay. FernAndez-Armesto notes: 
'Broadly speaking it is a left/right conflict, with supporters of social 
radicalism ranged against those reluctant to make things worse by ill- 
considered attempts at improvement. The controversy crystaffised in 
the late 1960s in the rival reports of Arthur Jensen at Berkeley who 
claimed that 80 per cent of IQ is inherited (and, incidentally, that 
blacks are genetically inferior to whites) and Christopher Jencks and 
others at Harvard who also used IQ statistics to argues the opposite 
case. ' (2005 p. 162) 
Nevertheless, having stated it is reproductive biotechnology that holds the key to 
true equality, many advocates of posthuman technologies will argue that once it 
has been established that there are certain human characteristics worth 
max, nusing (such as inteffigence) and one advocates enhancement for the 
disenfranchised, then advocating universal enhancement naturally follows. 
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However this conclusion appears to be self-undermining, for if everyone was 
enhanced relative to their position, then the social dichotomy would remain. 
While this scenario seems unlikely, a more plausible possibility is that of an 
inequality through market forces. That a social dichotomy will be preserved, or 
may be even enhanced, by the availability of biotechnology being contingent on 
financial capacity. If this were to happen then the financially well-off would 
deploy their fiscal means to ensure that their children, above all others, had the 
best opportunities. Wright warns: 
'Biologists and ethicists have by now expended thousands of words 
warning about slippery eugenic slopes, reflecting on Nazi Germany 
and warning that a govermnent quest for a super race could begin 
anew if we're not vigilant. But the more likely danger is roughly the 
opposite; it isn't that the goverment will get involved in reproductive 
choices, but that it won't. It is when left to the free market that the 
fruits of genome research are most assuredly rotten. ' (Wright 1990 
p. 27) 
Indeed in what is sometimes called the "GA7TACA argument", both critics and 
advocates argue that liberal eugenics in the hands of the consumer would, in all 
probability, "benefit the rich far more than the poor. That they would take the gap 
in power, wealth, and education that currently divides both our society and the 
world at large, and write that division into our very biology. ' (McKibben 2004 
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p. 38) Even biotechnologists like Silver accept: 'The isolation of the poor could 
I- - become even more pronounced as well-off parents provide their children not only 
with the best education money will buy, and the best over-all environment that 
money will buy, but the "best cumulative set of genes" as well. ' (1999 pp. 263- 
264) 
There appears to be three stock responses to this predicament. Firstly, the belief 
that such inequality will become endemic, as those with genetic power will have 
little incentive to share their advantage. Some will consider this sufficient 
justification for the prohibition of liberal eugenics, especially when it is also 
believed nigh impossible to reject such technology once it has commenced. As 
McKibben argues: 'Once the game is under way, in other words, there won't be 
moral decisions, only strategic ones. If the technology is going to be stopped, it 
will have to happen now before it's quite begun. ' (2004 p. 36) 
The second response is to believe that government control can enforce genetic 
equality, without impinging on the will of the individual, Hughes' position is: 'For 
the new transhuman era to fully empower people politically and technologically 
we need a democratic transhumanist movement fighting both for our right to 
control out bodies with technology, and for the democratic control, regulation and 
equitable distribution of those technologies. ' (2004 p. xvi) 
The third standpoint centres on worries concerning authoritarian governments 
imposing on the freedom of the individual. Reflecting confidence in the market, 
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Silver's more laissez-faire attitude argues: 'If it is within the rights of parents to 
spend $100,000 for an exclusive private school education, why is it not also 
within their rights to spend the same amount of money to make sure that a child 
inherits a particular set of their genesT (1999 p. 264) 
Whilst future reproductive technology is likely to miffor the same social 
dichotomy and equitable distribution of services as contemporary societies, it is 
more than a little ironic that the final cut of "dystopian7' GA7TACA portrays a 
seemingly utopian environment where these issues have been solved. The film 
does not depict any overt race or gender discrimination, or the selective 
eradication of other distinguishing features. Indeed the black geneticist gives 
Vincent's parents a teasing look when he reads their character selections for 
Anton: 'Now you have specified hazel eyes, dark hair, fair skin. ' [11: 49] In 
addition, GAITACA depicts a society where there is no draconian govermuent 
imposition on the individual to use gene technology and no economic constraints 
that hinder its equal distribution. For while Vincent is bom without genetic 
manipulation, when his parents decide to have a second child, the option to use 
such technology seems openly available to them If anything, the method of 
Vincent's conception, and thus his underclass status, seems to be contingent on 
the principles of the parents; although it can be further argued the nature of 
Anton's conception suggests these principles are a luxury his parents cannot redly 
afford. 
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Nevertheless the decision, by Vincent's parents5 to utilise reproductively 
manipulation when having a second child raises questions relating to whether 
there is a substantive difference between the selection methods of historical and 
liberal eugenics. Agar argues that: 
'VAiile old-fashioned authoritarian eugenicists sought to produce 
citizens out of a single centrally designed mould, the distinguishing 
mark of the new liberal eugenics is state neutrality. Access to 
information about the full range of genetic therapies will allow 
prospective parents to look to their own values in selecting 
improvements for future children. Authoritarian eugenicists would do 
away with ordinary procreative freedoms. Liberals instead propose 
radical extension of them. ' (1999 p. 17 1) 
However, while the liberal eugenics portrayed in GAITACA appears to allow 
greater parental freedom and choice than the authoritarian and prescriptive 
eugenics of Huxley's day, this may be an illusion. In a telling section of 
voiceover, Vincent declares with bewilderment and possible exacerbation that: 
'I'll never understand what possessed my mother to put her faith in God's hands 
rather than those of her local geneticists. ' [09: 23] It is certainly plausible for a 
child to feel resentment towards their parents for not imbuing them with the social 
advantages associated with reproductive technology. Indeed Vincent's inherited 
heart disorder appears to be the most likely factor behind his parent's decision 
that: 'Like most other parents of their day, they were determined that their next 
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child would be brought into the world in what has become the natural way. ' 
[11: 03] The "natural way" being with the use of genetic selection and 
manipulation. 
Whilst initial social pressure to use genetic selection will likely fall only on those 
with known heredity illness, it seems inevitable that the coercion to consume will, 
eventually, encapsulate all aspects of would-be parenting. Silver believes: 'It is 
individuals and couples who want to reproduce themselves in their own images... 
who want their children to be happy and successful... not governments - who will 
seize control of these new technologies. ' (1999 p. 10) 
Indeed rational choice theory, such as Hardin's The Tragedy of the Commons 
(1968), argues that rational beings will seek to maximise their own interests, even 
if this is at the detriment of the collective. This is because the gains made by the 
individual are wholly theirs; while the losses incurred are shared among the 
group. Applied to liberal eugenics this theory suggests that would-be parents, who 
believe genetic selection is advantageous to their prospective child, are act' 
rationally by participating in selection, even if they also believe such technology 
is detrimental to society. 
-; Indeed, in a society that values individual freedom above all else, it is 
hard to find any legitimate basis for restricting the use of 
reprogenetics. And therein lies the dilenuna. For while each individual 
use of the technology can be viewed in the light of personal 
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reproductive choice - with no ability to change society at large - 
together they could have dramatic, unintended, long-term 
consequences. ' (Silver 1999 p. 11) 
In addition some advocates will argue, once the fundamental issue of safety has 
been addressed, the enormous therapeutic potential of gene selection will 
transform its social acceptability and make its use a moral imperative. Hughes 
cites Singer's "preventive principle": 'For any condition X, if it would be a form 
of child abuse for parents to inflict X on their child soon after birth, then it must, 
other things being equal, at least be permissible to take steps to prevent one's 
child having that condition. ' (Singer 2003) 
From this Hughes concludes: 'the parent who doesn't take reasonable, available 
steps to ensure that their future child has normal abilities is as morally culpable 
for their child's disabilities as the parent who causes those disabilities after birth. ' 
(2004 p. 147) It would seem, from Hughes' perspective, Vincent's parents' 
decision not to use gene selection for their first child, was both frivolous and 
negligent, and it is they who are not only biologically accountable for Vincent's 
underclass status, but morally responsible for it as well. Of course if Hughes' 
position became socially dominant, it would seem plausible to envisage a society 
where decisions on gene selection are viewed as de facto tests of parental fitness, 
thus adding to the social pressure to use. 
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WWle this standpoint may seem a little extreme to some in contemporary society,, 
there are signs - for example the increasing use of prenatal testing - that it is 
gaining social approval, especially among would-be and actual parents to whom 
such decisions are not theoretical abstracts. In fact it would already seem quite 
unlikely to find parents who, having seen Vincent's predicament, would then 
admonish his parents for their actions regarding Anton"s conception. Moreover if 
GATTACA had depicted Vincent's parents being told, prior to Vincent's 
conception, that conceiving a child would likely result in the transmission of heart 
disease or underclass status, many in contemporary society would condemn their 
decision not to use the genetic technology available. Indeed it should be noted that 
Vincent's character is depicted as sufficiently single-minded to reverse his 
parents' decision if the technology existed. That is, if there were sufficiently 
potent gene therapy to reverse his genetic status, Vincent would willingly 
supersede his parent's wishes and become a member of the "healthy" social elite, 
postfacto. 
If anything, GAITACA's portrayal of parental decision-making surrounding gene 
selection becomes increasingly implausible the more it is examined. For as long 
as gene selection is seen as a method for helping would-be parents to ensure Ir 
progeny has the best chance of a healthy and successful fife, then liberal 
democracies will embrace the technology with such self-righteous gusto that 
social coercion to consume becomes analogous to authoritarian enforcement. 
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As a result, and in keeping with other contemporary social issues, if there is social 
disquiet over liberal eugenics, it is most likely to originate from those without 
access, rather than from those with access. Indeed, if demands are made, it will 
not be that those with access should be refused access, but rather those without 
access should also have access. 
Better Humans.. Safer Machines? 
Film: RoboCop (1987) 
Married father of one "Alex Murphy" is a Detroit police 
officer who has just been transferred from the pleasant 
precinct of Metro South, to crime ridded Old Detroit, 
on behest of Omni Consumer Products (OCP) "the firm 
which recently entered into a contract with the city to 
fund and run the Detroit Metro Police Department. y 
[2: 131 
At the same time "Dick Jones" president of OCP is co- 
chairing a meeting in which he plans to unveil and 
demonstrate ""ED-209". A 'self-sufficient law 
enforcement robotf [10: 391 developed by "Security 
Concepts"r a subsidiary of ocp, in an attempt to assist 
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the police with their struggle to reduce crime prior to 
the redevelopment of Old Detroit. 
Unfortunately the demonstration of ED-209's "arrest and 
disarming procedure" results in the death of an OCP 
executive. However while Jones attempts to assure the 
CEO that this was simply a glitch, a temporary setback, 
executive "Bob Morton" makes him aware of the "RoboCop" 
programme he has developed, "as a contingency against 
just this sort of thing. f [13: 01] 
Out on patrol, Murphy and his newly assigned partner 
""Lewis" respond to an "all units" call that "a 211" (an 
armed robbery) is in progress. After an initial armed 
confrontation with the criminals, Murphy and Lewis lose 
track of the getaway van, only to relocate it,, now 
abandoned, at the old steel mill. Murphy and Lewis then 
enter the premises without back-up and are captured by 
the robbers. Nevertheless Lewis manages to escapes, but 
Murphy is mortally wounded and later dies in hospital. 
Evidently given the green light to proceed with the 
RoboCop programme, Morton now presides over what 
appears to be the "cyborganisation" of the dead police 
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officer (Murphy), a process that in this instance 
involves a morbid discussion on whether to keep the 
remaining human arm. The point is resolved, and "total 
body prosthesis" determined, after Morton is reassured 
that the subject: "signed the release forms when he 
joined the force. He's legally dead. We can do pretty 
much what we want to him. ' [27: 36] 
In addition to its powerful armoured mechanical body,, 
"fastest reflexes modern technology has to offer, 
onboard computer assisted memory and a lifetime of on- 
the-street law enforcement programming' [28: 57], the 
cyborg: "RoboCop" has also been programmed with f our 
prime directives. The first being: Serve the public 
trust,, the second: Protect the innocent, the third: 
Uphold the law, and a fourth which is classified. 
Installed into service within the Old Detroit police 
precinct, RoboCop displays such superiority as a law 
enforcement officer that Security Concepts is 
Aprojecting the end of crime in Old Detroit within 
forty days. ' [42: 01] However this prediction is brought 
into question after three events happen in quick 
succession. Firstly, RoboCop has a dream, in which he 
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recalls his death as officer Murphy; something that is 
meant to be impossible,, as his support team believe 
they have successfully erased his past memory. 
Secondly, Lewis challenges RoboCop to recognise himself 
as Murphy. Thirdly, whilst patrolling the streets, 
RoboCop happens upon a robbery in progress, the 
perpetrator of which he recognises as a member of the 
gang that killed Murphy. 
Having now acknowledged his past life as Murphy, 
RoboCop becomes obsessed with apprehending his ultimate 
killer, gang leader: "Clarence Boddicker". In the 
meantime Jones, still smarting from the ED-209 debacle, 
has Boddicker kill Morton for usurping his influence 
over Security Concepts; but unfortunately for Jones, 
Boddicker "spills his guts" to RoboCop regarding this 
working relationship after being caught and arrested. 
Boddicker' s testimony prompts RoboCop to arrest Jones 
at OCP headquarters, but is foiled by "Directive Four", 
which Jones explains is his 'little contribution to 
your psychological profile. Any attempt to arrest a 
senior officer of OCP results in shutdown. f [70: 46] 
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Seemingly able to avoid total shutdown RoboCop flees 
the building, pursued initially by an ED-209, and then 
a large number of Police Officers who have been given 
the order, probably by Jones, to destroy RoboCop. 
Escaping to the old steel mill with Lewis, RoboCop is 
then hunted-down by Boddicker and his gang. Having 
eliminated their threat, RoboCop returns to OCP 
headquarters to give the executive board testimony 
regarding Jones' involvement in Morton's murder and 
explain the limitations of Directive Four. Jonesf 
response is to retrieve a handgun and take the CEO 
hostage. However this action backfires when the quick- 
witted CEO dismisses Jones, thus releasing him from 
Directive Four association. 
Having shot Jones repeatedly resulting in his 
unquestionable death, RoboCop is then thanked by the 
CEO and asked for his name, to which he replies: 
"Murphy". [97: 031 
Hans Moravec believes that humans will rush headlong into the era of intelligent 
machines, in fact: 'we have very little choice, if our culture is to remain viable. ' 
(1988 p. 100) The reason for this seems to be a "slippery-slope" argument based 
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on the belief that technological development is inextricable from human 
evolution. Human societies and economies are, like biological organisms, subject 
to evolutionary pressures. Having developed and embraced increasingly efficient 
methods of production in an effort to gain advantage over their cultural 
competitors, mankind has become locked into a never-ending battle to stay one 
technological step ahead. If any nation had the temerity to halt unilaterally their 
technological evolution, the result for that nation would be to 'succumb either to 
A. 1- - 
the military might of unfriendly nations or to the economic success of its trading 
partners. ' (1988 p. 101) 
AlthOugh not specifically framed as POSthunlani, this thinking permeates 
throughout the posthuman debate. Hughes uses the same - if we do not, they will 
- standpoint in an attempt to provoke lethargic democrats into support' 
posthuman technologies. Arguing that 'democrats need to embrace transhuman 
enhancement is that it may be the only way to keep liberal and social democracies 
competitive with authoritarian regimes. ' He goes on to clarify that: 'Of course I'm 
thinking of China. ' (2005 p. 200) 
Whilst the vast majority of those who embrace the technological slippery-slope 
argument are unwilling to contemplate an alternate conclusion, believing the 
universal cessation of technological progress, or even its decline, is patently 
inconceivable, Moravec is at least willing to contemplate its most devastating and 
inescapable outcOme: 
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'If, by some unlikely pace, the whole human race decided to eschew 
progress, the long-term result would be almost certain extinction. The 
universe is one random event after another. Sooner or later an 
unstoppable virus deadly to humans will evolve, or a major asteroid 
will collide with the earth, or the sun will explode, or we will be 
invaded from the stars, or a black hole will swallow the galaxy. ' (1988 
P. 101) 
This prediction seems a little bizarre, not in its content but rather the fact that it 
has been aired in the first place. For it is more than a little tenuous of Moravec to 
repudiate technological cessation based solely on unforeseen catastrophes and the 
long-term mortality of the human species, living on a dynamic Earth, orbiting a 
fading star. Scientists have, for decades, been estimating the lifespan of the sun, 
Hawking believes: 'Our star has probably got enough fuel for another five 
thousand million years or so' (1989 p. 83), and there are many hypotheses 
regarding the ultimate fate of the universe. Yet very few ponder what humans will 
be doing at these points in time; assuming that they wifl either be extinct, or that it 
is rather meaningless to talk about such distant predictions. Indeed many argue 
that contemporary technoscience is an equally plausible threat to human 
extinction as deadly vinms, near earth object impact, or alien invasion. 
Nevertheless the reason why the extinction argument is so potent to Moravec is 
I- - because he seems to have transcended the view that human species will die out, or 
more precisely he believes humans are potentially immortal: 'By growing rapidly 
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enough, a culture has a finite chance of surviving forever... I will fantasize about 
schemes that would allow an entity to restructure itself so as to function 
indefinitely even as its universe ended. ' (1988 p. 101) Indeed Moravec truly 
believes that a posthuman entity, or "our successors" (1988 p. 149) could become 
immortal. 
'RoboCop conveys an intense awareness of our new "postmodern 
condifion7'. It articulates the fear of a completely alienated, 
-rationalized, mechanical world where human beings and their body 
parts are technologically processed, where emotions are lacking, 
where the ego is in ruins, where personal identity is absent, and where 
simulation approaches perfectiom The fear in RoboCop is two-fold: 
that human beings will be replaced by machines (automation), and 
that human beings are becoming machines (alienation), spiritually and 
emotionally lifeless rationalists, technologically processed and 
simulated beings. ' (Best 1987) 
RoboCop is a socio-political satire, dystopian allegory of future technology and a 
utopian showcase for the posthuman. While the plot is interlaced with a damning 
social commentary on corruption and technological hubris, the main action 
appears to follow an idealised posthuman. narrative, firstly by hyping anxiety 
towards automation, then countering this with posthuman alienation, and finally 
unmasks this alienation as exaggerated. 
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Borrowing from past science fiction narratives RoboCop's portrayal of 
automation is replete with failure. ED-209's arrest procedure "mishap") is not only 
an example of faulty hardware: 'It didn't hear the gun drop. He didn't hear itV 
[12: 331 but also of faulty software, of programming safeguards. Safeguard 
inadequacy is revisited in an apparent homage to the WarGames narrative and as a 
side crack at both the Strategic Defence Initiative and its, soon to be retiring, 
sponsor US President Reagan. Here "Media Break" reports on another automation 
failure: 'Ten thousand acres of wooded residential land were scorched in an 
instant when a laser canon aboard the Strategic Defence Peace Platform misfired 
today during routine start-up tests... it was a day of mourning for the families of 
113 people known dead at this hour, among them, two former United States 
presidents who had retired in the Santa Barbara area. ' [76: 321 The issue of 
malevolent/benevolent usurpation of automaton control, highlighted in Asimov's 
"The Evitable Conflict", is played out when corrupt OCP President Dick Jones 
unleashes ED-209 on RoboCop after his failed arrest attempt: 'Maybe you'd like 
to meet a friend of mineT [71: 21] In addition, Murphy's transformation into 
RoboCop contains elements of pseudo-automation i. e., procedures that attempt to 
make him act like an automaton. For example when his memory is erased and 
when, in an obvious parody of Asimov's three laws of robotics, he is programmed 
with the four prime directives. Both of these procedures have limited success, 
with RoboCop having memory flashbacks and being able to circumvent certain 
elements of the prime directives. As Best argues: 'Throughout the film we see the 
human world trying to master nature but ultimately failing. Thus, the numerous 
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failures of ED-209,, the power failure at the SDI space station and its subsequent 
misfires, the return of RoboCop's memory and former identity despite 
computerised programming, all signal the film's critique of technological 
reification as a flawless cybernetic control over the human life-world, albeit one 
already integrated with technology. ' (1987) 
A . 
0. 
Aner the OCP executive is gunned down by ED-209, Bob Morton describes the 
'RoboCop programme as 'a contingency against just this sort of thing. ' [13: 01] 
One is left to ponder whether he simply means in case of failure in the primary 
project (ED-209), or whether it is a loaded comment implying the inevitable 
failure of such automation? This said it appears unlikely that he is referring to 
doubt regarding the value of technoscience, for both projects clearly deal with 
cutting-edge technology. Indeed RoboCop glorifies both technological failure and 
its success; this is nowhere more evident than in the portrayal of Murphy's death 
and RoboCop's "birth7', as Wood states: 'conventional medical technology fails to 
save the severely injured Murphy.... This failure of conventional technology is 
counterpoised with the success of unconventional technologies, ones that have the 
capacity not only to keep the body of Murphy alive, but also to radically 
transform the notion of being alive. ' (2002 p. 164) 
VAilst Murphy's death was clearly not one of old age, and it would normally be 
expected that every effort would be made in an attempt to preserve his life, 
somehow his reincarnation as the potentially immortal RoboCop seems to exceed 
this expectation. In fact, for many, the idea that man might harness posthuman 
144 
technologies to transcend death fills them with great apprehension, as McKibben 
writes: 
'No generation of writers or thinkers has ever before faced the actual 
possibility of immortality. Always before, it's been a symbolic or 
religious or figurative prospecti, not something to be accomplished 
with gene regulation or nanotechnology wizardry or silicon-flesh 
connections. There's been no time to let the idea gestate in our various 
cultures. But it fills me with the blackest foreboding. It would 
represent, finally, the ultimate and irrevocable divorce between 
ourselves and everything else. ' (2004 p. 165) 
For many, this position seems counterintuitive, Broderick believes: 'Defeating 
death and planning rejuvenation are goals no more absurd than finding remedies 
for shortsightedness and asthma' (1999 p. 20 1) The reasonableness of this position 
is grounded in a commonsense perception of the good life. Morbidity and 
mortality are patently reviled throughout the First World and vast financial 
resources are ubiquitously invested in the creation and sustenance of institutions 
specifically designed to reduce morbidity and, by association, increase longevity. 
The question of slowing, or reversing, this process, either by the stagnation or 
cessation of medical funding, seems palpably absurd; and many believe it is 
equally absurd to restrict medical progress by outlawing posthuman technologies. 
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Indeed, this latter proposition seems beyond many of those who vehemently 
oppose the posthuman. Fukuyama adopts the seemingly popular contradiction of 
attacking posthuman enhancement whilst accepting, even applauding, what can 
only be described as "posthuman therapy". While he accepts: 'The distinction 
between therapy and enhancement has been attacked on the grounds that there is 
no way to distinguish between the two in theory and therefore no way of 
discrimination in practice' (2002 p. 209), his proposed solution seems to be little 
more than drawing subjective lines in windswept sand: 
'One obvious way to draw lines is to distinguish between therapy and 
enhancement, directing research towards the former while putting 
restrictions on the latter. The original purpose of medicine is, after all, 
to heal the sick, not to turn healthy people into gods. We don't want 
star athletes to be hobbled by bad knees or torn ligaments, but we also 
don't want them to compete on the basis of who has taken the most 
steroids. This general principle would allow us to use biotechnologies 
to, for example, cure genetic diseases like Huntingdon's chorea or 
cystic fibrosis, but not to make our children more intelligent or taller. ' 
(Fukuyama 2002 pp. 208-209) 
Nevertheless, whilst many in the First World will view the outlawing of certain 
posthuman technologies as counterintuitive, they will openly scom those who 
suggest mortality is to be revered and embraced. 
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V,, I IK. ass (2004 pp. 266-267) offers four reasons why he believes "our finitude" may 
be of benefit. Firstly, he doubts that the pleasure of life would increase 
proportionately to any life extension. Secondly, he doubts whether life can be 
serious or meaningful without the limit of mortality. Thirdly, he believes 
awareness of mortality, ours and others, is the key to understanding love and 
beauty. Fourthly, he believes mortality allows the moral excellence of being able 
to give or fight for one's life. In response to these sentiments, Aubrey de Grey 
writes: 
'Possibly the most absurd argument opposing the effort to cure human 
aging is that to extend our lives indefinitely would be unnatural: 
would render us in some sense no longer human. The feature that, in 
. my view, places this argument above all others 
in the absurdity stakes 
is the enormity of what it overlooks within its own scope. To stand 
back and (by one's inaction) cause someone to die soon, when one 
could act to let them live in good health for a lot longer at no (or even 
modest) cost to oneself or anyone else, is arguably the second most 
unnatural thing a human can do, second only (and by a very small 
margin) to causing someone's death by an explicit action. To ask 
humanity to accept -Ehe naturalness" argument against life extension, 
and on that basis to delay the development of a cure for aging, is thus 
to ask it to transform itself into something as un-human as can be 
ined. ' ( 'Grey 2004 p. 1) 
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In contrast others argue both Kass and Grey's positions are little more than 
fanciful humanist nonsense. Fernindez-Armesto notes: 'Our obsessive desire to 
prolong our lives seems odd when so many of them are empty or filled only with 
meretricious comforts or rewards. ' (2005 p. 156) For FernAndez-Armesto, life can 
neither gain value nor meaning, from death, nor loses such things from 
immortality. This is because life simply has no value or meaning. Indeed, while 
political philosophers may argue that social stability is best served with self- 
oppression (one where the social imagination has reffied the social contract into 
delusions of morality grounded in ideological, or religious, authority), to suggest 
it is unnatural to allow someone to die either by inaction or killing them, is to 
have completely lost sight of the human as animal, and morality as social 
construct. Death is neither to be spurned nor accepted, it is to be ignored. As John 
eli - Gray argues: 
'We think we differ from other animals because we can envision our 
deaths, when we know no more than they do about what death brings. 
Everything tells us that it means extinction, but we cannot begin to 
imagine what that means. The truth is, we do not fear the passing of 
time because we know death. We fear death because we resist passing 
time. If other animals do not fear death as we do, it is not because we 
know something they do not. It is because they are not burdened by 
time. ' (2003 p. 130) 
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These opi i inions are clearly academic to the baby food eating immortal RoboCop, 
as Wilson notes: 'the transformation of the dead, or ahnost-dead. policeman, into a 
cyborg requires the elimination of most of his body other than his face and 
brain.... It is never made clear how much body Murphy retains, other than his 
brain which has been modified by the implantation of a programmable chip... but 
a metal shaft driven into the area above his heart does not harm him. ' (1995 
p. 251) 
Bostrom and Sandberg believe enhancing human cognition can be achieved via a 
number of methods, many of which are uncontroversial. and have little to do with 
posthuman technologies: 
'Education and training, as well as the use of external information 
processing devices, may be labelled as "conventional" means of 
enhancing cognition. They are often well established and culturally 
accepted. By contrast, methods of enhancing cognition through 
"unconventional" means, such as ones involving deliberately creating 
nootropic drugs, gene therapy, Or neural implants, are nearly all to be 
regarded as experimental at the present time. ' (2007 p-2) 
MjirrOring the RoboCop naffative, Warwick believes humans can be augmented by 
connecting 'extra memory or extra processing capabilities directly on to the brain, 
possibly in the form of silicon chips". (1998 p. 267) An obvious advantage of 
compatibility between brain and computer will be the ability to upload and 
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download digital information. However, while RoboCop displays the advantages 
of being able to upload infonnation, specifically when he inputs data into the 
police computer [53-, 52], and relays Jones' testimony to the OCP executive 
[95: 49]; little is made of any download capacity. Indeed it is possible for his "law 
enforcement" and "directives" programming to have been embedded in his source 
code rather than downloaded afterwards. Interestingly, it is The Matrix that 
contains the techno-enthusiasts most definitive demonstration of brain 
downloading. Here Neo, looks towards a helicopter and asks Trinity 'Can you fly 
that thing? ' Her answer is 'Not yet. ' [ 102: 52] Seconds later, having asked Tank to 
upload the pilots programme into her brain, she can fly it without having 
undergone the rigmarole of months, if not years, of flight school. 
In response to this some will undoubtedly argue that present day humans fail to 
utilise the fiffl extent of the brain; and if anything human society is moving into an 
era where the brain is needed even less. In First-World societies, the ability to 
access information is becoming more important than the information itself The 
irony with The Matrix example is that 'as computer technology evolves, the air 
force seems more likely to eliminate than enhance pilots. ' (Stock 2002 p. 24) 
Indeed, ever increasing automation seems more likely to result in the complete 
elimination of the human user. Soon transportation, as with many other devices, 
may lose all manual controls, at which point only computers will need to know 
how they are utilised. 
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As RoboCop is unveiled, Morton announces: 'We get the best of both worlds. The 
fastest reflexes modem technology has to offer, onboard computer assisted 
memory and a lifetime of on-the-street law enforcement programming. ' [28: 55] 
The implication here seems to be that RoboCop, has some fundamental advantage 
that separates him from the competition, assumedly ED-209. However Morton"s 
list only contains attributions that are patently within the scope of an intelligent 
robot, including the ability to upload and download information. it must therefore 
be assumed that the audience has missed the part where Morton explains the 
benefits of RoboCop's clearly definable human element. 
The advantage of developing a posthuman rather than a robot law enforcement 
officer is questioned further with the terse and dispassionate manner in which 
RoboCop interacts with an assault victimý stating clinically: 'Madam, you have 
suffered an emotional shock, I will notify a rape crisis centre. ' [37: 40] However 
as the narrative develops the benefits of placing a human inside the machine 
I- - mcomes increasingly apparent, although some (are possibly unintended. 
One presumable benefit of being posthuman is RoboCop's ability to understand 
directives that, unlike Asimov's laws, contain a level of abstraction. Such 
flexibility is superior not only to the technological sophistication of the timeframe, 
it is certainly in advance of ED-209, but possibly beyond some contemporary 
humans. The result of this is that while RoboCop follows the standard pattern of 
safeguard deviation and reinterpretation shown in many science fiction 
automatons, his human dimension acts as a safeguard par excellence. At no point 
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do questions arise regarding whether RoboCop understands his orders, can be 
reasoned with, or is dangerously out of control. On the two occasions RoboCop 
seems to transcend the directives: firstly when he does not completely shutdown 
after attempting to arrest Jones, even though Jones specifically states: 'Any 
attempt to arrest a senior officer of OCP results in shutdown' [70: 501; and 
secondly his intentions to murder Boddicker: 'I'm not arresting you anymore' 
[92: 06]; these do not seem errors in programming, but rather reassuring human 
influences. Even the idea of shooting Boddicker can be viewed from a position of 
empathy and understanding rather than of horror at technology run amuck. Indeed 
by seemingly venting his anger and frustration at the futility of arresting a 
recidivist murderer, with connections that aflow him to circumvent the law, 
RoboCop's actions are akin to the: "taking the law into his own hands" of Dirty 
Hany (1971) CaUahan, rather than rampaging ED-209. This view is of course 
compounded when RoboCop makes such quips as 'Your move, creep' [37: 23] the 
term "creep" conspicuously lacking the pejorative impact of "-punIC'. 
While it can be argued that placing man inside the machine may be seen as the 
ultimate safeguard against increasingly intelligent technology, RoboCop's unique 
position highlights an obvious danger. Warwick and several of his students 
believe "the big issue" surrounding posthuman technology is: 'If cyborgs are 
created with superhuman capabilities from a normal human start point then it 
certainly brings about a threat to humanity itself... After all, when cyborgs 
exhibiting an intelligence that far surpasses that of humans are brought about, it 
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will surely be the cyborgs themselves that make any decisions about how they 
Liteat humans. ' (2002 p. 239) 
At this point the human element of a posthuman may become a liability, as 
humans are all too susceptible to corruption by power. Indeed, if there were only a 
few prototype posthumans, ontologically different from the general populous, it 
may be possible for them to run arnuck. A by-product of RoboCop's socio- 
political satire is the representation of many characters that are far less wholesome 
than the idealised Murphy. The single-minded, self-serving, back-stabling of 
corporate, and gangster, politics highlights a number of inherent flaws in such 
technology having a human element. However in a seemingly throw-away 
comment regarding the potential threat posthumans might pose to humans, 
Warwick ponders that: 'Perhaps the development of direct, mi'litary-style cyborgs 
might be possible to avoid. ' (2002 p. 239) Unfortunately this sentiment seems 
wholly disconnected from the realities of modern warfare, as Gray argues: 
'In the postmodern military, cybernetics is the dominant metaphor, 
computers the most important force multiplier, and the cyborg man- 
machine weapons system the ideal. The military expends vast 
resources to transform solders into cyborgs. Already human-machine 
interfaces have improved incredibly, and now information is 
displayed on windshields, visors, or even directly into the eyes of 
weapons operators. The field of virtual reality came out of this 
research. There are also projects studying psychopharmological 
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modifications that reprogram soldiers so they can fight without fear in 
the hyperlethal battle space of postmodern war. Other research seeks 
to develop direct mind-computer communications for infantrymen 
wearing cxoskeletons, as weU as for tank drivers, submarine 
steersmen, and aircraft pilots. ' (2002 p. 58) 
Warwick's comments also clearly fail to acknowledge Moravec's argument that 
the main driving force behind posthuman development will be competition with 
other nations. Wbile there may be scientific interest, medical advantage, and 
economic gain to be had from pioneering such technologies, nation state paranoia 
I- - has tended to focus initial questions regarding the best utilisation of new 
technoscience on the military. In this sense, the posthuman may, contrary to 
Warwick's beliefs, constitute a similar threat to the humanity as intelligent 
machines. 
Of course, there are those who believe posthumans like RoboCop will never exist. 
Stock argues that: 'Such techno-exuberance, though an increasing influence on 
our culture, is far-fetched. Our flesh is a dense three-dimensional matrix of 
biological cells, ill suited for a permanent, working union with broad arrays of 
sensitive electronic probes. ' (2002 p-21) He also believes: 
'The problem with Ray Kurzweil's vision goes much deeper than 
mere technical feasibility. Even if in thirty years from now, as he 
predicts, we could buy machines with the computational power of a 
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thousand human brains for $1,000, program it effectively, and 
somehow shunt it into our brains, why would we? So steeped are we 
in the culture of artificial intelligence and special effects that at first 
this sounds like a ludicrous question. Such an amazing augmentation 
surely would transform us mere morals into cyber-demigods. Yet 
when I try to think of what I might gain by having a working link 
between my brain and a supercomputer, I am stymied if I insist on two 
criteria: that the benefits could not be as easily achieved through some 
other, non-invasive procedure, and that the benefits must be worth the 
discomforts of brain surgery. As I see it, an actual brain-computer link 
would bring us almost nothing that our sense - fed by tiny external 
devices such as miniature speakers to whisper in our ears and fibre- 
optic eyeglass projectors to tbrow images onto our retinas - could 
not. ' (Stock 2002 p. 23) 
Similarly Mazlish believes man's next step will be 'the coming into being, at the 
hands of humans, of a new type of species, the thinking machine. ' (1993 p. 223) 
For Mazlish the flesh is an obvious boundary to the posthuman and therefore 
believes the future lays rather in the creation of intelligent computers and their 
implantation into robotic bodies, creating the "combot", the computer robot. 
(1993 p. 224) Mazlish continues: 'There seem to be no bounds, in principle, to the 
expansion of intelligence in such machines. They seem prepared to take off from 
the limits reachedDy '--- the human brain. ' (1993 p. 225) Unlike Warwick, Mazlish 
appears untbreatened by such machines: 'However the combot develops, I do not 
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believe that it will replace humans. Like other species, it will become one that 
coexists alongside them, in symbiotic relation. ' (1993 p-232) 
Wifilst Moravec, like Warwick, rejects Mazlish's optinism arguing: 'intelligent 
machines, however benevolent, threaten our existence because they are alternative 
inhabitants of our ecological niche' (1988 p. 100), he does not see the posthuman 
as the prosthetics of RoboCop. Instead he believes the future lies in brain 
uploading. Agreeing with the limitations of the flesh, Moravec's solution to being 
superseded by intelligent machines and possible human extinction, is to propose 
uploading human minds and downloading them directly into computers: 
'It is easy to imagine human thought freed from bondage to a mortal 
body - belief in an afterlife is common. But it is not necessary to 
adopt a mystical or religious stance to accept the possibility. 
Computers provide a model for even the most ardent mechanist. A 
computation in progress - what we can reasonably call a computer's 
thought process - can be halted in midstep and transferred, as program 
and data read out of the machine" s memory, into a physicaUy different 
computer, there to resume as though nothing had happened. Imagine 
that a human mind might be freed from its brain in some analogous (if 
much more technically challenging) way. ' (1988 p. 4) 
This idea is wholly unlike the Posthuman cognitive enhancements discussed by 
Bostrom and Sandberg (2007), as Warwick points out: 'Hans [Moravec] 
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suggested that as humans we could fight back [against intelligent machines] by 
become machines ourselves. ' (2002 p. 70) The major objection to becoming a 
machine in this fashion revolves around a disagreement between, what Moravec's 
caUs, the "body-identity" and the "pattem-identity" position. (1988 pp. 116-117) 
The conflict between these two perspectives can be explained with reference to 
the teleportation technology of Cronenberg's The f7y. Although clearly a 
fantastical method of transportation, there seems to be two obvious theoretical 
methods of teleporting someone. The first would be for telepod-A to conduct a 
complete body-scan and atomise subject- 1. Then to transport, via a conduit, 
subject- I's atomised body to telepod B, where it is reassembled using the 
blueprint gleaned from the body scan. The second method would be for telepod-A 
to conduct a complete body-scan of and destroy subject-1. Then to transmit, 
digitally, the body scan information to telepod B, where it is decoded and used to 
generate an exact copy of subject-I at the atomic level. The major difference 
between these processes is that the first method transports the subject whereas the 
second destroys it and creates a copy. Becoming a posthuman machine would 
entail using the second method; the same one Brundle implies is used by the 
telepods of The Ry: 'The computer is giving us its interpretation of a steak. It's 
translating it for us, it's re-thinking it rather than reproducing it, and something's 
getting lost in the translation. ' [25-411 
Moravec lu,,, c.,,, Iieves, as with the pattern-identity position, that there is no difference 
between subject-I and copy of subject-1. As such, copy of subject-I wifl exit 
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telepod-B with exactly the same knowledge and thought processes of subject-1, 
even the illusion of remembering stepping into telepod-A. The process will be one 
of complete continuity. Yet others may see things differently, as Moravec admits, 
the body-identity position argues: 
I-Dp 
Regardless of how the copying is done, the end result will be a new 
person. If it is I who wn being copied, the copy, though it may think 
of itself as me, is simply a self-deluded impostor. If the copying 
process destroys the original, then I have been killed. That the copy 
may then have a great time exploring the universe using my name and 
my skills is no comfort to my mortal remains. ' (198 8 p. 116) 
Of course subject destruct may not be a necessary element of copying a brain to 
be inputted into a machine, although ironically, as has already been mentioned, it 
may be necessary in teleportation to avoid duplication. However if the telepods 
were used as a duplicator, then it becomes easy to get to the nub of the conflict. 
Moravec's stance is that if subject- I were duplicated in the teleportation process - 
resulting in subject-1 stepping out of telepod-A and copy of subject-I stepping out 
of telepod-B - then it would be meaningless for subject-I to claim primacy over 
copy of subject-1, for they are ostensible the same. This said, many will argue this 
position is counterintuitive. Nevertheless, when someone successfully downloads 
a file from say the web, it seems meaningless to refer to this file as a copy, rather 
than the original, for the information held on both systems is identical. The crux 
of this argument therefore seems to depend on the acceptance, or rejection, of the 
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premise that human identity is an illusion and the human mind is simply 
biological information that is independent of the medium in which it is conveyed. 
Whilst Moravec's ideas may seem a flight of fantasy, it should be noted that 
Warwick not only agrees with its technical feasibility, he implies such work is 
already underway, although at a much lower level: 'All of this, though, requires 
the ability to obtain a detailed plan of the way a human brain is arranged. 
Technically we are at present a long way from achieving this. Indeed, we are only 
just about able to do such a thing with lower insects. ' (1998 p. 266) In fact 
Moravec's work seems to reflect the musing of former Chief of the Theoretical 
Division at NASA, Robert Jastrow: 
'At last the human brain, ensconced in a computer, has been liberated 
from the weaknesses of mortal flesh. Connected to cameras, 
instruments and engine controls, the brain sees, feels, and responds to 
stimuli. It is in control of its own destiny. The machine is its body; it 
is the machine's mind. The union of mind and machine has created a 
new form of existence, as weH designed for life in the future as man is 
designed for life on the African savannah. It seems to me that this 
must be the mature form of inteffigent life in the Universe. Housed in 
indestructible lattices of silicon, and no longer constrained in the span 
of its years by the life and death cycle of a biological organism, such a 
kind of life could live forever. It would be the kind of life that could 
leave its parent planet to roam the space between the stars. Man as we 
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know him will never make that trip, for the passage takes a milhon 
years. But the artificial brain, sealed within the protective hull of a star 
ship, and nourished by electricity collected from starlight, could last a 
million years or more. For a brain living in a computer, the voyage to 
another star would present no problems. ' (1981 pp. 166-167) 
While debate continues regarding how, whether, or why there should be a 
marriage between man and machine; the advantages of having a posthuman, 
rather than a machine, as police officer in RoboCop, is self-evident. This said 
Graham stresses RoboCop's 'technologies mark his superiority and strength, but 
this is tinged with a sense of the irrevocable loss of his humanity (symbolised by 
shadowy memories of his home and family). Although cybernetic and prosthetic 
enhancements have saved Murphy's life, they are ambivalent blessings'. (2002 
p. 209) Indeed while Wood acknowledges Holland's belief that 'a "genuine" 
human mind is identified as the essential element of a human person: and a mind 
is precisely what we are told RoboCop... has retained' (1995 p. 160), and Best 
(1987) and Bukatman"s (1994 p. 258) conviction that RoboCop's subjectivity is 
best accounted for by attributing it to the "meat component" (the re i ing 
human elements), she questions these assumptions. Concluding, in a similar 
_e_. - fashion to Graham, that: 'Robocop's subjectivity cannot be simply allied with its 
organic parts; it has become different, altered by its intersection with technology. 
This difference is clear in RoboCop's statement about Murphy's family: I can 
feel them, but can't remember them! " [82: 24] (2002 p. 166) 
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While this perception may have held true during the early stages of RoboCop's 
inception, by the end of the film it seems to have been lost. Indeed, the assertion 
of Murphy's character within RoboCop surely undermines Graham and Wood's 
assumptions that posthuman technology is necessarily a "debumanising force". 
It should also be noted that the origin of Murphy's perceived "dehumanisation7 is 
centred on his memory being wiped; for this generates the confusion and loss 
surrounding his family, and undermines RoboCop's ability to interact 
compassionately with other humans. The irony here is twofold. Firstly,, wiping the 
candidate's memory does not seem a necessary element of the posthuman. There 
is certainly no suggestion that the memory is wiped for a practical reason, like 
facilitating the procedure, or cleansing the brain of past weaknesses in character. 
It probably only happens in RoboCop to add to the despicableness of OCP i. e., 
their blase circumvention of the need for a willing participant. Secondly, 
analogous memory loss, caused by conditions such as amnesia, dementia, and 
Alzheimer's etc., is endemic within human populations and also seen as 
dehumanising, but this has nothing to do with the posthuman. Ironically it can be 
argued that posthuman. technologies may help preserve humanness in this respect, 
by helping to restore and maintain memory. Indeed it appears that Graham and 
Wood have mistaken augmentation, rather than memory loss, as the dehumanising 
element in RoboCop. 
Contrary to arguments focussing on Murphy's dehumanisation; RoboCop's 
humanisation, symbolised in the reclamation of his name Murphy, results in the 
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Murphy/RoboCop hybrid appearing human plus, rather than human minus: a 
stronger and more robust human, with extra senses, greater longevity and an 
assisted and expanded memory; rather than a castrated, biological automaton with 
a human face. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MONOTHEISM 
Salvafion from Technologism? 
Film: The Matrix (1999) 
"Thomas Anderson" is leading a double life, by day he 
is a computer programmer for respectable software 
company "Metacortex", by night he is a computer hacker 
going by the alias "Neo". 
Late one evening a hacker named "Trinity" contacts Neo, 
explaining that she is aware of his desire to uncover 
what The Matrix is, but warns him he is being watched. 
Later at work Anderson is delivered a mobile telephone 
on which he is contacted by someone called "Morpheus" 
who warns him to leave the building. Anderson fails to 
do this and is apprehended by the police and 
questioned, by what appears to be, law-enforcement 
agents. During his interrogation Anderson is presented 
with evidence appertaining to his criminal activities 
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as Neo. It is then suggested that the authorities are 
willing to overlook these offences if he cooperates 
with their attempt to arrest Morpheus. 
Released by the Police, Neo and Morpheus arrange to 
meet. Morpheus explains that The Matrix has to be seen 
to be understood. He then offers Neo two capsules one 
red, one blue, saying: 'This is your last chance. After 
this, there is no turning back. You take the blue pill, 
the story ends. You wake up in your bed and believe 
whatever you want to believe. You take the red pill, 
you stay in wonderland and I show you how deep the 
rabbit hole goes. f [27: 491 
Having taken the red capsule, Neo awakes and finds 
himself naked, coupled by wires and submerged in a 
small liquid-filled chamber, located in what appears to 
be a labyrinth of thousands of similar chambers. Having 
been disconnected and rescued by Morpheus and his crew, 
Neo is told that while he believes it is 1999, it is 
fact closer to the year 2199. He is also told that the 
world he knows exists only as a part of a neural- 
interactive simulation, known as The Matrix. In an 
important piece of back-story exposition, Morpheus 
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explains that 'at some point in the early twenty-first 
century all of mankind was united in celebration. We 
marvelled at our own magnificence as we gave birth to 
AI ... a singular consciousness that spawned an entire 
race of machines. We don't know who struck first, us, 
or them. But we know it was us that scorched the sky. 
At the time they were dependent on solar power and it 
was believed that they would be unable to survive 
without an energy source as abundant as the sun. ' 
[ 39: 44 ] 
However the machines have developed a new power supply, 
one that involves enslaving humans and plugging them 
into The Matrix. Morpheus continues: 'The Matrix is a 
computer generated dream world, built to keep us under 
control, in order to change a human being into this [a 
battery]' [41: 38] It then transpires that the reason 
Neo has been rescued from The Matrix is because he is 
believed to be "The One", the only person capable of 
controlling The Matrix and thus freeing the other 
humans. 
Unfortunately the renegades' progress towards this goal 
is hampered along the way by "Cypher". one of 
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Morpheus's crewmates, who betrays them to the machines 
in a deal that would see him reconnected to The Matrix. 
Whilst hatching the agreement Cypher laments to "Agent 
Smith" .a sentient program designed to resolve 
anomalies within The Matrix,. that: "You know, I know 
this steak doesnFt exist. I know that when I put it in 
my mouth,, The Matrix is telling my brain that it is 
juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know what I 
realise? Ignorance is bliss. ' [61: 11] The price for 
Cypher's treachery is his reinsertion into The Matrix, 
having been rendered unaware of its nature as a 
simulation, and to be rich and important within it. 
Later in the film Cypher implies that by failing to 
explain fully the reality of The Matrix before being 
offered their only chance of leaving it, Morpheus has 
manipulated them into making the choice he desires: 'He 
[Morpheus] lied to us,, Trinity. He tricked us. If you 
[Morpheus] had told us the truth, we would have told 
you to shove that red pill right up your ass! ' [84: 46] 
Luckily Neo is eventually revealed as The One and saves 
the day, although this is only possible after the 
requisite chasing, hiding, shooting and the killing-off 
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of most minor cast members; with the addition this time 
of some snazzy martial arts assisted with 
photogrametric and CGI visual effects. 
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia Nozick offers a "brain-in-vat" thought experiment 
entitled the "experience machine": 
'Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing 
a great novel,, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All 
the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to 
your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, 
preprogramming your life experiences?... Of course, while in the tank 
you won't know that you're there; you'll think that it's all actually 
happening.... Would you plug in? ' (1974 pp. 42-43) 
The Matrix appears to incorporate an adaptation on this theme although reversed, 
the question here being not whether to plug into an illusion, but rather whether to 
unplug from an illusion. 
Life inside the simulation "The Matrix7 is portrayed as mirroring current post- 
industrial society and thus resonates well with its target audience because it 
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challenges the status quo: 'Every vacuous hour of MTV, every superficial fashion 
magazine,, every dot. com telling us to "click here! " further alienates us from any 
scrap of an idea that might lend some sort of transcendent or enduring meaning to 
our allotted eighty years. ' (Fontana 2004 pp. 215-216) However at the same time it 
appears awash with realist overtones, to the extent that it 'eventually tempers the 
techno-anxiety it reflects by establishing the supremacy of the real'. (Dinello 2005 
p. 179) 
While the film clearly implies the "Nebuchadnezzar's" crew, except "Tank" and 
"Dozer" who were: 'bom free, right here, in the real world' [45: 11], have chosen 
the real above the illusion, there are two elements that suggest mature informed 
consent has not played a central role in this process. The first of these relates to 
maturity, as Morpheus states: 'we never free a mind once it's reached a certain 
age. ' [43: 01] This is explained away as a problem of flexibility; that older minds 
cannot adjust to life outside The Matrix. Yet the other side of this argument is that 
younger minds are more reckless, impressionable and easier to manipulate. The 
second point is lack of information, for if the portrayal of Neo's disconnection is 
used as a template, it becomes clear that little or no prior ontological information 
is ever divulged, making an informed decision to unplug patently impossible. This 
ignorance is then compounded by Morpheus' obfuscation: 'you are a slave, Neo. 
Like everyone else, you were bom into bondage, bom into a prison that you 
cannot smell or taste or touch, a prison for your mind. Unfortunately, no one can 
be told what The Matrix is; you have to see it for yourself 1 [27: 10] When these 
elements are brought together, it becomes evident that disconnecting from The 
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Matrix is more a case of misinformation and recklessness, rather than a 
considered decision. 
The type of person who chooses to leave The Matrix is also telling. It is important 
here to note that the fihn portrays a self-selected population of individuals who 
have unplugged. However by portraying only those who have chosen to leave The 
Matrix, the viewer is kept ignorant of those who have, or would, refuse the red pill 
and their reasons behind such a decision. Zynda argues that when discussing The 
Matrix and Nozick's experience machine with his undergraduate philosophy 
classes, only 'a small number insist that they would... be hooked up to the 
Experience Machine. (I have never asked these students if their lives are not all 
that great. That would be most impolite). ' (2004 pp. 54-55) The implication here is 
that only the disillusioned, or dysfunctional, would choose to "hook up" to an 
illusion. Yet ironically, these appear to be the types of individual who choose to 
disconnect in The Matrix. Those individuals like Neo, unfulfilled, socially inept, 
generation X technogeek loners with no meaningful interpersonal relationships. 
When Neo shows doubt regarding his decision to disconnect from The Matrix: 'I 
can't go back, can IT [42.46], this manifests itself as unsettled confusion and 
disbelief at his new enviromnent, not the pining of loved ones lost. An 
explanation for this anomaly might be that disconnection from The Matrix for 
Neo et al., like connecting to the experience machine for some of Zynda's 
students, is more an adventure for those who have little or nothing to lose, rather 
than an indication of ontological desire. 
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Indeed, if this argument were reversed it appears to suggest that those who value 
their present lives, would, in aH likelihood, choose to remain where they are 
mimaterial of whether it is reality or an illusion. This argument can be further 
investigated with the creation of a more accurate reversal of Nozick's thought 
experiment: one without a realist moral crusade or the systematic targeting of 
young social recluses, and with free, full and prior disclosure of all information 
relating to disconnection. In this scenario an individual is informed that 
disconnection from The Matrix entails the loss of everyone and everything they 
have ever cared for inside the illusion: partners, family, friends, colleagues, pets, 
belongings etc., and also holds greater experience limitations, more hardship and 
less fulfflment. The pertinent question now seems to be which type of person 
would prefer to reside outside the illusion and would they be doing so for 
highfalutin ontological reasons or because the illusion offered them little to give- 
ulr)? IF 
. 
The character "Cypher" further undermines the concept of ontological snobbery. 
Having been disconnected from The Matrix for nine years, Cypher has finally 
rejected the moral crusade of emancipation and now wishes to be reconnected. Of 
course the film portrays this decision as hedonistic moral bankruptcy and 
counterpoints it with the moral virtue of the other rebels, as Hanson argues 'The 
moral correctness of their position is also illustrated by the moral poverty of 
Cypher,, the character who wants to return to the Matrix. Cypher is shallow and 
stupid; he betrays and kills his colleagues, is bitter at being rejected as a lover and 
leader., and wants to forget the truth. ' (2004 p. 32) However in a world of moral 
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relativism, this self-righteousness can easily be undermined by simply redirecting 
motivation. If Cypher's return to The Matrix were portrayed as driven by a desire 
to reunite with a loved one, rather than for greed, then sympathies would quickly 
change and Cypher would become a flawed hero. This said The Matrix appears to 
have pretensions beyond a reworking of a brain-in-vat thought experiment, for it 
also follows the hero/saviour narratives of classic mythology. 
Having first studied the myths of Theseus and Romulus, Raglan widened his 
research into hero mythology, concluding that 'when these stories were dived into 
separate incidents there were certain types of incidents which ran through all, or 
most, of the stories. ' (1934 p. 212) From his analysis and using the story of 
Oedipus as the archetype, Raglan proposes that the "'Hero of Tradition7 can be 
I- -- broken down into a pattern of twenty-two incidents: 
'I. His mother is a royal virgin 2. His father is a king, and 3. Often a 
near relative of his mother, but 4. The circumstances of his conception 
are unusual, and 5. He is also reputed to be the son of a god. 6. At 
birth an attempt is made, often by his father, to kill him, but 7. He is 
spirited away, and 8. Reared by foster-parents in a far country. 9. We 
are told nothing of his childhood, but 10. On reaching manhood he 
returns or goes to his future kingdorm 11. After a victory over the king 
and/or a giant, dragon or wild beast, 12. He marries a princess, often 
the daughter of his predecessor, and 13. Becomes king. 14. For a time 
he reigns uneventfully, and 15. Prescribes laws, but 16. Later he loses 
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favour with the gods and/or his subjects, and 17. Is driven from the 
throne and city. 18. He meets with a mysterious death, 19. Often at the 
top of a hill. 20. His children, if any, do not succeed him. 21. His body 
is not buried, but nevertheless 22. He has one or more holy 
sepulchres. ' (1934 pp. 212-213) 
Although the events are listed in a coherent order, Raglan does not consider their 
chronology a necessity. Using this scherna, the story of Neo reads: We (9) hear 
nothing of his childhood4 but on reaching manhood he leaves and then (10) returns 
to the Matrix, only (17) to be driven out again. He (19) ascends, to (18) meet with 
a mystical death, dying simultaneously in and outside The Matrix, but (2 1) his 
body is not buried. He then (11) defeats the Leviathan that controls The Matrix 
and (13) becomes its master, but proclaims he will (14) reign uneventfully, 
although (15) change the laws of the programme. He (20) has no progeny. Whilst 
a score of eleven out of twenty-two may seem rather unimpressive, when it is 
noted that, possibly due to format brevity, the film makes no reference to Neo's 
infancy, the story of his manhood contains eleven out of the last fourteen of 
Raglan's incidents. 
This said it is probably the events and references beyond the hero of tradition that 
are most noteworthy; specifically, the similarities between the story of 'Neo, the 
Messiah-fike hero of The Matrix' (Zynda 2004 p. 44) and that of Jesus of Naza eth 
- who scores nineteen on the Raglan scale. [20: 46] (The God Who Wasn't There 
2005) These include: having disciples, prophecies of his arrival [43: 52], a disciple 
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doubting his status [86: 311, being betraying by a disciple to the authorities for a 
reward [61: 07], being resurrected [119: 39], and ascending to the heavens 
[ 124: 06]. In addition, Neo's love interest is called "Trinity", the Christian doctrine 
that God is one being who exists, simultaneously and eternally, as the Father, the 
Son (incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth),, and the Holy Spirit. Interestingly The 
Matrix's protagonist is referred to by three names: Mr. Anderson, Neo and "The 
One". Tank states that: 'The last human city. The only place we have left. ' [45: 22] 
is called "Zioe', a term used to symbolize Jerusalem and the Promised Land to 
come, in which God dwells among his chosen people. Morpheus' hovercraft is 
called the Nebuchadnezza [36: 21] a probable reference to Nebuchadnezza 11 
(a. k. a. Nebuchadnezzar the Great), who is referred to in the biblical books of 
Jeremiah and Daniel. The ship's name plaque states the vessel is a "Mark III No. 
11" [36: 35], it seems a doubtful coincidence that chapter three, verse 11 of the 
Gospel according to Saint Mark, reads: 'And unclean spirits, when they saw him, 
fell down before bini, and cried, saying, Thou art the Son of God. ' (KJV 
1611/1997 NT p. 47) More overtly, at the beginning of the film "ChoP'thanks Neo 
by saying: 'Hallelujah, you're my saviour, man. My own personal Jesus Christ. ' 
[8: 18] 
It is interesting to note that a number of academics (Dundes 1976, Jackson 1985, 
Wells 1999) have argued that the story of Jesus of Nazareth is based on an 
amalgamation of mythical characters rather than an actual historical figure; and 
frequently mention the similarities between the life of Jesus and the mythical 
figures of Osiris/Horus, Dionysus and Mithras etc.. Consequently, it could be 
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argued that the story of Neo has its origins in Pagan solar deities rather than 
Christianity, or post-Christian Gnosticism as some have argued. (Frankfurter 
2003) 
It is clear that whether in the symbolic sense of Neo's corporate cubical rat-race 
office work, his social inadequacies due to his cyberspace leisure activities, or in 
the actual posthuman technology that links the body to the illusion: 'The Matrix 
warns against surrendering control of our lives to technology, giving up our 
bodies to machines. ' (Dinello 2005 p. 176) Beyond this is the implication that 
salvation from meaninglessness is to found not by recourse to humanistic 
modernity or transcendence through existentialism, but by regression to Christian 
mysticism. 
Agent Smith implies that humans need salvation beyond the controlling force of 
technology, when he declares: 
'Did you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a perfect 
human world? Where none suffered, where everyone would be happy. 
It was a disaster. No one would accept the program, entire crops were 
lost. Some believed that we lacked the programming language to 
describe your perfect world. But I believe, that as a species, human 
1--ings define their reality though misery and suffering. The perfect Uq-w 
world was a dream that your primitive cerebrum kept trying to wake 
up fronl. ' [88: 15] 
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This is de facto testimony that the humans of The Matrix are unfit for the 
perfection of Christian Heaven. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that 
whilst governed by the laws of a computer programme, the humans cannot 
undergo the atonement and spiritual amelioration necessary to attain the afterlife. 
It therefore follows that release from The Matrix is only the first step towards 
ultimate Cluistian salvatiorL 
Nevertheless Fontana ponders: 'If we are to make the claim that The Matrix is a 
religious movie, we must ask, "So, where is GodT" (2004 p. 210) His solution is 
to suggest either there is no understanding of God in the fihn, or "God is played 
by God" in sense of the intangible God of Christian belief. Yet it seems clear that 
God is manifest throughout the film in the concept of "free will" (the liberty of 
indifference); freedom from the deterministic controls of The Matrix symbolising 
the free will given by a Christian God. As Morpheus recites: 'As long as the 
Matrix exists, the human race will never be free. ' [43: 43] 
However for the free will of Christianity to exist it necessitates escape from more 
than just The Matrix. It entails the repudiation of, not only, theological 
dete ii ni, the idea that anything less than a complete specification of every 
event would be incompatible with God's omnipotence: 
'So will does not belong to the nature of God any more than other 
natural things do, but it is related to that nature in the same way as 
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motion and rest, and all other things which we have shown to follow 
from the necessity of the divine nature and to be determined by it to 
existence and operation in a certain way. ' (Spinoza 1677/2000 Corol. 2 
102) 
It also necessitates the rejection of contemporary scientific materialism, where 
'natural laws are strictly determinative of future consequences, so that given one 
initial state of a physical system, at a definite later time there is one and only one 
outcome possible. " (Weatherford 1991 p. 3) As Wooldridge succinctly argues: 'In 
the context of a completely physical biology, free will poses no problem - it 
simply doesn't exist. ' (1968 p. 183) Indeed Gray believes: 'the idea of free will 
does not come from science. Its origins are in religion - not just any religion, but 
ý1- - the Christian faith. (2003 p. xii) 
This said, nefarious arguments have been made purporting that scientific 
discovery, in the form of quantum theory, has resurrected free will. A weak 
counterargument to this is the hyper-improbability, even considering chaos 
theory, of a sub-atomic quantum event affecting the electrochemical activity of 
the brain sufficiently to alter a single action in a lifetime. A stronger counter is 
that even if such an event happened, it would be meaningless to free will. For 
quantum theory implies superpositions are "randonY' events. Unfortunately the 
liberty of indifference, the ability to initiate the creation of new causal chains of 
events, necessitates the existence of physical laws that transcend both the 
-1 -A determined and the random. 
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Like most contemporary Christians, Neo rejects that he lacks free will: 'Because I 
don't like the idea that I'm not in control of my own life. ' [25: 47] Unfortunately, 
in the film, he actuaUy rejects "fate" but this must be a coUoquialism for 
"determinism7'. Fatalism is patently absurd, for it entails agent free will with the 
exception of specific fated events. If someone is fated to die tomoffow, it is 
conceptually possible for them to alter the means by which they die; the only 
element where they have no control is the ability to sidestep tomorrow's death. 
Determinism on the other hand entails only the illusion of free will (the liberty of 
spontaneity), with the agent having no control, and all future events bei 
unchangeable and unavoidable. 
The irony here is Neo's repudiation of determinism is based on life inside The 
Matrix, where, it must be assumed, the material determinism of the computer 
programme holds. It is therefore an example of the potency of the illusion of free 
will. It should also be noted that when the "Oracle" says: 'And don't worry about 
the vase' [70: 04] moments before Neo breaks it, this also happens inside The 
Matrix, and thus can be seen as the result of a mathematical calculation of 
necessary future events, analogous with the capacities of Laplace's Demon 
(1814/1951 p-4), rather than a miraculous prophecy. 
Nevertheless the ultimate, and often overlooked, conundrum offered-up by The 
Matrix is that the salvation of mankind is not to be found in freeing them from the 
illusion. When the final victory arrives, there is no suggestion of releasing the 
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thousands of millions of humans still plugged into The Matrix network. The 
liberation the rebels seem to have been fighting for is not freedom from the 
illusion, but freedom from the artificial intelligence controlling it. When Neo 
states his intentions at the end of the fihn: 'to show these people what you don't 
want them to see. I'm going to show them a world, without you, a world without 
rules and controls, without borders or boundaries; a world where anything is 
possible' [123.05], he is clearly not talking about showing them the "real" world, 
the earth of circa 2199, the one suffering from a nuclear winter. He is talking 
about showing them a different illusion, admittedly this will be one that is not 
controlled by the artificial intelligence, but nevertheless it will still be illusion. 
This last point is not simply implied, for Neo is shown, moments after his 
declaration, inhabiting a continuing and populated illusion. The irony here is The 
I If-- Matrix concludes by implying, contrary to its realist aspirations, that life within 
the illusion is preferable to the real. 
The crux now becomes whether Neo can deliver freedom whilst mankind is still 
connected to the illusion. If he can, then The Matrix can be read as a tale of theist 
salvation through spiritual awakening, the rescuing of humanity from moral 
relativism, modernistic technoscience, and the inevitable enslavement this 
combination will entail, via acceptance and affirmation of the Christian faith and 
its ideals. 
If he cannot, then The Matrix can be read as a tale of the salvation of man via 
duplicity; the acceptance, for the sake of humanity, of a religion that ultimately 
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cannot deliver on its claims. This potentially "Neo"conservative interpretation of 
The Matrix can be founded on the Straussian belief that liberalism, in its modern 
form, contains within it an intrinsic tendency towards relativism and that: 
'the very openness of the open society contains within itself a self- 
destructive gerrn. This disease to which Strauss pointed is... the 
tendency of democratic tolerance to degenerate, first into the 
easygoing belief that all points are equal... and then into the strident 
belief that anyone who argues for the superiority of a distinctive moral 
insight, way of life, or human type is somehow "elitist" or 
antidemocratic - and hence immoral. ' (Tarcov and Pangle 1987 
p. 929) 
From this standpoint comes the belief that liberal societies must be saved from 
themselves - in this instance its adoption of posthuman technologies - by recourse 
to hegemonic laws and their enforcement. Indeed, rescue from the "tyranny of the 
majority" (Tocqueville 183 5/2000 p. 106, Mill 1859/1985 p. 5) can only be brought 
about by manipulating the cultural attitude. To this end, Strauss saw the answer in 
the methods of ancient political philosophy, no better example being the 
utilisation of "noble lies": 
'And even supposing this were otherwise and not as the argument has 
proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures 
to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful 
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lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do 
what is right, not on compulsion, but voluntarily. ' (Plato 
348BCE/2000 663d-e p. 39) 
Having accepted this, it is but a small step to the conclusion that if salvation, from 
relativism and in turn salvation from the posthuman, lay in reversing the 'series of 
Western ideas [that] starts with "providence' which is transposed to "progress" 
and shifts from there into "nihilism"' (Lyon 1996 p. 5); then the pragmatic 
solution may be to promote providence, here in the form of Christianity doctrine, 
even if the protagonists do not believe in such things themselves. 
This neoconservative paternalist reading suggests The Matrix is symbolic of a 
subliminal and potentially subversive, propaganda campaign attempting to 
promote the insincere espousal of Christian faith to a suggestible audience, in an 
attempt to save them from themselves. 
More Human than Human 
Film: Blade Runner: The Directorfs Cut (1982) 
On-screen written back-story: 'Early in the 21st 
Century, THE TYRELL CORPORATION advanced robot 
evolution into the NEXUS phase -a being virtually 
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identical to a human - known as a Replicant. The NEXUS 
6 Replicants were superior in strength and agility, and 
at least equal in intelligence, to the genetic 
engineers who created them. Replicants were used Off- 
world as slave labour, in the hazardous exploration and 
colonization of other planets. After a bloody mutiny by 
a NEXUS 6 combat team in an Off-world colony, 
Replicants were declared illegal on earth - under 
penalty of death. Special police squads - BLADE RUNNER 
UNITS - had orders to shoot to kill, upon detection, 
any trespassing Replicant. This was not called 
execution. It was called retirement. ' [2: 251 
Los Angeles, Novemberf 2019. Retired "Blade Runner" 
"Rick Deckard" is involuntarily re-enlisted into the 
Police by his old boss Captain "'Bryant", after the near 
fatal shooting of Blade Runner "Holden". It transpires 
that f our -, %replicants", humanoid cyborgs nearly 
indistinguishable from humans and illegal on earth, 
have arrived on the planet having hijacked a shuttle 
craft Off-world. Three nights ago they tried to break 
into the ""Tyrell Corporation", the company that 
develoPs replicants, one of them being killed in the 
process. Bryant explains: "We lost the others. On the 
181 
possibility they might try to infiltrate his employees, 
I had Holden go over and run "Voight-Kampff" tests on 
the new workers. Looks like he got himself one. ' 
[ 13: 53 ] 
Deckard"s task is to find and eliminate the three 
remaining outlaw replicants, but Bryant warns that this 
model of replicant, the Nexus 6, is: 'designed to copy 
human beings in every way except their emotions. The 
designers reckoned that after a few years they might 
develop their own emotional responses. You know, hate, 
love, fear, anger, envy. So they built in a fail-safe 
device ... a four year life span. ' [15: 15] 
The issue here appears to centre on the current method 
of distinguishing between a covert replicant and a 
human: the Voight-Kampff test, which is an empathy test 
that measures 'capillary dilation of the so-called 
blush response, fluctuation of the pupil, involuntary 
dilation of the iris. ' [18: 04] The implication is that 
it may be possible for a replicant, over time, to 
become sufficiently emotionally adept to pass such a 
test and thus become functionally indistinguishable 
from a human. Worried about this possibility.. Bryant 
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sends Deckard to the Tyrell Corporation to test their 
Nexus 6 model. 
At the Tyrell Corporation Deckard meets with ""Dr. Eldon 
Tyrell" who requests to be indulged by seeing the 
Voight-Kampff test performed on a human before it is 
performed on the Nexus 6 replicant: 'I want to see it 
work on a person. I want to see a negative before 
provide you with a positive. f [18: 30] At this point 
Tyrell offers "Rachael" a Tyrell employee as a human 
subject. Having completed an admittedly more extensive 
test than normal,, Deckard declares that Rachael is in 
fact the replicant, but paradoxically she does not know 
it. Tyrell confirms this, explaining that Rachael' s 
ignorance comes from been programmed with false 
memories, creating a continuity between past and 
present. 
Deckard and "Gaff",, another Blade Runner, then search 
the f lat belonging to ""Leon", F the replicant who shot 
Holden, and find clues suggesting his whereabouts. 
Meanwhile replicants Leon and "Roy Batty" coerce 
replicant eye bioengineer "Chew" into divulging that 
befriending '"J. F. Sebastian" is the best way of gaining 
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access to Tyrell, the only person Chew believes knows 
the answers to Battyfs questions on: 'Morphology, 
longevity, incept dates. ' [28: 081 
Rachael visits Deckard at home and asks for an 
explanation as to why Tyrell has erroneously told him 
she is a replicant. She then produces a photograph of 
her as a child with her mother, as suggested proof of 
her ancestry. Deckard retorts by reciting a number of 
Rachael's most personal secrets, secrets she has not 
divulged to anyone. Confused, Rachael is told that 
these are: 'Implants! Those aren't your memories, 
they're somebody else's. They're Tyrell's niecels. ' 
[32: 55] 
Clues from Leon's apartment lead Deckard to a bar where 
"Zhora", the third replicant, is performing. 
Masquerading as a trade union representative Deckard 
gains access to Zhora, but his line of questioning 
makes Zhora suspicious and she attacks him. However, 
another performer interrupts the attack, prompting 
Zhora to f lee, only to be chased, caught and "retired" 
(killed) by Deckard. Moments later, Bryant appears and 
informs Deckard that he now has four replicants to 
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retire,, the three still on the run from the shuttle 
craft and Rachael who has absconded from the Tyrell 
Corporation. 
Deckard spots Rachael across the road and attempts to 
catch her but is waylaid by Leon, who demands to know 
how long he has to live. Deckard is overpowered and 
badly beaten in an ensuing melee that threatens to end 
in his death, Leon exclaiming after Deckard passes out: 
"Wake-up, time to die. 1 [60: 31] Deckard is however 
rescued at the last moment by Rachael who shoots Leon 
with Deckardf s relinquished gun. Back in Deckard' s 
flat, Rachael asks if Deckard would hunt her down if 
she ran, to which he replies: "No. No, I wouldn't. I 
owe you one. But somebody would. ' [63: 39] Rachael and 
Deckard's 
intimately. 
relationship then seems to develop 
In the meantime "Pris", the fourth replicant, has 
befriended Sebastian and on BattyFs arrival they 
convince him to take Batty to see Tyrell. During Batty 
and Sebastian's meeting with Tyrell, Batty establishes 
that Tyrell is incapable of extending the lifespan of a 
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replicant, at which point Batty kills Tyrell and leaves 
alone. 
Deckard receives orders from Bryant to search 
Sebastian's address, having first confirmed that 
Sebastian's body was also found with Tyrell's. On 
entering Sebastian's home Deckard is ambushed and 
overpowered by Pris, but manages to retrieve his pistol 
and shoot her before she can finish him off. 
Batty then arrives at Sebastian' s flat, at which point 
Deckard open fires on him but misses, resulting in 
Batty declaring: 'Not very sporting to f ire on an 
unarmed opponent. I thought you were supposed to be 
good. Aren't you the good man? Come on Deckard. Show me 
what you' re made of .' [91: 41] Batty then toys with 
Deckard, eventually forcing him to retreat out onto the 
building's roof, where he attempts a jump from one 
building to another. This he manages, although not 
wholly successfully, and is left clutching a beam 
overhanging a precipitous fall; Batty then follows but 
his jump is more successful. 
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Having safely traversed the buildings, Batty walks over 
to Deckard and seemingly waits for him to fall. 
However., just as Deckard looses his grip, Batty grabs 
hold of his arm and pulls him to safety. 
Batty, who is rapidly reaching the end of his four year 
lifespan, now openly ponders his short life and 
laments: 'All those moments will be lost in time like 
tears in the rain. Time to die. ' [102: 351 Batty then 
dies. Gaff appears and questions Deckard whether he has 
finished, Deckard's confirmation prompts Gaff's 
rejoinder: 'It's too bad she won't live. But then 
again, who does? ' [104: 36] 
Deckard returns home and finds Rachael alive and well. 
Preparing to f lee,, Deckard then discovers an origami 
unicorn on the floor outside the flat. The implication 
here is that Gaff, an origami practitioner, has already 
been to Deckard's abode, found Rachael sleeping and 
decided not to "retire" her. With the knowledge that, 
at least Gaf f has given them a head start,, Deckard 
joins Rachael in the lift and the end credits role. 
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At the core of Blade Runner is the question of taxonomy, specificafly the 
mtelligibility and defming characteristics of the term "huma. W'. It offers up the 
human to the android cyborg, the real to the simulated, but fails to recommend an 
intuitive method of differentiation: 
'Technologies call into question the ontological purity according to 
which Western society has defined what is normatively human. For 
example, in Blade Runner... [r]eplicants are machines that are 
superficially indistinguishable from humans. At the same time,, 
however, humans have come more and more to resemble machines in 
the high-tech, alienated, urban wasteland surroundings. The fragile 
and indeterminate nature of the very boundary between humans and 
artefacts, sentience and inertness, authentic and artificial, constitutes 
the heart of the novel and its film adaptation. ' (Graham 2002 p-5) 
Blade Runner opens with back-story information that technological development 
has become sophisticated to the point of producing robots virtually identical to 
humans. The film then depicts a scene with two seemingly human characters, 
Holden and Leon, which is totally bereft of specific reference to their status. The 
fact that it is not until moments later, in Bryant's office, that there is testimony to 
Leon being a replicant helps to underline their indistinguishable nature. 
Having created an environment of potential character paranoia and genus second 
guessing, this is immediately castrated, firstly, by the visual introduction of the 
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replicants that need retiring; and secondly, with dialogue that implies the presence 
of replicants on earth is a freak occurrence: 'No sir. Not embarrassing, because no 
one')s ever going to find out they're down here. Because youlre going to spot 
then-4 and you're going to air them out. ' [12: 20] This point is reinforced further 
when the film depicts the replicants as having red eyes (Rachael [63: 08] Pris 
[71: 05] Batty [82: 44] etc. ). Although the irony here is twofold: firstly, that the 
identifier is for the audience only (as the film characters do not acknowledge this 
aberration) and secondly, that a natural reaction to certain lighting conditions (the 
reflecting of light off the retina) is being used to denote the artificial. 
Paradoxically the result of these plot devices is to undermine the importance of 
identif3ring who is, or is not, a replicant, for they have already been identified. 
However having done this the film still manages to tap into the insecurity 
surrounding man's special position in the great chain of being, but does so 
obliquely. Instead of the more conventional idea of offering up the human animal 
to the non-human animal facilitating questions regarding whether their 
consciousness is a matter of ontological or relative difference; Blade Runner, by 
juxtaposes humans with replicants - entities specifically designed to be 
commensurate in both physical form and cognitive ability - challenges whether, 
as indistinguishable "equals", they deserve the same status. If replicants are 
worthy of human exclusivity then the so-called "essence of man7 is either 
quantified as an ontological characteristic that other species can attain, or exposed 
as only a relative characteristic. However, if replicants are deemed undeserving of 
equal reverence, the onus becomes accounting for this. 
189 
Blade Runner appears, at least initially, to suggest "empathy" as a possible 
identifier between human and replicant, and thus possibly the essence of man. Yet 
whilst the novel: Do Androids Dream ofElectric Sheep?, on which Blade Runner 
is loosely based, clearly states: 'Empathy, evidently, existed only within the 
human community, whereas intelligence to some degree could be found 
throughout every phylum and order including the arachnida' (Dick 2004 p. 27); 
some commentators have suggested the fihn 'attempts to establish memory as the 
locus of humanity. ' (Landsberg 1995 p. 184) Landsberg argues that in the ope ig 
scene, with Holden and Leon, 'what "catches" the replicant is not the absence of 
empathy, but rather the absence of a past, the absence of memories. Leon cannot 
describe his mother, cannot produce a genealogy, because he has no past, no 
memories. ' (1995 p. 184) However, this surely cannot be the case, for if a replicant 
could be identified simply by not being able to account for its past, then the 
Voight-Kampff test becomes elaborate nonsense. In the opening scene Leon is in 
a heightened state of anxiety and seems to crack under the pressure of the test. 
Later it becomes apparent that he lacks a keen mental acuity; aware of his 
deficiencies Leon probably believes he will be exposed by the test and cracks 
under the pressure of seconding guess the answers needed to avoid detection. 
Indeed Rachael can account for her past, but is stiR identified as a replicant; and it 
is made clear that the reason Rachael was difficult to identify as a replicant was 
not because of her implanted memories per se, but because she has developed 
something akin to empathy. The implication being, that social interaction plays an 
important role mi the development of empathy and Rachael has, through her 
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implanted memories, gained many years of something akin to social experience. 
The fact that Rachael is successfully exposed as a replicant may only imply that 
implanted social experience is not a sufficient basis for the development of a more 
comprehensive grasp of empathy. 
However, the suggestion that empathy may be a human identifier is further 
complicated by Batty's killing of Tyrell and the helpless Sebastian; for while 
ý1- - these are the actions of a replicant without empathy they are recognisable as the 
actions of a psychopath: an empathy deficient human. Consequently, if Batty 
lacks the essence of man because he is deficient of empathy, then consistency 
dictates that human psychopaths are also lacking the essence of man. 
To confuse matters further, the narrative then appears to build on the proposed 
link between experience and the development of empathy. Here Batty's 
relationship with Pris, his sense of loss at her death, and his own impending 
demise, now seems to coalesce as the vehicle for Batty's empathic maturation; 
climaxing with his decision not to kill Deckard. For unlike Rachael who appears 
to have developed empathy as a result of artificial memories, Batty has developed 
it from direct experience. 
The question of the essence of man having being thrown into disarray, Blade 
Runner ends with Deckard and Rachael fleeing as implied lovers. Again 
boundaries are called into question, specifically whether Deckard's decision to be 
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with Rachael is laudable or disturbing; and whether Deckard can have a 
meaningful relationship with Rachael, who is "merely" a machine. 
Blade Runner's questioning of the essence of man is similarly played out in the 
contemporary posthuman debate. Here one popular counterargument to 
posthuman enhancement is based on the belief that humans have intrinsic value 
and dignity beyond other animals. This value is based on the notion that there are 
some essential, but obscure, superiority characteristics that compose man's 
essence. The worry is that technological interventions in human evolution might 
corrupt human nature and thus undermine human superiority. 
Exponents of this theory argue that humans without human dignity are ipso facto 
no longer "human! '. As a result, enhancement technologies are seen as not only 
having the power to damage human nature, but also the ability to render the 
human extinct. Andorno notes: 'The notion of human dignity is regarded by many 
of our contemporaries as the last barrier to irreversible biotechnological 
mterventions on our own nature. " (2001 p. 15 1) 
Unfortunately the concept of human nature is somewhat controversial and for 
many centuries debate has raged over a number of key issues: does human nature 
exist, and if so, at what point does a human gain this quality? Is it at birth, 
conception, or simply by being part of the human species? Can the title be lost? 
'Is there some qualitative difference between humans and other animals, or is it all 
a question of quantities and balance? Is there one key thing that all humans have, 
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or is there a range of qualities, irregularly dispensed? And, most crucially, is 
human nature inherently good, bad or indifferentT (Ruse 1995 p. 376) 
Contemporary thinking on human nature generaRy centres on the dominant 
scientific and sociological positions that assert there is little material evidence for 
. A. 
1- 
- 
the existence of human nature, beyond its social construction, it being an artefact 
invented by humans to legitimise their exploitation of non-humans; and the 
dominant humanist and religious positions that assert the existence of human 
dignity is self-evident, either as a result of evolutionary ontological leap, or by gift 
from God. Possibly even both - note the Pope's Message to the Pontifical 
A. r- Academy of Science (John Paul 11 1996), which amends the encyclical Humani 
Generis (Pius XII 1950) by stating that evolution is now considered more than a 
hypOthesis. This was seen as fin-ther cementing the compatibility, with certain . F. K- 
conditions, between the theory of evolution and the Catholic Church. 
Unfortunately, the Achilles' heel of the human essence argument is its potential to 
be undercut by investigation of the very nature of its existence. For if the essence 
of man cannot be identified then the legitimacy of its existence, and thus its need 
to be protected, is brought into question. Fukuyama's response to this is to warn: 
'Denial of the concept of human dignity - that is, of the idea that there is 
something unique about the human race that entitles every member of the species 
to a higher moral status than the rest of the natural world - leads us down a very 
perilous path. ' (2003 p. 160) 
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Of course for theists, legitimising the superiority of human beings over aH other 
earthly existence and that they deserve dignity does not demand recourse to 
empirical evidence, as Fukuyama notes: 'For Christians, the answer is fairly easy: 
it comes from God. Man is created in the image of God, and therefore shares in 
some of God's sanctity, which entitles human beings to a higher level of respect 
than the rest of natural creation. ' (2003 p. 150) This belief is of course predicated 
on chapter one, verses 26 to 29 of The First Book of Moses, Called Genesis: 
'And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and 
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of 
ý1- - uae air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every 
creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his 
own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female 
created he them. And God blessed thern, and God said unto them, Be 
fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and 
over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. And God said, 
Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the 
face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree 
yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. ' (KJV 1611/1997 OT p. 2) 
This foundation also enables the theists to accuse posthuman advocates of 
undermining the sanctity of the human, by encroaching on God's territory in 
attempting to perfect the species: 
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'The last and most seductive of these disquieting prospects - the use 
of biotechnical powers to pursue 'ýperfectioW', both of body and of 
mind - is perhaps the most neglected topic in public and professional 
bioethics. Yet it is, I believe, the deepest source of public anxiety 
about biotechnology, represented in the concern about "man playing 
God". ' (Kass 2003 p. 10) 
This argument is nevertheless only a theist rallying cry rather than a serious 
attempt to engage with the overwhelmingly secular technophiles, for having 
conceded they are attempting to perfect the species, they will reject the premise 
that there is a God to encroach on. This said, not aR theists accept the "man 
playing God"' argument follows from scripture, in fact some, like Mackay, argue 
the reverse: 
'Undertaken in the proper spirit, human engineering is not playing God 
at all, but serving God.... Human perfectibility by human effort is 
impossible; the grace of God is quite essential if man is ever to reach 
perfection. But this surely is not the issue. What concerns us in human 
engineering is not perfectibility at all; it is something much more 
modest we might call improvability. And the idea of human 
improvability, so far from being heretical, is something the Christian 
must examine as a matter of duty.... There is no sin in seeking to 
mitigate the effects of our fallenness as human beings. " (1979 p. 59) 
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Unfortunately for those who advocate the existence of human dignity from a 
standpoint not founded on Genesis, their position is constantly being confused and 
undermined by the rapidly escalating complexity of scientific enquiry into the 
ontology of man. Whereas in the past human and non-human animals appeared 
fundamentally different, hence Lichtenberg's aphorism: 'That man is the noblest 
creature may also be inferred from the fact that no other creature has yet contested 
this claim. (1800/1990 Bk. D p. 59) The indisputable identifiers usually associated 
with human superiority such as: consciousness, sentience, social hierarchy, 
intelligence, complex cerebral cortex, developed language etc. have now been 
I- -- Drought into question, if not totally rejected. Also the seeming arbitrariness of 
these characteristics has been questioned, thus adding weight to claims they are 
little more than "speciesist". (Ryder 1970; Singer 1974) That is they are attempts 
by humanists to retain the Christian "Great Chain of Being" (having rejected 
theism) by creating biased ranks in which humans are placed at the top by design. 
In addition the striking technological advancements in computer technology, and 
the recent neurological research that no longer perceives the human brain and the 
computer CPU as incommensurate, may result in the eventual doom of the most 
espoused bastion of human supremacy, the ranking of "most inteffigent". To make 
matters worse, the ever increasing demand for human egalitarianism has 
undermined and frustrated the flexibility of humanists to adopt new hyper-specific 
uniqueness and superiority characteristics, lest they be socially exclusive. An 
example of this would be the use of Fletcher's fifteen "positive propositions" 
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underpinning his concept of "personhood". (1979 pp. 12-16) These being: 
minimurn intelligence, self-awareness, self-control, a sense of time, a sense of 
futurity, a sense of the past, the capability of relating to others, concern for others, 
communication, control of existence, curiosity, change and changeability, balance 
of rationality and feeling, idiosyncrasy and neocortical functioning. The socially 
unpalatable problem with this notion of personhood is it excludes not only the 
likes of embryos and foetuses, but also infants, young children, and the mentally 
infirm. Indeed, medical conditions such as Alzheimer's and dementia could result 
in the ability for someone to obtain personhood in their youth and then lose the 
title before they die. 
With this in mind, the final haven for many secularists advocating human dignity 
seems to be equivocation and ambiguity in the form of the indefinable. The 
pronouncement that the essential and defining characteristic of humanity, the 
foundation for their anthropocentrism, and that which needs protecting, is the je 
ne sais quoi that makes us human. Some are sufficiently woffied about keepi 
these qualities elusive, thus enabling unseen alteration and protecting them from 
direct interrogation, that they dare not even adom them with a coHective epithet: 
'there remains some essential human quality underneath that is worthy of a certain 
level of respect - call it Factor X. ' (Fukuyama 2003 p. 149) 
In defending secular human dignity Fukuyama claims that: 
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Terhaps the most famous effort to create a philosophical basis for 
human dignity was that of Kant, who argues that Factor X was based 
on the human capacity for moral choice. That is, human beings differ 
in intelligence, wealth, race, and gender, but all were equally able to 
act according to moral law or not. Human beings had dignity because 
they alone had free will - not just the subjective illusion of free will 
but the actual ability to transcend natural determinism and the normal 
rules of causality. ' (2003 p. 15 1) 
Here Fukuyama appears to be implying that Kant believes humans are special and 
deserving of dignity because they alone have free will, a free will beyond an 
illusion of free will, as humans are detached from the laws of causality. Fukuyama 
appears to confirm this interpretation by adding: 'It would be very difficult for 
any believer in a materialistic account of the universe - which includes the vast 
majority of natural scientists - to accept the Kantian account of human dignity. ' 
(2003 p. 15 1) Of course what Kant said was: 
'As an intelligence, a rational being counts himself as belonging to the 
world of the understanding, and simply as an efficient cause 
belonging to the world, he calls his causality a will. On the other hand, 
however, he is also a part of the world of the sense, where his actions 
are encountered as mere appearances of that causality. But we can 
have no insight into how these actions are possible by means of such a 
causality, since we have no direct acquaintance with it. Instead, these 
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actions, when viewed as belonging to the world of sense, have to be 
understood as determined by other appearances - namely, by desires 
and inclinations.... Therefore, although I regard myself from one 
point of view as a being that belongs to the world of sense, I shall 
have to recognise that, as an intelligence, I am subject to the law of 
the world of understanding - that is, of reason, which contains this 
law in the Idea of freedom, and thus in the autonomy of the will. I 
must therefore regard the laws of the world of the understanding as 
imperatives for me and see the actions that conform to this principle 
as duties. ' (Kant 1785/2002 §3 453-454 pp. 252-253) 
The gist of Kant's argument is that although humans do not have free will, 
because they are physical entities and thus obey physical laws, it is meaningless to 
talk of humans without free will. Our language, attributions of responsibility, the 
nature of our interactions with others, and ultimately the coherence of our lives, is 
founded on the assumption we have free will. For Kant the knowledge that 
humans are not free is, from a practical perspective, utterly useless. An analogy 
for Kant's position can be found in the anecdote involving the epistemological 
sceptic Pyrrho of Elis, who allegedly ran away from a cantankerous dog. While 
for Pyrrho it is theoretically possible, if not probable, that said dog did not exist in 
a realist sense, this would have been of little practical consolation if Pyrrho had 
been bitten by it - 
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Whilst debate continues regarding the potential success of Kant in his next step - 
linking the pure reason that humans do not have free will, with the practical 
reason (the illusion) that they do - any transcendence of causality Kant proclaims 
is ultimately perceptual in nature, rather than physical as Fukuyama claims. 
Nevertheless Kant's attempt to formulate a basis for human dignity using the 
concepts of free will (whether an illusion or not) and moral choice, clear fails to 
satisfy Fukuyama who demands greater discrimination. The problem seems to 
centre on the compatibility of human dignity and the posthuman. Unlike Kant, 
who was never exposed to the idea of transcending the human, Fukuyama 
questions whether a posthuman would be worthy of dignity. That is, even if it had 
Kant's prerequisites, free will and moral choice. 
In an argument that seems specifically designed to act as the basis for restricting 
posthuman technologies, Fukuyama states: 'Factor X cannot be reduced to the 
possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or sociability, or sentience, or 
emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has been put forward as a 
ground for human dignity. It is all of these qualities coming together in a human 
whole [my emphasis] that make up Factor X. ' (Fukuyama 2003 p. 17 1) 
The inclusion of the term "human whole" is of primary importance because it 
spells out Fukuyama's belief that for something to possess "Factor X" it not only 
has to be human by necessity (the customary ad hoc ruling-out of non-humans) 
and have all the requisite qualities associated with human dignity (it is easy to get 
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the impression that such a list is open to constant revision and would contain 
indefinable elements if necessary); it also has to be a specific type of human, that 
is a "human whole". However, what is a human whole? Fukuyama states that: 
'. what gives us dignity and a moral status higher than that of other living creatures 
is related to the fact that we are complex wholes rather than the sum of simple 
parts'. (2003 p. 17 1) He then marries this holistic approach with the belief that: 
'If Factor X is related to our very complexity and the complex 
interactions of uniquely human characteristics like moral choice, 
reason and a broad emotional gamut, it is reasonable to ask how and 
why biotechnology would seem to make us less complex. The answer 
lies in the constant pressure that exists to reduce the ends of 
biomedicine to utilitarian ones - that is,, the attempt to reduce a 
complex diversity of natural ends and purposes to just a few simple 
categories like pain and pleasure, or autonomy. ' (Fukuyama 2003 
172) 
Here Fukuyama. is arguing that the potential will soon exist, if it does not already, 
for the creation of humanoid babies, through biotechnology, that lack the 
complexity to be a human whole. The inference is that such babies, de facto 
posthumans in the eyes of Fukuyama, would be deficient in Factor X and thus be 
unworthy of human dignity: 'For this will be the constant trade-off that 
biotechnology will pose: we can cure this disease, or prolong this person's life, or 
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make this child more tractable, at the expense of some ineffable human quality 
like genius, or ambition, or sheer diversity. ' (2003 p. 172) 
Unfortunately Fukuyama's position seems to fall down on two accounts. Firstly, 
his conception of human dignity is, Ue Kant's, predicated on assumptions that 
are equally susceptible to accusations of being both ad hoc and without 
foundation. Whilst Fukuyama's argument is systematically speciesist, Kant's 
anthropocentricity is based on his assumption that only humans have the free will 
that allows moral choice. This said if moral choice were perceived as grounded in 
the reffication of social contracts, then the dynamics and hierarchies of some 
animal social groupings may undermine Kant's assumptions empirically. 
Secondly, Fukuyama attempts to defend his speciesism by recourse to "human 
complexities", an obscure, ambiguous and potentially fictional identifier that he 
fails to account for fully. Indeed obvious questions arise, such as whether humans 
gained these complexities over time or all at once. If it is the former, then why 
did, and can, only humans gain them? If it is the latter, then what accounted for 
this ontological leap? If losing complexity is disadvantageous, is gaining ftwther 
complexity advantageous? If posthuman technologies have the potency to reduce 
complexity, do they also have the potency to increase complexity? Or does the 
contemporary human have the optimal level of complexity, and if so, what 
accounted for this optMMSation? 
Paradoxically the success of the complexity argument seems contingent on 
theism. Arguing as a secular humanist,, Fukuyama's defence of the human is 
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equally susceptible to accusation of incoherence, arbitrariness and speciesism as 
historical characterisations of human dignity. However from a theist perspective, 
where God makes man unilaterally complex, and in his own image (the 
implication being, with the optimal level of complexity), the potency of 
Fukuyama's defence against the posthuman seems to increase exponentially. The 
aetiology behind this discrepancy - and others like it within the posthuman debate 
- may be the tendency of some theists to adopt "methodological" secularism in an 
attempt to disseminate and legitimate arguments that are ultimately theist in 
nature. To this end, a telling statement may be Fukuyama's apparent nod to the 
religious gallery when he argues: 'The problem of how consciousness arose does 
not require recourse to the direct intervention of God. It does not, on the other 
hand, rule it out, either. ' (2003 p. 17 1) 
Interestingly McKibben's defence against the posthuman also claims humans 
have a quintessential element: 'What makes us unique is that we can restrain 
ourselves. We can decide not to do something that we are able to do. We can set 
limits on our desires. We can say "Enough7'. ' (2004 p. 221) In fact this ability 
seems to form the central tenet of his text entitled Enough, in which he argues 
humans should accept what they have -a veritable cornucopia of what man needs 
to survive, in the West at least - and leave it at that. That is: 
'We need to do an unlikely thing. We need to survey the world we 
now inhabit and proclaim it good. Good enough. Not in every detail; 
there are a thousand improvements, technological and cultural, that 
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we can and should still make. But good enough in its outlines, in its 
essentials. We need to decide that we live, most of us in the West, 
long enough. We need to declare that, in the West, where few of us 
work ourselves to the bone, we have easy enough [sic]. In societies 
where most of us need storage lockers more than we need nanotech 
miracle boxes, we need to declare that we have enough stuff. Enough 
intelligence. Enough capability. Enough. ' (2004 p. 112) 
Of course, McKibben's claim that human self-restrain is idiosyncratic is not to be 
taken too seriously. Nevertheless his position is quite perplexing, for he appears to 
be advocating the universal technological status quo, predicated on vague and 
unconvincing platitudes. Indeed his position is not fleshed-out beyond the 
testimony that First World living is, in the most part, unobjectionable and 
therefore little necessity to change it. However in arguing this, McKibben 
advocates a position that is unpalatable to both orthodox theists, who generally 
desire technological cessation to be limited to its use on humans, and radical 
enviromnentahsts who generally desire wholesale technological regression. 
This said McKibben appears to have copied Fukuyama, in that he has, 
pragmatically, adopted a methodological position. That is, in an attempt to affect 
genuine change, enviromnentalist McKibben has cast-off the shackles of the 
"return to nature" enviromnental narrative, and in a potentially shrewd move, 
adopted a compromise position, one more palatable to his, primarily US, 
readership. To this end, a teHing statement may be his unconvincing attack on the 
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environmental movement, which appears more a case of self-deprecation 
transforming into vindication: 
'Environmentalists share, I fear, some measure of the guilt. The 
movement to value everything else on earth has often talked carelessly 
about people, spreading the idea that we are a grim and uncontrollable 
race, a cancer cell metastasising unchecked across the defenceless 
fabric of nature. From the moment that the Reverend Malthus first 
advanced his theory that reproduction would inevitably outstrip food 
production, a certain kind of despair has informed an awful lot of 
what we would eventually call environmentalism. Whenever I've 
given a lecture on some of the ways we might mend our 
environmental troubles, someone from the audience has usually risen 
to ask if, say, global warming isn't simply a way for nature to "get rid 
of us", a species more trouble than we're worth. I feel that despair 
myself sometimes; there are days when my own consumer lust and 
essential apathy convince me we're doomed' (2004 pp. 115-116) 
Habermas' defence against the posthuman differs substantially from that of 
Fukuyama's and McKibben's, specifically in that it is not founded on human 
uniqueness. Instead Habermas argues posthuman technologies should be resisted 
because they wifl have a detrimental effect on the human psyche: 
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'We therefore tend to forget that the revolution of breeding practices 
by genetic engineering is itself no longer governed by the clinical 
mode of adjustment to the inherent dynamic of nature. What it 
suggests, rather, is the dedifferentiation of a fundamental distinction 
which is also constitutive of our self-understanding as species 
members. ' (Habermas 2003 p. 46) 
Superficially, Habermas seems to be arguing that the adoption of genetic 
engineering will result in humans no longer being governed by the laws of nature. 
The implication here is twofold, firstly, biotechnological breeding practices are 
unnatural; and secondly, current breeding practices are by contrast, natural. To 
concede biotechnological breeding practices are unnatural., is one thing; but to 
suggest that, the medically supported and socio-economical selected, breeding 
practices in the First World follow the 'inherent dynamic of nature' is to bri 
Habermas' concepts into question. However a further examination of Habermas' 
position suggests that he is actually advocating the protection of the perceived 
natural breeding practices because he believes they are an inextricable part of our 
self-understanding. 
Habermas argues reproductive genetic engineering necessitates a level of 
predestination that will result in fatalism and resentment in those who have been 
manipulated. However he also believes: 'Liberal eugenics needs to face the 
question of whether the perceived dedifferentiation of the grown and the made, 
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the sub ective and the objective is Uely to affect the autonomous conduct of life j 
and moral understanding of the programmed person. ' (2003 pp. 52-53) 
The basis of this position is human intuition, the belief that: 'The "self' of this end 
in itself we are obliged to respect in the other person is primarily expressed in the 
authorship of a life guided by his own aspirations. Everybody interprets the world 
from his point of view, acts according to his own motives, is the source of 
authentic aspirations. ' (Habermas 2003 p. 55) The implication here is that 
biotechnology will rob the individual of respect from others because he will not 
be the author of his own motives. Yet like Kant, Habermas believes that the 
human is only a material object, bound by the physical laws of causation, and thus 
has no authorship. Consequently Habermas must instead be arguing that 
biotechnology will rob the individual of respect because he will not be perceived 
to be the author of his own motives. 
Habermas continues: 'Eugenic interventions aiming at enhancement reduce 
ethical freedom insofar as they tie down the person concerned to rejected, but 
irreversible intentions of third parties, barring him from the spontaneous self- 
perception [my emphasis] of being the undivided author of his own life. ' (2003 
p. 63) The telling phrase here is "spontaneous self-perception", for it seems to 
denote the subjective illusion of free will, otherwise known as the liberty of 
spontaneity. From this perspective Habermas, is arguing the reason humans should 
reject biotechnology is not because it would reduce human autonomy, but because 
it would result in the widespread, but ultimately erroneous, belief that it would 
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reduce human autonomy. To borrow from Kant's terminology, Habermas is not 
trying to protect human autonomy in the pure sense (which does not exist), but 
rather in the practical sense. 
This said, Habermas' acknowledges that the biotechno, logical child will not lose 
the perception of free will, but rather will have the realities of a lack of freedom 
forced upon thern. Indeed, when this happens, the actions and testimonies of those 
deemed to lack autonomy will reflect on the self-perception of those deemed to 
possess it. That is, the genetically engineered will argue that although they 
evidently lack autonomy, being a product of biotechnology, they still possess 
intuitive freedom. Consequently, they will reveal intuitive freedom is not 
contingent on material freedom, and thus provoke a wider questioning of the 
intuitions and realities of human autonomy. 
An adaptation of this scenario is played in Blade Runner, with the actions and 
intentions of the replicants challenging our ontological assumptions. For 
replicants not only look and act like humans, they also have intentions, dynamic 
mtelligence, and intuitive autonomy. Yet, the conviction that a robot cannot be 
free, for it is little more than a material object obeying physical laws, grounds our 
socio-cultural understanding of the notion. This apparent contradiction challenges 
the assumption that free will is necessary, or even existent, in humans. 
Habermas' attack on biotechnology is founded on both the belief that the 
posthuman will challenge our self-perception, and the assumption this would be 
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detrimental to the human psyche, presumably because our intuitive freedom is 
seen as positive and fundamental to being human. The implied solution to this 
threat is to sidestep the challenge by repudiating posthuman technologies. 
This said, it must be noted that those who champion Habermas' argument cannot 
solicit widespread advocacy. For the fundamental problem with his position, as 
with all error theories, is that the wholesale acceptance of the stance ultimately 
destroys it. This is because it is impossible to view the error without the necessary 
"God's-eye-view". However, having done this, it is then equally impossible to 
regress back into holding the initial and erroneous belief Consequently, the 
success of this argument is ironically dependent on its ability to remain hidden 
from the majority. 
Doubtlessly some will respond to Habermas by questioning whether man is best 
served by maintaining such an illusion; whether challenging our self-perception, 
like challenging the existence of God, is necessarily detrimental? Others will 
highlight that human self-perception is susceptible to challenge from more than 
just the posthuman; and thus question whether Habernias also advocates the 
rejection of such technologies as genetic testing and the creation of perceptually 
autonomous machines. 
However, possibly the most successful counterargument to Habermas' position is 
the accusation that it defends little more than an apparition. Kant ultimately 
believes that the knowledge humans are not free, is, from a practical perspective, 
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utterly useless. From this position human self-perception is not contingent on a 
belief in autonomy, but rather its intuitive nature. For Kant, the rejection of 
material autonomy is compatible with living life as an intuitively autonomous 
agent, for the knowledge that humans lack free will cannot nullify their intuition tý 
that they possess it. 
The Power of Nighf mares 
Film: The Fly (1986) 
In a vain attempt to impress journalist "Veronica 
Quaif e", socially inept scientif ic genius "Seth 
Brundle" boasts that he is 'working on something 
that'll change the world and human life as we know it. ' 
[2: 05] Unfortunately Quaife has heard it all before and 
is dismissive of Brundle Is offer to Visit his 
laboratory; she has three further interviews to conduct 
before she can leave and already seems bored with the 
science convention. 
This said Brundle's persistence eventually wins out, 
with Quaif e not only accompanying, but driving him 
home. It is during this journey that increasingly 
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queasy Brundle admits: 'I'm always like this. It's 
motion sickness. When i was a kid, I puked on my 
tricycle. I hate vehicles. ' [3: 271 
Having arrived at an old fish packing house, Brundle 
invites Quaife inside and demonstrates his invention: 
the "Telepod". In true stage magician style he asks the 
journalist for something uniquely personal and places 
the offering, a stocking, into one of the telepods only 
for it to disappear and then reappear in a different 
pod. Initially incredulous, Quaife is told: "You get 
it, all right. You just can't handle it. Your stocking 
has just been teleported, from one pod to another. 
Disintegrated there, and re-integrated there, sort of. 
It'll change the world as we know it, right? ' [09: 14] 
Amazed Quaife takes her covertly recorded interview to 
ex-lover and editor of "Particle Magazine" "Stathis 
Borans". However Borans is scornful, suggesting Quaife 
has fallen for a party trick and when Brundle suddenly 
appears at the door, Borans is off-hand, and leaves to 
attend to more important business. 
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Conversing over lunch, Brundle explains to Quaife that 
the telepods are not ready for public dissemination, 
that: "something important is missing... I can only 
teleport inanimate objects. 1 [13: 591 Nevertheless 
Quaife still intends to continue with her article. In a 
last ditch attempt to stop her, Brundle offers Quaife 
the opportunity to follow the project to completion and 
then to have exclusive book rights. 
Placated, Quaife watches Brundle dramatically fail to 
complete the teleportation of a live baboon, the ape 
being turned inside-out on reintegration. Having paused 
f or an intimate moment together,. Brundle conducts an 
experiment with Quaife's help. This involves 
teleporting a steak and then comparing its taste with 
that of an unteleported control. Quaife's conclusion 
that the teleported steak tastes synthetic, prompts 
Brundle to surmise that: 'The computer is giving us its 
interpretation of a steak. It's translating it for us, 
it's re-thinking it, rather than reproducing it and 
something's getting lost in the translation. ' [25: 42] 
Having made certain programming amendments, a second 
baboon is teleported, but this time successfully, 
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resulting in Quaife's droll remark that: 'You'll never 
have to get car sick again! ' [29: 13] While celebrating 
Quaife learns that Borans intends to publish an expose 
of the telepods in the next magazine issue and in an 
attempt to stop him, she leaves the laboratory without 
explanation. Her meeting with Borans is successful but 
in the meantime,. Brundle gets drunk and jealous and 
decides to hasten the pace of his research by 
teleporting himself. Unfortunately, unknown to Brundle, 
a housefly enters the telepod with him on his 
successful journey. 
During the proceeding days Brundle and Quaife begin to 
notice subtle changes, nay, improvements, in the 
scientist's physique and performance. In a later 
conversation with Quaif e, Brundle explains that these 
changes have prompted him to ask the telepod control 
computer: 'if it improved me and it said it didn't know 
what I was talking about .... And I'm beginning to think 
that the sheer process of being taken apart atom by 
atom and put back together again, why it's like coffee 
being put through a filter. It's somehow a purifying 
process. It's purified me, itfs cleansed me. ' [43: 57] 
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However these changes soon take on a more sinister form 
and Brundle suffers from personality change, complexion 
deterioration and peculiar hair growth. Worried Quaife 
has some of the hair cuttings analysed and confronts 
Brundle with the results stating that: 'The guy at the 
lab had trouble identifying them. He finally came to 
the conclusion that they were definitely not human 
In fact, very likely insect hairs. ' [55: 471 
Brundle's physiological and psychological changes 
accelerate, and bits of his anatomy start falling off 
and new appendages appear. After four weeks of 
separation, Quaife visits the lab and is shocked by 
Brundle's deformed appearance and the news that he has 
identified the aetiology of the "disease": "A fly got 
into the transmitter pod with me that first time when I 
was alone. The computer got confused; there weren't 
supposed to be two separate genetic patterns and it 
decided to, splice us together.... My teleporter turned 
into a gene splicer .... Now I'm not Seth Brundle 
anymore. Im the offspring of Brundle and housefly. ' 
[ 63: 4 71 
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However as the hideous transformations continue, 
Brundle realises that he is not afflicted by a 
potentially contagious mutagenic disease, but rather he 
is metamorphosing into a chimera: "I'm becoming 
something that's never existed before. I'm becoming 
"'Brundlefly". 1 [69: 01] Nevertheless, Brundle develops a 
theoretical fusion "refinement" procedure, designed to 
decrease to a minimum the percentage of fly in 
Brundlefly, by gene-splicing it with one or more "pure" 
human subjects. [73: 421 However, having done so, he 
seemingly overlooks the serendipitous arrival of 
shotgun wielding Borans as an opportunity to test his 
theory. Indeed, having easily overpowered the magazine 
editor, Brundle seems driven by a bizarre intersexual 
desire to fuse himself with, the now pregnant, Quaife. 
Having "'manhandled" Quaif e into the f irst telepod, 
initiated the fusion procedure and entered the second 
telepod, Brundle is left to rue not having killed the 
magazine editor. For Borans now blasts shotgun pelts 
through the cables connecting Quaife's telepod to the 
control computer. In an unsuccessful attempt to 
intervene, Brundle manages to get half way out of his 
telepod before the fusion procedure is activated. The 
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result is both Brundle and the open third of the second 
telepod, being teleported and fused. Reappearing from a 
third telepod, this amorphous cyborg is met by Quaife 
and the shotgun, the outcome is a reluctant mercy 
killing. 
Adam Curtis asserts, in his three part documentary The Power ofNightmares: The 
Rise of the Politics of Fear, that: 
'In the past, politicians promised to create a better world. They had 
different ways of achieving this. But their power and authority came 
from the optimistic visions they offered to their people. Those dreams 
failed. And today, people have lost faith in ideologies. Increasingly, 
politicians are seen simply as managers of public life. But now, they 
have discovered a new role that restores their power and authority. 
Instead of delivering dreams, politicians now promise to protect us 
from nightmares. They say that they will rescue us from dreadful 
dangers that we cannot see and do not understand. And the greatest 
danger of all is international terrorism. A powerful and sinister 
network, with sleeper cells in countries across the world. A threat that 
needs to be fought by a war on teffor. But much of this threat is a 
fantasy, which has been exaggerated and distorted by politicians. It's a 
dark illusion that has spread unquestioned through governments 
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around the world, the security services, and the international media. " 
[0: 04] 
The apparent crux of this standpoint is the Straussian belief that liberal 
democracies contain the seeds of their own destruction; that the liberal ideal of 
individual freedom ultimately results in the questioning and undermining of the 
values, authority and ideology that holds society together. Building on this 
foundation, the proposition is that having degenerated into relativism, fear has 
become the only political agenda in the First World; and that within post- 
industrial societies: 'Those with the darkest nightmares became the most 
powerful. ' [2: 24] 
Curtis examines the nightmare that is international Islamic terrorism, a "phantonf' 
he believes has been created by the US neoconservatives, and one that has 
changed the Global political landscape. Interpreting the statements and actions of 
British Prime Minster Tony Blair, Curtis proposes: 
'What Blair argued was that faced by the new threat of a global terror 
network, the politician's role was now to look into the future and 
imagine the worst that might happen and then act ahead of time to 
prevent it. In doing this, Blair was embracing an idea that had actually 
been developed by the Green movement: it was called the 
"precautionary principle". Back in the 1980's, thinkers within the 
ecology movement believed the world was being threatened by global 
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warming, but at the time there was little scientific evidence to prove 
this. So they put forward the radical idea that govermnents had a 
higher duty: they couldn't wait for the evidence because by then it 
would be too late; they had to act imaginatively, on intuition, in order 
to save the world from a looming catastrophe. [50: 24] 
However!, the problem with this type of thinking is highlighted in Curtis' 
mterview with Bill Durodie: 
'But once you start imagining what could happen, then there' s no 
limit.... What it is, is a sbift from the scientific, "wbat is" evidence- 
based decision making, to this speculative, imaginary "what if' based 
worst case scenario. ' [51.56] 
In a society where the most fantastical threats are likely to glean the greatest 
attention and yield the maximum reaction, politics becomes an exercise in illusion 
in which there is a vested interest in inflating and exaggerating any perceived 
danger. As long as the implied threat contains the merest element of 
verisimilitude, the populace will be motivated to seek protection. 
Of course fear has always been a political commodity, hence Mencken's 
aphorism: 'The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed 
(and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of 
hobgoblins, all of them imaginary. ' (1918/2005 p. 53) However, when the 
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perceived success of the precautionary principle - as motivating change regarding 
global warming - is associated with the fainthearted, feckless and self-obsessed 
individualism of First-World decadence, the potency of nigbtmares appears to 
increase exponentiaRy. 
In the introduction of his book Wonderwoman and Superman, John Harris asks: 
'We can now, literally, change the nature of human beings.... Whether we should 
do so and in what ways is the subject of this book. Should we celebrate the 
ingenuity and imagination of the biotechnologists who have made all this possible 
or should we rather try to limit and control their activities? ' (1993 p. 2) The subtle 
but clearly loaded nature of Harris' question speaks volumes for the veneer of 
neutrality coating many posthuman texts that lack the temerity to be evangelical 
on the subject. By contrast the introduction of Citizen Cyborg, by James Hughes 
declares: 'This book argues that transhuman technologies, technologies that push 
the boundaries of humanness, can radically improve our quality of life, and that 
we have a fundamental right to use them to control our bodies and minds. ' (2005 
P-Xii) 
This style tends to be repeated when questions are asked about the efficacy of 
such technologies. VVhile the timid 'see neither supermen nor monstrosities 
emerging from gene splicing' and believe the immortal prosthetic posthuman is: 
'the language of technological hyperbole, which comes pretty close to pure 
fantasy' (Mazlish 1993 p. 175, pp. 220-22 1); the impetuous fantasise of ontological 
change and the creation of minor deities: 
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'The Singularity will allow us to transcend these limitations of our 
biological bodies and brains. We will gain power over our fates. Our 
mortality will be in our own hands. We will be able to five as long as 
we want (a subtly different statement from saying we will live 
forever). We will fully understand human thinking and will vastly 
extend and expand its reach. By the end of this century, the 
nonbiological Dortion of our intelligence will be trillions of trillions of 
times more powerful than unaided human intelligence. ' (Kurzweil 
2005 p. 5) 
T-1 - However while those advocating posthuman technologies prophesise a comucopia 
of human advancements, others envisaging nothing but catastrophe: 
'Although most of the planet is blissfully unaware of what is 
approaching, lulled by promises of a "'great big beautiful tornorrow",, 
the near future will be anything but beautiful. A terrifying future 
thunders toward mankind, an impending fate embodied by monstrous, 
blasphemous combinations of human and animal genetic materials, of 
man/machine cyborgs, and of beings not only with increased 
capacities and extended life-spans, but also with re-engineered 
morality void of compassion. This future is so abhorrent as to almost 
defy the imagination. ' (Quayle 2003 p. 1) 
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To this end Cronenberg's rendition of The Ry encapsulates all fronts, while 
Brundle's alteration is universal and its potency is exponential, his metamorphosis 
is seemingly painless and unhurried. The posthuman technology improves then 
impairs, recreates then destroys. The human is transformed into superhuman: with 
superior reactions, athleticism and sexual prowess; and then into freak: sprouting 
hairs, deteriorating skin and losing figure nails. Becomes a demigod: walking on 
ceilings and leaping unharmed off taU buildings; and then a grotesque: shedding 
appendages, developing an exoskeleton and regurgitating liquefying saliva. 
While Dinello believes The Fly 'powerfully dramatises the dire consequence of a 
random mishap in the technology of genetic engineering as the horrors of 
transgenic creatures' (Dinello 2005 p, 197), it can also be seen as one of the purest 
of posthuman. narratives, for it deals with the subject obliquely. The fact that the 
telepods are not designed as gene splicers functions to isolate the idea of 
posthuman endeavour from direct scrutiny. By focusing, foremost, on a mistake in 
the execution of scientific method, and then having this error as the essential 
ingredient of the derivation into the posthuman, the film attains distance from the 
realpolitik of posthuman technoscience: the moral issues, paymasters,, vested 
interests and hidden agendas. Indeed, Brundle's work is already somewhat 
removed as no-one: 'knows what the project reaRy is' [ 10: 11 ], and neither he nor 
his project is corrupted by wealth and power: 'But they [Bartok Science 
Industries] leave me alone because I'm not expensive. And, they know they" 11 end 
up owning it all, whatever it is' [ 10: 2 1 J, hubris or narcissism: 'I don't work alone. 
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There's a lot of stuff in there I don't even understand.... I farm bits and pieces out 
to guys who are much more brilliant than I am. ' [09: 551 
In addition Brundle's character is portrayed as benign and his research, which is 
ultimately only a form of transportation, seems as laudable. In fact, by 
representing Brundle as sincere, genial, and magnanimous bordering on self- 
deprecating, and by making his research benign and unsullied by corruptive 
influences and morally unimportant, The Ry appears to break from the formulaic 
science fiction scientist who tends to be 'driven by arrogance, greed, and 
impetuous, self-absorbed creativity. ' (Brem and Anijar 2003 p. 22) 
The geniality of Brundle makes it difficult to dismiss his rather unpalatable level- 
headed scientific rationalism, in the face of transformation, simply because he is a 
dislikeable character. Indeed, instead of descending into a panic or destructive 
rage at his metamorphosis, Brundle is Philosophical throughout the entire process. 
When he initially displays enhanced physiological abilities such as quicker 
reactions, greater strength and stamina etc., it prompts Brundle to question 'the 
computer if it had improved me' [43: 57]; deep in transition, he gains new 
physiological abilities, the capacity to walk on the ceiling etc., and ponders: 'I 
seem to be stricken by a disease with a purpose wouldn't you say, maybe not such 
a bad disease after all? ' [68: 16]; metamorphosing even further, Brundle amasses a 
collection of discarded human appendages, but is still accepting: 'You're relics. 
Yes you are. You can't deny it; vestigial, archaeological, redundant, artefacts of a 
bygone era, of historical interest only. ' [75: 06] .; C; F 
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Indeed in a seemingly prescient statement concerning the co smetic- surgery 
culture, the contemporary dissatisfaction with the "imperfect" body, Brundle 
states: 'I know what the disease wants.... It wants to turn me into something else. 
That's not too terrible is it? Most people would give anything to be turned into 
something else. ' [68: 41] 
While Brundle's transformation is ultimately depicted as a graphically horrific 
experience; his demeanour, his apparent lack of pain, and the fact telepods were 
not designed as gene splicers, all seems to detract attention away from knee-jerk 
technophobia. In fact the reverse may be true, for the only credible method of 
returning Brundle to his human form is by mastering the telepods as gene splicers, 
rather than teleporters. This possibility is alluded to in the form of the "The 
Brundlefly Project": 'Goal: to decrease to a minimum the percentage of fly in 
Brundlefly. Solution: the fusion by gene-splicing of Brundlefly with one or more 
'ýpure" human subjects. ' [73: 42] 
Paradoxically, although The Fly withholds "successful" gene manipulation, the 
telepods represent a potential solution a number of concerns surrounding the 
posthuman debate. This is because they offer the ability to transform the human 
genetically on an individual level, without the need for a gradual and systematic 
lineage of genetic manipulation. This sidesteps issues regarding incremental and 
endemic corruption of genetic information by the transmission of unforeseen 
mistakes; and allows for a far quicker and more systematic procedural refmement. 
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It also renders mute questions regarding the genetic manipulating of the unborn, 
for telepod genetic transformation can take place at any age and could even 
include "informed" consent. 
Interestingly, while the gory nature of The Ry clearly has the requisite "yuck" 
factor to resonate as an allegory for technoscientific precaution, it does not appear 
to be the narrative of choice for those who repudiate the posthuman. One reason 
why this is the case may be that the linchpin of The Fly's nightmare is a solvable 
technological issue. The mistake Brundle makes, allowing the computer to fuse 
two separate entities together instead of teleporting them as separate entities, 
appears easily resolvable. As such mankind is perpetually attempting to solve 
technological problems. Offering-up a litany of "potentiar" safety issues as the 
sole reason to refrain from developing a potentially beneficial technology, is 
hardly likely to carry the argument in the long run. Indeed, those who reject 
, posthuman development but advocate analogous "therapeutic" technologies are 
actively undermining the safety issue argument. For the solving of similar issues 
surrounding their therapeutic use will ultimately trickledown resulting in the 
reduction of safety issues surrounding their non-therapeutic use. 
Indeed, the worst case scenarios referenced by those who oppose the posthuman. 
tend not to centre on corruption, mistakes, accidents, monsters, or technology out 
of controL but rather on the exaggerated nightmare of success. When Habermas 
(2003) argues that development towards the posthuman is contrary to the good life 
(pp. 1-15) and will undermine the concePt of freedom and the self-understanding 
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of humanity (pp. 16-74); and Kass (2004) states the posthuman is against god 
(pp. 231-256), human flourishing (pp. 29-54) and that immorality is inhuman 
(pp. 257-276), they are referring to the "successful" utilisation of such techniques. 
Again when McKibben (2004) claims the posthuman. will trivialise, human life 
(pp. 1-67) and Fukuyarna, (2003) declares it is contrary to the concepts of human 
rights (pp. 105-128), human nature (pp. 129-148), and human dignity (pp. 148-177)3, 
they are not referring to safety issues and technological mistakes, but the fruition 
of the posthuman as conceived by its advocates. 
In attempting to counterargue the pro-posthuman narrative, its detractors may 
have adopted a more advanced argument than their opponents. Fighting rhetoric 
with rhetoric; they have reinterpreted the utopian storyline to read as a dystopia. 
nightmare, inverting the hyperbole surrounding the posthuman to help create a 
similar narrative depicting the imminent death of the human. In doing this they 
may have managed to inflict a potential coup de grace to their adversaries, for 
every positive blow scored for the posthuman, is counterpunched as a negative 
blow against the human, ad infinitum. To value the posthuman, is to disregard the 
human, and of course a confrontational stalemate, is a defacto win for the human. 
Unsurprisingly, having created their fantasy nightmare scenario, the death of the 
human as a result of the success of postbuman technology, some critics of 
posthuman enhancement have followed the neoconservative lead and co-opted the 1W 
precautionary principle as a tool to fight their cause. In doing this they have, like 
certain radical elements of the environmental movement, extended the 
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precautionary principle beyond its original methodological scepticism, 
transforming it from a constructive evaluative tool into an absolutist theory at 
odds with technoscience. 
George Annas is an advocate of using the "extreme" version of the precautionary 
principle as a defence against posthuman enhancement. He argues: 
'The environmental movement has adopted the precautionary principle 
to help stem the tide of environmental alterations that are detrimental 
to humans. One version of this principle holds that "when an activity 
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment... the 
proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the 
burden of proof' - that the activity is more likely to be beneficial than 
harmful. ' (Annas, Andrews and Isasit 2002 p. 153, internal quote from 
Raffensperger and Ticker 1999 P. 354) 
This extreme interpretation of the principle is usually hardened further by 
marrying it with the belief that technological benefits - whether environmental or 
in this case posthuman. - are practically inconceivable: 
'It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable 
genetic modification, could provide benefits to the human species in 
extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication 
could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were 
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rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity 
currently exists or is on the horizon. ' (Annas, Andrews and Isasit 2002 
153) 
Unfortunately, the absolutist nature of this inconceivability clause, which when 
combined with the restrictive version of the precautionary principle results in little 
more than a de facto rejeetion of all posthuman endeavour, appears impossible to 
mamtam consistently without it being predicated on a severe technological 
cynicism i. e., the belief that technological development is, by its very nature, 
detrimental rather than beneficial. Indeed, many of the so-called advantages of the 
posthuman appear to be based on self-evident claims. This has lead to a number of 
pertinent questions being overlooked; specifically, why does having a more 
powerful brain, or being able to live longer, run faster, jump higher etc., constitute 
advantage or improvement? If anything, the current level of human intelligence is 
already high enough to be a survival liability. For it has enabled humans to create 
extremely hazardous nuclear, chemical and biological substances and weaponry; 
and massive pollution, environmentally unsustainable lifestyles and enormous 
over-population. This intelligence has rendered the human the one species on the 
planet capable of, deciding to and succeeding in, killing every member of its own 
species and probably most others as well. Such ingenuity does not appear to be X- - 
particularly advantageous, and this line of argument seems equally valid when 
applied to physiological enhancements. For even if they are successful they seem 
equally likely to hinder rather than benefit humanity. 
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Of course posthuman modernists, like those in the Extropy Institute, reject this 
position. They still follow modernist thinking, believing in perpetual progress, the 
triumph of reason, and ultimately human amelioration: 'Pursuing extropy means 
seeking continual improvement in ourselves, our cultures, and our environments. 
Perpetual progress involves improving ourselves physically, intellectually, and 
psychologically. It means valuing the perpetual pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding. ' (More 2003) More continues by arguing that: 'If the 
precautionary principle had been widely applied in the past, technological and 
cultural progress would have ground to a halt. Human suffering would have 
persisted without relief, and life would have remained poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short: no chlorination and no pathogen-free water; no electricity generation or 
transmission; no X-rays; no travel beyond the range of walking. ' (2004) 
Unfortunately, no matter how reasonable this standpoint appears at first glance, 
the counterargument is that while conducting a synchronic examination of 
contemporary health issues may suggest that posthuman. technologies may be 
beneficial, a diachronic; examination exposes the fact that the vast majority of 
human health issues are as a direct result of First World industrialisation. As 
Capra argues: 
'industrialised countries are plagued by the chronic and degenerative 
diseases appropriately called "diseases of civilization7l, the principal 
killers being heart disease, cancer, and strokes. On the psychological 
side, severe depression, schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders 
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appear to spring from a parallel deterioration of our social 
environment. There are numerous signs of social disintegration, 
including a rise in violent crimes, accidents and suicides; increased 
alcoholism and drug abuse; and growing numbers of children with 
learning disabilities and behavioural disorders. The rise in violent 
crimes and suicides by young people is so dramatic that it has been 
called an epidemic of violent deaths. At the same time, the loss of 
young lives from accidents, especially motor accidents, is twenty 
times higher than the death rate from poho when it was at its worst. ' 
(Capra 1983 pp. 4-5) 
If one actively generates health hazards and then potentially solves them through 
technology, should this be deemed more beneficial to humanity than simply 
refraining from generating them in the first place? More inadvertently highlights 
this point with his example: chlorination and pathogen-free water. Humans have 
survived for millennia without chlorinated water. The reasons why First World 
drinking water "needs" to be disinfected is due to the unsanitary characteristics of 
human communities, and because humans now have an underdeveloped immune 
system, ironically caused by disinfectant dependency. Ozone and chlorine 
disinfected water was introduced, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, in response to pathogen issues arising from water contaminated with 
human faecal matter. (USEPA 2000 pp. 1-2) Chlorinated water is thus a 
paradigmatic example of human ingenuity solving a manmade problem. 
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It may in fact be argued that posthuman solutions to First World health issues can 
only offer, at best, parity with past levels of human wellbeing. If this is so, then it 
may seem reckless to gamble with potentially hazardous and irreversible 
technologies, when more prudent, but admittedly challenging and time 
consuming, social and cultural alternatives exist. The pertinent question here 
appears to be whether posthuman technologies would have offered tangible 
lifestyle improvements to, say, American, Australasian and African aboriginals 
prior to European colonialism? Hobbes who, unlike More, had lived through the 
English Civil War and lived during a period of general ignorance towards the life 
outside of Europe, may be forgiven his parochial comments regarding the nature 
of man outside the Leviathan, that is: 'continual fear, and danger of violent death; 
and the life of nxin, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short., ' (1651/1996 p. 84) 
This said those who advocate the posthuman often argue that human 
"enhancement" should be viewed using a self-evident, rather than universal, 
framework. Bostrorn believes going beyond the current limits of human 
psychology and physiology is a shared human goal that equates to life 
improvement 'by any reasonable criteria'. (2007 p. 5) Indeed, the "reasonable" 
majority would love to have a more powerful brain, or be able to live longer, run 
faster, jump higher etc., as argues Hughes: 
'But people do know they want health, longevity, security and 
prosperity for themselves and their kids. When push comes to shove 
very few are eager to embrace sickness, disease, mental decline and 
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early mortality in order to avoid hubris or preserve the "humanness". 
So the constituency for a political ideology that promotes human 
enhancement includes the vast majority of the planet's people, rich 
and poor, religious and secular. ' (2005 p. 66) 
Yn 
. L-.... ass mockingly oversimplifies this thinking, perhaps justifiably, as: 'Life is good, 
and death is bad. Therefore, the more life the better'. (2004 p. 262) Nevertheless, 
technological cynics will argue that it says more about the vacuous, instant- 
gratification lifestyles of most First World citizens than any considered opinion on 
the "good life", In fact due to the relative nature of our existence, any perceived 
advantage in increasing, for example, human lifespan, will be swallowed-up 
within a few generations. Instead of using these extra years to do the things 
current human never gets around to doing, the most likely consequence will be the 
spending of more time doing exactly the same things, only slower. Humans will 
spend longer at school, longer at university, longer at work etc.. As already stated, 
the life expectancy in the UK for a new bom boy in 1901 was 45 years; in 1999 it 
was 75 years. (Hicks and Allen 1999 p. 8) Has this extra life expectancy been 
utilised to its full potential? Will those bom in the early twenty-first century have 
an ontologically superior life to those bom in the early twentieth century? Will 
they necessarily achieve greater meaning, fulfilment, and self-worth? Do humans 
even celebrate the fact that they will on average live longer? Or does the 
knowledge simply pass them by, as they now expect to five longer? 
Unfortunately, the relativity of human existence is such that any fimdamental 
change in ability will only seem fundamental for a short period of firne, before it 
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becomes the nonn. It may take a few extra generations to adapt to rapid change, 
but eventually, within a few generations, the momentous will becomes the banal. 
In addition, cynics will highlight the seeming irresponsibility of allowing humans 
to determine their own evolutionary direction, citing the capricious nature in 
which past, present and probably future generations have, and will, defme and re- 
define, what is good for civilised man. Human history is littered with allegories of 
possible futures that constantly fluctuate between the utopian and the dystopian. 
The paradigmatic example of this is Aldous, Huxley's novel Brave New World. 
Published in 1932 - one year after his brother, renowned biologist Julian Huxley, 
wrote his pro-eugenic treatise What Dare I think? - Brave New World, also 
printed by Chatto, & Windus, was far from the dystopian attack on future 
technoscience (especially eugenics) it is currently perceived to be. As Bradshaw 
notes in his introduction to Brave New World: 
'Brave New World bas long been installed... as one of the principal 
dystopian or anti-utopian novels of the twentieth century. Its title is 
now a pervasive media phrase, automaticaUy invoked in connection 
with any development viewed as ultra-modem, ineffably zany or i 
involving a potential threat to human liberty. When Huxley wrote the 
novel, however, he had other things on his mind besides the 
'-f-mghtmarisW' future.... Huxley's original purpose in writing Brave 
New World may well have been to satirise Men Like Gods and the 
fantastic, 'Valifbmian7 world it depicted'. (2004 pp. vi-viii) 
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Indeed in the historical frainework of the early 1930's, Brave New World can be 
read as having an optimistic portrayal of future genetic technology, where 
ýmedical science has eliminated virtually all disease, together with the debilitating 
effects of old age. ' (Carey 1999 p. 447) This reading certainly seems compatible 
with the apparent similarities in Aldous' and his brother's advocacy for eugenics: 
'Two weeks prior to the publication of Brave New World, in a talk 
broadcast on BBC Radio in January 1932, Huxley discussed the 
possible use of eugenics as an instrument of political control and 
expressed his readiness to sanction eugenicist measures to arrest the 
"rapid deterioration... of the whole West European stock7. ' 
(Bradshaw 2004 p. x) 
However, many within both the intelligentsia and the social establishment, of the 
time, saw human eugenics as hold the imminent solution to a number of social 
issues. Ferndndez-Armesto notes: 
'this was one of the orthodoxies of the age. In early Soviet Russia and 
parts of the USA in the same period, the right to marriage was denied 
to people officially classified as feeble-minded, crimin 1, and even (in 
some cases) alcoholic. By 1926, compulsory sterilisation of people in 
some of the categories had been adopted in nearly half the states of 
the USA. ' (2005 p. 15 3) 
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However the revelations of Nazi eugenics, its racial purity ethos and the mass 
exterminations of those deemed "unfit" to breed, was to undermine pro-eugenic 
enthusiasm. Soon Brave New World was reinterpreted as a prophetic attack on 
eugenic technologies. Of course some of this historicism may be in part 
attributable to the hindsighted representation of the original in Aldous' post- 
Holocaust book Brave New World Revisited. 
'In his 1946 Foreword to Brave New World Huxley makes no 
reference to the appeal which planning and eugenics held for him at 
the time he wrote the novel. Hitler and the "Final Solution7 had made 
all such ideas unthinkable and by then Huxley had long since forsaken 
them. Instead, the Foreword and Brave New World Revisited (195 8) 
emphasise the novel's prophetic awareness of the "nightmarisW' 
future which the hegemony of Soviet Communism seems to portent. ' 
(Bradshaw 2004 p. xii) 
Seventy years on, the ever increasing talk of cloning, embryo selection and 
genetic engineering etc., is again challenging human perceptions of reproductive 
enhancement. Indeed, to this end, Brave New World may soon return to being 
viewed as a positive representation of the efficacy of such technology. 
While the arguments associated with technological cynicism and extreme 
precautionary principles may seem cogent, lucid and persuasive, it seems rather 
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unpractical, if not fanciful to believe humanity is ever likely to reverse the 
direction of its lifestyle and return to a pre-techno logical era. This said certain 
environmental issues may become severe enough to result in a partial reinmig-in of 
technoscience. 
However such results are likely to be a pyrrhic victory for those who have 
appropriated the precautionary principle as an absolutist method of halting 
posthuman development. For if the principle is to be deemed as more than simple 
arbitrary protectionism, it will need consistence of application, being applied to 
all new technologies, not just the posthuman. Yet unlike many radicals within the 
environmental movement, the idea of abandoning large swaths of agricultural, 
commercial, medical and future-technologies research, simply because they fail to 
meet the precautionary principle will seem abhorrent. This is because Annas et al. 
are, paradoxically, libertarian humanists who advocate unconstrained free-market 
technological progress. Their co-opting of the precautionary principle is simply an 
attempt to halt an individual technology they find objectionable. This being the 
case, Annas has been forced to counter accusations of arbitrary and inconsistent 
application by explaining why posthuman endeavour should be singled-out for 
" special treatment": 
'In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as 
crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can 
alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the 
foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own 
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hands and directing it towards the development of a new species, 
sometimes termed the '-ýposthuman". ' (Annas, Andrews and Isasit 
2002 p. 153) 
Unfortunately Annas's strategy is little more than hanging the legitimacy of one 
argument on the inferred legitimacy of others i. e., there is such a thing as human 
essence, that it is threatened by posthuman technologies, and that it is worth 
protecting. These arguments, as already demonstrated, appear more than a little 
suspect. 
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CHAPTER V 
BEYOND HUMANISM 
Accepfing fhe Morfal Flesh 
Novel: Infinity Welcomes Careful Drivers (1989) 
The year is 2179 and indolent waster "Dave Lister" 
awakes to find himself slumped across a table in a 
McDonald's burger bar on Mimas, one of Saturn' s moons. 
The last thing he can remember is celebrating his 
twenty-fourth birthday with a Monopoly board pub-crawl 
of London with six of his very closest friends. 
Six months later and having only managed to save fifty- 
three of the eight hundred dollarpounds he needs to buy 
a shuttle ticket back to Earth; Lister has a stroke of 
genius. He will join 'the Space Corps, get on an Earth- 
bound ship and as soon as he gets home: thank you, 
goodnight. Lister, David, AWOL. ' (Grant and Naylor 1992 
p. 33) The only flaw in this plan is that the ship 
Lister gets assigned to, the "Red Dwarf", will take him 
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to Earth,, but only after it has first mined ore from 
Triton, a process that will take approximately four- 
and-a-half-years. 
Some months later, Lister, in a desperate attempt to 
escape the monotonous routine of lif e onboard ship,, 
intentionally breaks quarantine regulations by 
smuggling aboard and hiding a show cat named 
"'Frankenstein". The "smallest, healthiest animal with 
the best pedigree he could find... inoculated for every 
known disease, to ensure that she didn't actually 
endanger the crew' . (Grant and Naylor 1992 p. 8 9) Then 
having gotten himself deliberately caught, Lister is 
sentenced to the statutory punishment of three years in 
a stasis booth, suspended in time, without pay. 
subjective instant later Lister is released from 
stasis by the ship's computer "Holly" to the news that 
'Everybody' s dead, Dave' . (Grant and Naylor 1992 p. 98) 
It transpires that after Lister was placed into stasis 
the ship suffered a catastrophic cadmium II radiation 
leak. In the fifteen nanoseconds Holly had to react to 
this, he managed to seal of f as much of the ship as 
possible and set the drive computer to accelerate Red 
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Dwarf out of the solar system in an attempt to avoid 
spreading nuclear contamination. However, there was 
little he could do to save the crew, all of whom had 
died in the accident with the exception of Lister, who 
Holly had kept in stasis until the radiation had 
reached a safe background level. This process has taken 
three million years. 
The situation f or Lister seems rather bleak; he is 
alone on a gigantic mining ship three million years 
into deep space and is now probably the last human in 
existence. This said Red Dwarf's mainframe can generate 
a single crewmember hologram and so, in an attempt to 
stop Lister slipping further into insanity, Holly 
decides to generate a hologram of Lister"s 
insufferable, cowardly and anal-retentive workmate: 
"'Arnold J. Rimmer". 
On reopening the radiation seals to the cargo decks, 
Holly notices a non-human life form and sends Lister 
and Rimmer to investigate. Here they find "Cat", a vain 
dim-witted feline humanoid, who is apparently the last 
onboard evolutionary descendant of the evidently 
pregnant Frankenstein. 
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Soon afterwards the Red Dwarf receives a distress 
signal f rom the ship "Nova 5" and rescues the last 
remaining crewmember,, a sanitation droid called 
""Kryten". Lister learns from Kryten that the Nova 5 has 
a Duality Jump drive system that could transport it to 
Earth in approximately three months. Also capable of 
sustaining one hologram, the Nova 5 is fuelled and 
crewed by the Red Dwarf members, and a course is set 
for Earth. 
Two years later, and the "space adventurers" are 
enjoying a gratifying life back on Earth. However fame 
and its associated fortune have affected the crew 
differently. Lister seeks peaceful anonymity and 
settles down in a backwater town in the American mid- 
west. Rimmer puts his money into developing the 
"Solidgram" a solid body to house a hologram. These 
sell in such quantities that he is now one of the three 
or four richest men in the world. Cat on the other hand 
lives in opulent seclusion on a Danish island. 
This said Listerts life has developed one minor 
inconvenience; both his forearms have become 
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excruciatingly painful. In an attempt to easy this he 
applies some cream and is shocked, and perplexed, to 
find the word "'DYING" written in pain across his arm. 
However, in time, the message changes to read "U=BTL". 
Unfortunately, Lister understands this message and sets 
off to round-up Rimmer and Cat. 
""Better Than Life" is an illegal brain implant, a 
deadly game offering a cripplingly addictive 
hallucinogenic nirvana. A computer-induced alternative 
reality where a player's fantasies are played out, 
whist he is kept oblivious of the outside world and 
ignorant of having entering the game. 'Not one person 
ever entered the Game without believing he could take 
it or leave it. Only inside, few ever made the painful 
journey back to reality. ' (Grant and Naylor 1992 p. 295) 
Suddenly Kryten appears and recounts how, after 
fuelling the Nova 5, the Cat had found a stash of 
smuggled BTL games aboard Red Dwarf, and how, having 
started playing, both Lister and then Rimmer had 
followed the Cat into the game in a vain attempt at 
rescue. During this time, he had attempted to care for 
his helpless crew members, but as the situation became 
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more desperate, had taken to lasering warning messages 
into Lister's arms. Apparently unsuccessful, in this 
attempt to extract them from the game,, Kryten 
eventually decided to enter the game himself. 
Now inside the game, Kryten explains that to leave, 
firstly, a player must want to leave, and secondly, he 
must find his own exit located somewhere within his own 
fantasy. 
Back in the American mid-west village his subconscious 
had copied from the film It's a Wonderful Life, Lister 
finds his exit and ponders leaving his wife and 
children: 'What harm was one more day? He turned away 
from the dissolving exit and crunched up the drive to 
220. One more night of that pinball smile. Just one. He 
couldn't leave them on Christmas Eve. But,, of course., 
in Bedf ord Falls it was always Christmas Eve... " (Grant 
and Naylor 1992 p. 298) 
Whilst contemplating human happiness both Smart (1973) and Edwards (1979) 
refer to a set of behavioural experiments carried out on rats by Olds and Milner in 
the 1950's. The experiments centred on the artificial stimulation, via implanted 
242 
electrodes, of pleasure centres within the brain. Having achieved this, Olds and 
Milner then ceded control of the resultant "pleasure device" to the rats, via a lever,, 
and then studied the animals' behaviour. Edwards' summarises the results: 
'Male rats that have been taught to turn on the electricity by pushing a 
lever seem to prefer this source of happiness to any now standard 
sources of ratty pleasures. They will press the lever to the point of 
physical collapse in preference to eating and drinking, and even in 
preference to copulating with an available female rat in heat. ' (1979 
p. 60) 
To illustrate the sheer extent of hedonistic lever pressing, Olds and Milner noted 
that in one particular set of experiments, rat "A-5" pressed the lever 'at 1920 
responses an hour; that is, about one response for every 2 sec. ' (1956 p. 425) 
The results of these behavioural experiments inspires Smart to visualise: 'a 
pleasant picture of the voluptuary of the future, a bald-headed man with a number 
of electrodes protruding from his skull, one to give the physical pleasure of sex, 
one for that of eating, one for that of drinking, and so on. ' (1973 p. 19) While 
Smart seems to envisage the occasional recreational plugging in and out of this 
pleasure device, analogous to that of the "Penfield Mood Organ7 in Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? (Dick 2004 p. 3), Edwards takes the idea a step Rjrther, 
postulating: 
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'Suppose that we knew how to sustain life and awareness for years 
and years with little or no physical exercise. If we had a chance, under 
those conditions, to consign ourselves to a hospital bed attached to a 
well-placed set of electrodes for the next fifty or sixty years of our 
life, but with no other type of human activity, experience, or 
fulfilment, would we take iff (1979 p. 60) 
Of course both Smart's and Edwards' pleasure devices fail as "all things being 
equar' hypotheticals, as their conceptions are constrained by, what was for them, 
contemporary technical conceivability. Nozick however manages to break from 
the mental straightjacket of technical conceivability, and by adapting Descartes' 
methodological scepticism - specifically his concept of the malin genie or r-6evil 
demon7' (1641/1999 § 12 p. 15) - develops, the already mentioned, "experience 
machine" scenario: 
'Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writ' g 
a great noveL or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All 
the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to 
your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, 
preprogramming your life experiences?... Of course, while in the tank 
you won't know that you're there; you'll think that it's all actually 
happening. --- Would you plug 
inT (Nozick 1974 pp. 42-43) 
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The thought experiments of Smart, Edwards and Nozick are ultimately designed 
to explore certain questions appertaining to the meaning of human existence, 
specificaRy: 'What does matter to us in addition to our experiencesT (Nozick 
1974 p. 43) Is there point, meaning and/or anything of intrinsic value to life 
outside of the self, or is it the case that: 
'the world we live in and seem to know has no ultimate reality, and 
that our attachment to it is an attachment to an illusion. Reality itself 
has neither name nor form, and what has name and form is but a 
painful dreaming from which all reasonable men would wish to 
escape if they knew the way and knew that their attachment was to 
nothingness. Life is without sense and point, there is a ceaseless 
alternation of birth and death and birth again, the constantly turning 
wheel of existence going nowhere eternally; if we wish salvation, it is 
salvation from life that we must seek. ' (Danto, 1968 p. 28) 
The resultant conclusions of each thought experiment proponent is illuminating. 
Nozick's standpoint is: 'We learn that something matters to us in addition to our 
experiences by imagining an experience machine and then realising that we would 
not use it. ' (1974 p. 44) The reasons for rejecting the experience machine, Nozick 
believes, are threefold. Firstly, 'we want to do certain things and not just have 
experiences of doing them'. Secondly, "we want to be a certain way, to be a 
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certain sort of person'. Thirdly, we would not want to be limited to 'a world that is 
no deeper or more important than that which people can construct.,, (1974, p. 43) 
In contrast Edwards holds that: 'As idealist philosophers have always insisted, the 
concrete world of everyday experience would be no less reliable or interesting if 
caused by God than by matter, as common sense assumes.... In practice, however, 
the electrodes simply cannot do what God can do; and there we shall probably 
have to leave it. ' (1979 p. 67) 
Smart's position is somewhat more equivocal, questioning: 'Now is this the sort 
of life that all our ethical planning should cuhninate in?... Surely not. Men were 
made for higher things, one can't help wanting to say, even though one knows that 
men weren't made for anything, but are a product of evolution by natural 
selection. ' (Smart 1973 p. 19) 
While these thought experiments were initially little more than philosophical 
devices: 'We are infinitely far removed from being able to create such a 
qualitatively hedonistic paradise electronically' (Edwards 1979 p. 67), it has been 
argued that recent technological developments have made the creation of 
analogues human/computer simulations only a matter of time (Bostrom 2003d), 
possibly only a matter of decades. (Smith 2005) Indeed the emergence of such 
technologies appears to have provoked the creation of an array of science fiction 
narratives, which have set out to represent and explore the social and 
psychological effects of having such posthuman technologies. 
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Writing in a social climate that has changed somewhat since the seventies, these 
narratives have challenged the: 'Theologians and humanists [who] go to the 
length of devoting book after book to "the conquest of nihilisnf'. Their solutions 
vary from a return to Calvin to the glorification of "the spontaneous affimnation of 
life". ' (Goudsb1om 1980 pp. 140-141) Gone is the idea providence, 'the City of 
God - the most perfect possible state, under the most perfect of monarchs. ' 
(Leibniz 1714/1998 §85 p. 280) Gone also is the tacit modernistic optimism, the 
sense of reverence toward a universal project, an amoral science working with 
reason towards human amelioration. In its place is cynicism, relativism, systemic 
individualism, the rejection of metanarratives and despondency at the 
meaninglessness of First World consumerisrn. 
In a world where technology is playing an ever increasing role in leisure and 
pleasure time, the conviction in the inconceivability of a rational person preferring 
simulation rather than reality seems antiquated. Indeed, the actions of many seem 
to suggest Western cultures have transcended the question altogether, the 
pertinent issue now being, if such technology is developed, what will be the extent 
and pervasiveness of its use? 
Infinity Welcomes Careful Drivers can be seen as an allegory for man's post- 
industrial condition. Focusing on the loneliness experienced by the last surviving 
members of the Red Dwarý it highlights both the pointlessness and monotony of 
decadent life and the escalating social isolation via technological dependence. It 
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appears more than simple coincidence that the personalities of the four main 
characters symbolise contemporary society personified i. e., the indolent waster, 
the self-indulgent neurotic, the superficial narcissist and the mindless conformist. 
This said it is only after the accident, the radiation leak, and the death of the rest 
of the crew, when the self enforced structure of employment is broken, that the 
protagonists suffer the fall revelation of their decadency. As a slogan of the Paris 
demonstrations of May 1968 states: 'Nous ne voulons pas d'un monde oU' la 
certitude de ne pas mourir de faim s'echange contre le risque de mourir d'ennui' - 
we want nothing of a world in which the certainty of not dying from hunger 
comes in exchange for the risk of dying from boredorn. (Tang 2006) From this 
standpoint, the crew's decision to plug themselves into the total immersion game 
"Better Than Life", the novel's equivalent to the experience machine, seems to be 
the perfect means of escaping the banalities of reality. 
Better Than Life is ontologically more sophisticated than the experience machine, 
as it allowing for notions of desire and happiness beyond Nozick's seemingly 
naive conception (or beyond what he is willing to admit). The game 
acknowledges that humans gain pleasure from such things as deferred 
gratification, abstinence, masochism, delusion, pain etc., and can even deliver 
fulfihnent when neurosis dictates that this can only be achieved by withhold' 
fulfilment. As Rimmer ponders: 
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'Could he really have fantasised this woman?... But having got her, 
why would he then fantasize she was unfaithful? With Hugh the 
hairy-shouldered pool attendant! What the hell did that say about the 
state of his mind? Mentally unwell, that's what it said. And why had 
he fantasised his wife's refusal to make love with him for the past 
eighteen months?... He moaned softly. The innards of his psyche were 
there for afl to see: putrid and rotten and rancid. His neuroses paradi 
like grinning contestants in the Mr. Universe contest! ' (1992 p. 284) 
Once inside Better Than Life the Red Dwarf crew exist happily for 'two years' 
(1992 p. 261) before Kryten's attempted interventiorL This is a curious timeframe 
as the game is opened ended and Kryten can enter at any time. It may be homage 
or simple coincidence, but Nozick writes of the experience machine: 'After two 
years have passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to select 
the experiences of the next two years. ' (1974 pp. 42-43) 
The problem with Better Than Life is that it is so good at illusion and gratification 
that it appears implausible that anyone would wish to leave. So the conundrum 
becomes how to make the characters aware of their fate. The mechanism used is 
that the game cannot sustain the life of the gamer. However, the plausibility of 
this proposition can only be maintained if it is assumed that Better Than Life is 
unintentionally addictive, having been developed as a recreational game rather 
than an alternative reality machine analogous to the experience machine. The crux 
here is that whilst humans have yet to develop the analogous interface and 
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simulation technology, they have 'already developed the life-support technology 
needed to keep a biological body (and mind) alive while computer interfaced. ' 
(Smith 2005 p. 336) 
It will be argued that rationally choosing to connect to such a machine, an agent 
must not only participate in a process of conceiving and evaluating credible 
outcomes, but also possess the ability to transcend any immediate displeasure 
associated with leaving their present reality. Smart argues: 'Maybe from 
tomorrow onwards, once the electrode work has started, we should be perfectly 
contented, but we are not contented now at the prospect. ' (1974 p. 2 1) This may be 
due to attachments to things left behind., even though moments later such things 
will either be forgotten or reappear inside the game. Or simply because 'I should 
be annoyed today if told that from tomorrow onwards I should be an electrode 
addict, even though I knew that from tomorrow onwards I should be perfectly 
happy. ' (Smart 1974 p. 12) However a decision not to connect to an alternative 
reality machine made on the basis of hyper-scepticism or hyper-cautiousness 
cannot be seen as a declaration in favour of life outside the machine, but rather an 
inability to conceive of, or an unwillingness to participate in, the parameters of the 
thought experiment. 
Infinity Welcomes Careful Drivers circumvents these issues by withholding, 
initially at least, the fact that the crew have connected to Better Than Life. This 
plot device serves to facilitate a fuller participation in the illusion and enables 
greater input and insight than that offered by a linear thought experiment. When 
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the crew's game playing is finally revealed, the juxtaposition of being stranded 
alone on a spaceship three million years into deep space, compared with the 
quality of life offered by the game, throws into disarray the knee-jerk assumption 
that "reality" must be self-evidently preferable to a simulation. 
Having done so it becomes all to easy to empathise with Lister's position and his 
inability to leave the game, for it seems obvious that the life and relationships he 
has developed within Better TI= Life offer him greater value and pleasure than 
those on Red Dwarf Nozick's issues of doing, being and belonging to a world 
beyond experience, appear of little value to Lister's predicament. In fact it is 
evident that the game has lived up to its epithet, life within it is clearly: better than 
Lister's life outside of it. Without the issue of life-support, it seems hard to 
imagine many in Lister's position would wish to leave the game; and some, like 
Lister, would be willing to stay even if it ultimately kills them. 
Infinity Welcomes Careful Drivers examines widely held and generally 
unquestioned assumptions regarding ontology, human psychology, posthuman 
technology and the value of life. However, in doing so it may have become a 
cautionary tale for both detractors and champions of posthuman technologies. 
This is because the narrative appears to have stumbled across a potentially 
crippling obstacle to fiature posthuman development, the possibility that man is ill- 
equipped, or even incapable of transcending egoism, relativism and base desires. 
As Gazzaniga argues in the opening paragraph of the provocatively entitled 
article: What Are Brains For?: 
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'Sex. Indeed, I would argue that the cathedral we build, the books we 
read and write, the science we create, the cars we drive, the stocks we 
buy and sell, all of the mergers, the politics, and the wars we wage - 
in short, everything that constitutes the intricate web of life that we 
have constructed around ourselves with our amazingly large brains - 
serves a very simple purpose. Sex. ' (1997 p. 157) 
Far from being a transitionary phase towards the posthuman, the coupling of brain 
to CPU might create the ultimate addiction, the zenith of personal fulflilment, and 
the death of all impetus towards the posthuman project; and any other project for 
that matter. Ironically while Goldenberg argues: "We are, I think, engaged in a 
process of making one another disappear by living more and more of our lives 
apart from other humans, in the company of machines" (1993 p. 11), total 
immersion simulations analogous to Better Than Life may be both the ultimate 
cause oý and the ultimate solution to, social isolation. 
The Posthuman as Existential Aspiration 
Novel: The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy (1979) 
Affable pillock "Arthur Dent" is having a bad ThursdaY. 
Firstly, he has been trying desperately to come to 
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terms with the fact that his house is scheduled for 
demolition to make way for a local bypass. This being 
something he first became aware of only the day before, 
despite the fact that the bypass plans had been on 
display, for the last nine months, in the cellar of the 
local planning office. Or more specifically 'on display 
in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a 
disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying Beware 
of the Leopard. I (Adams 1979 p. 12) Secondly, "Ford 
Prefect", one of Dent's closest friends, has just asked 
him: 'How would you react if I said that I'm not from 
Guildford after all, but from a small planet somewhere 
in the vicinity of Betelgeuse? ' (Adams 1979 p. 23) 
Thirdly, his home planet, the Earth, has just been 
destroyed by an alien race, the "Vogons", to make way 
for a hyperspace express route, something which came as 
a great surprise to most of the Earth's inhabitants, 
this even though, as the ""Prostetnic Vogon Jeltz" of 
the Galactic Hyperspace Planning Council explained: 
'All the planning charts and demolition orders have 
been on display in your local planning department in 
Alpha Centauri for fifty of your Earth years. I (Adams 
1979 p. 31) 
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Meanwhile, on the opposite spiral arm of the Galaxy 
""Zaphod Beeblebrox", President of the Imperial Galactic 
Government, is participating in the naming ceremony of 
the new Improbability Drive prototype spaceship: "The 
Heart of Gold". All is going swimmingly, until the ship 
is unveiled, at which point stupefied Beeblebrox 
utters: 'That is really amazing.... That really is 
truly amazing. That is so amazingly amazing I think T'd 
like to steal it' (Adams 1979 p. 38), and then proceeds, 
in a moment of crazed incontinence, to grab "Trillian" 
his latest girlfriend and act on his impulse. 
Dent, who up until a few minutes ago believed humans 
were the only intelligent life in the Galaxy, now finds 
himself and Ford aboard the Vogon ship that has just 
destroyed the Earth. It transpires that Ford has 
managed to hitch a lift, vicariously, via a matter 
transference beam, and the generosity of the Vogon"s 
"Dentrassi" cooks. Although not as precarious as having 
been left to melt into space along with the Earth, once 
the Vogon Captain learns of Ford and Dent's arrival 
their stay onboard is both unpleasant and short; for 
unlike the Dentrassi, the Vogons are 'one of the most 
unpleasant races in the Galaxy - not actually evil, but 
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bad tempered, bureaucratic, officious and callous. I 
(Adams 1979 p. 45) 
Ejected into open space, unprotected Dent and Ford 
expect to live no longer than thirty seconds. However 
seconds later, they are rescued by Beeblebrox and 
Trillian, or more specifically by the spaceship they 
are piloting. This highly improbable act occurred as a 
result of The Heart of Gold's improbability drive, 
which, when engaged, causes it to 'pass through every 
point in the Universe'. (Adams 1979 p. 79) 
Soon The Heart of Gold is in orbit around its 
destination the planet "Magrathea", which is apparently 
'some kind of legend from way back which no one 
seriously believes in. Bit like Atlantis on Earth, 
except that the legends say the Magratheans used to 
manufacture planets. ' (Adams 1979 p. 92) 
Having safely, although somewhat fortuitously, 
navigated the planetary automated defence system and 
landed on the surf ace; Trillian,, Ford and Beeblebrox 
set out to explore what they assume to be the 
uninhabited remnants of the Magrathean subterranean 
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settlements, whilst Dent and "Marvin" the "paranoid 
android" are told to guard the entrance, f rom whom 
Beeblebrox has not entirely made clear. 
Bored and depressed with Marvinf s conversation,. Dent 
wanders off, only to be startled by the appearance of 
native "Slartibartfast" who explains that the 
Magratheans have recently been tasked with building the 
"Earth Mark Two" and are 'making a copy f rom the 
original blueprints. ' (Adams 1979 p. 123) Dent"s 
surprise at this revelation then transforms into 
astonishment when he is further informed that the 
planet was originally commissioned, paid for and run by 
mice. However this then slides into incredulity when 
Slartibartfast continues by explaining that mice are 
"hyperintelligent pan-dimensional beings. Your planet 
and people have formed the matrix of an organic 
computer running a ten-million year research 
programme'. (Adams 1979 p. 125) 
In a critical piece of exposition it is revealed that, 
many millions of years ago, a race of hyperintelligent 
pan-dimensional beings became so frustrated with the 
constant bickering about the meaning of life, they 
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built a stupendous supercomputer: ""Deep Thought",, to 
solve the problem once and for all. Having asserted 
that there is a simple answer to "the Ultimate Question 
of Life, the Universe,, and Everything",, Deep Thought 
explains it will take some time to calculate the 
answer, approximately seven and a half million years. 
Seven and a half million years later Deep Thought 
announces it has calculated the answer to the *"'Great 
Question". but that it is not going to be liked. 
Reluctantly the super computer declares: 'The Answer to 
the Great Question... of Life, the Universe and 
Everything... is ... forty-two. ' (Adams 1979 p. 135) 
In an attempt to placate his contemptuous audience, 
Deep Thought suggests that the unsatisfactory nature of 
the answer has probably arisen from no-one having ever 
known what the question actually was. Deep Thought then 
offers a potential solution, that is the building of a 
new and even more complicated super computer: 
computer which can calculate the Question to the 
Ultimate Answer, a computer of such infinite and subtle 
complexity that organic life itself shall form part of 
its operational matrix.... And it shall be called 
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The Earth., ' (Adams 1979 p. 137) The upshot of this is 
that Deep Thought designs the Earth,, the Magratheans 
build it, humans live on it and the Vogons destroy it 
five minutes before the programme was completed. 
Slartibartfast then takes Dent to meet the mice, where 
he is reunited with Trillian, Ford and Beeblebrox. It 
is now explained to Dent that the mice may be able to 
circumvent the necessity of building a second Earth 
because "there's a good chance that the structure of 
the question is encoded in the structure of your 
brain. ' (Adams 1979 p. 149) At this point, they offer to 
buy Dent's brain off him. Ford exclaims that he thought 
they were offering to read his brain electronically, to 
which the mice reply: 'Oh yes ... but we Id have to get 
it out first. It' s got to be prepared. Treated 
Diced. ' (Adams 1979 pp. 149-150) 
Having rejected their kind offer, the meeting is rudely 
interrupted by the Police, who have f inally caught up 
with Beeblebrox. Escape seems impossible, that is until 
the police officers' spacesuits malfunction as a result 
of their spaceship committing suicide, having spent too 
long in conversation with Marvin. Back on The Heart of 
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Gold, Beeblebrox and his extended crew set course for 
the Restaurant at the End of the Universe. 
In a paradoxically move, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy appears to recreate 
the modernist telos of secular man, the ultimate search for knowledge, and then 
seeks to undercut the highfalutin assumptions surrounding such a task and man's 
role within it. It does this firstly by challenging man's self-confidence, 
specifically by positing that 'human beings were only the third most intelligent 
life form present on the planet Earth' (1979 p. 104) behind mice and dolphins. 
Secondly, it expels the mysticism surrounding existence. Earth and the life on it 
are not the creation of God, or accidents of nature, but intentional entities, 
designed and built to form part of a biological computer created to calculate the 
Question to the Ultimate Answer. Thirdly, instead of leading the search for 
knowledge, man's role is that of a simple component, an element of "organic life" 
that has formed part of its operational matrix. Indeed it is the mice that will 'go 
down into the computer to navigate its ten-million-year programV (1979 p. 13 7) 
Whilst ridiculing the self importance man has attributed to himself, the novel also 
satires his creation myths, by creating a seemingly ridiculous alternative that, 
within the realms of contemporary scientific thinking, is more lucid and cogent 
than theist mythology. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the narrative as 
proffering "relative" deism: Deep Thought being the god that creates "nature", in 
the terms of Earth and life on it, and then leaves it to its own devices. Or even 
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polytheism, the mice are the gods that created Deep Thought and thus the defacto 
creators of the Earth, and are immanent within the planet. Indeed, the narrative 
does not explicitly rule-out the possibility of a being beyond the mice or Deep 
Thought. However, the creator of the Earth is clearly not the highfalutin 
omnipotent, omniscient, all-benevolent being of the Christian faith, and the 
human is little more than a biological cog of a much larger and more important 
project. 
By positioning man as merely a component of an organic computer, The 
Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy draws attention to the similarities between this 
position and his status as an evolving biological machine within neo-Darwinism. 
Similarly by placing hyperintelligent pan-dimensional beings, in the form of mice, 
also on the planet, it ridicules anthropocentricity as little more than speciesism. 
Indeed, by having the mice logically reason that Dent's brain is little more than an 
artefact of the computer programme i. e., analogous to a mere product of 
evolution, this highlights the question of human autonomy, and whether it is 
compatible with scientific laws, computational or evolutional. 
However, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy does more than make subtle 
sideswipes at the abilities, hubris and incongruous self-perception of those outside 
of the narrative. It also highlights how the human residents of planet Earth (the 
organic computer) are commensurate with the posthuman. That is, they possess a 
number of important characteristics normally associated with the posthuman 
rather than the human. Examples include, they are a product of utility, a means to 
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an ends rather than an end in themselves. Their minds are interconnected in some 
tashion, forming part of a collective, a shared consciousness capable of processing 
a computer programme. The information on their brains can be extracted digitally. 
Their intelligence not only lacks unique or ontologically exceptional components, 
but is also a form of biological "artificial" intelligence. Although they have the 
illusion of autonomy, as biological machines their brains are not capable of 
creating new causal chains of events and therefore their thoughts and actions are 
determined solely by physical laws. They are perceived, from the standpoint of 
the mice, as artificial, a technological creation, and a form of information. 
Having highlighted the posthuman nature of man, as computer component, and 
then surreptitiously associated it with the similarities in perceiving the Earth and 
its inhabitants as an organic computer and that of scientific materialism; it 
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be; comes difficult to sidestep questions of whether humans, outside of the 
narrative, are already posthuman. 
For Bruce Mazlish, viewing the human as little more than a biological machine is 
a necessary element of transcending the "fourth shock7' to the human ego - the 
other three being: Copernicus' proofs for Heliocentrism, Darwin's evolutionary 
theory, and Freud's psychoanalysis. (1993 p. 3) Mazlish argues: 
'My thesis, then, is that humans are on the threshold of decisively 
breaking past the discontinuity between themselves and machines. 
This thesis consists of two parts. On one hand, humans are ending the 
261 
discontinuity because they now can perceive their own evolution as 
inextricably interwoven with their use and development of tools, of 
which the modem machine is only the fialhest extrapolation. We 
cannot think realistically any longer of the human species without a 
machine. On the other hand, the discontinuity is being bridged 
because humans now perceive that the same scientific concepts help 
explain the workings of themselves and their machines'. (1993 p. 6) 
It is Mazlish's belief that this coming to terms with the ultimate nature of the 
human, as biological machine, is an essential step if man wishes to have a healthy 
relationship with his technoscience: 
'As I have suggested, this change in our metaphysical awareness, this 
transcendence of the fourth discontinuity, is essential to our 
harmoniously coming to terms with an industrial world. The 
alternatives are either a frightened rejection of the Frankenstein 
monsters we have created or a blind belief in the "superhuman 
virtues" and a touching faith that they can solve all our human 
problems. ' (1993 p-7) 
The fact that humans are already on the cusp of this paradigm shift leads Mazlish 
to the conclusion that technology is unlikely to threaten the human, or humanity. 
However Mazlish's confidence appears misplaced, for it is the compatibility 
between man and machine that will ultimately facilitate the development of the 
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posthuman. As Moravec states of uploaded minds: 'I consider these future 
machines our progeny, "mind children7 built in our image and likeness, ourselves 
in more potent form. Like biological children of previous generations., they will 
embody humanity's best chance for a long-term future. It behoves us to give them 
every advantage and to bow out when we can no longer contribute. ' (1999 p. 13) 
The problem with Mazlish's theory seems to be that it projects beyond its 
supposed target, failing to acknowledge why humans participate in science and 
technology, and why it is currently perceived as offering either salvation or 
damnation. 
White declares: 'One thing is so certain that it seems stupid to verbalise it: both 
modem technology and modem science are distinctively Occidental. ' (1967 
p. 1204) The reason for this, VVhite believes, has its origins in the vehemently 
anthropocentric nature of the Christian faith: 'Our daily habits of action, for 
example, are dominated by an implicit faith in perpetual progress which was 
unknown either to Greco-Roman antiquity or to the Orient. It is rooted in, and is 
indefensible apart from, Judaeo-Christian theology. ' (1967 p. 1205) White 
continues by arguing that: Tspecially in its Western form, Christianity is the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has seen. ' (1967 p. 1205) Indeed, the idea that 
God created man, in his own image, and then placed him as the ruler over the 
Earth, generates a twofold catalyst. Firstly, there is the implication that man is 
ontologically similar to God and thus might be able to understand and gain access 
to the mind of God, beyond the limits of the Bible, through the examination of 
God's creation: 'By relation, God had given man the Bible, the Book of Scripture. 
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But since God has made nature, nature also must reveal the divine mentality. The 
religious study of nature for the better understanding of God was known as natural 
ý1- - theology. ' (White 1967 p. 1206) Secondly, because everything on Earth, that was 
not man, was deemed mere utility, the process of examining and then utilising,, 
that which was not man, could be conducted with an unparallel iffeverence. 
The function of a religion is one of political philosophy. The success of any social 
grouping is dependent on its ability to motivate individuals to act contrary to their 
self-interest, for the greater good of the community. VAiilst in most contemporary 
societies the law represent the workhorse behind this process, this system needs 
protection from constant challenges to its validity. This protection can be achieved 
via different methods for example, threat of force, appeals to ideology, and 
through coercion via the creation of an unchallengeable moral authority. 
The Christian faith functions as the grounding for a system of social rules, with 
the Bible as its rulebook i. e., a set of parables designed to be taught as dogma in 
order to indoctrinate individuals in how they should Eve their lives. However, 
because man writes the rules of any religion they are temporally indicative. 
Indeed, it is evident from such things as the Ten Commandments that the Bible 
was written exclusively for consumption by a subjugated audience. This, in stark 
contrast to social rulebooks for the power elite, such as Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics (350BCE/1976) which deals with such diverse topics as magnificence 
(Bk. IV §ii pp. 149-153), conversational qualities (Bk. IV §vii pp. 167-169), and the 
political sciences. (Bk. Vl §vii pp. 213-215) 
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However, while the normative nature of social rules renders them unfalsifiable; as 
Hume argues: 
'In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when aH of a sudden I 
am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual coPulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis 
necessary that it shou'd be obserVd and explain'd; and at the same 
time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others,, 
which are entirely different from it. ' (1739/2003 BUIl part. 1 §. l 
para. 27 p. 302) 
It was the ontological claims, those that form the foundation of its declared 
authority, that have been undermined by its progeny, rigorous scientific method: 
'Inevitably, natural philosophers concentrated on what alone natural 
philosophy could reveal, God the Creator, and they did so increasingly 
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as the scientific revolution progressed. Just as inevitably, given the 
thrust of the new conception of nature, they found a God who 
revealed Himself in immutable laws and not in the watchful care of 
personal providence or in miraculous acts.... Because the Scientific 
'n - 
, Revolution occurred in a society dominated by religious concerns, it 
could not avoid such matters. Its net effect was to question those 
aspects of Christianity that distinguished it from theism. It remained 
for a future age, drawing on the same intellectual source, to question 
theism as well. ' (Westfall 1986 p. 234) 
The irony is it was Christian natural philosophers, such as Galileo, Newton and 
Darwin, who were pivotal in the undermining of the Bible's factual assertions. It 
should be noted that of these three, only Darwin lost his religion. 
There is of course debate as to the extent of this conflict. Noble claims: 'Only 
during the last century and a half or so has this tradition been temporarily 
biterrupted - or, rather, obscured - by secularist polemic and ideology, which has 
greatly exaggerated the allegedly fundamental conflict between science and 
religion' (1999 p. 4), and Lindberg and Numbers argue: 'Conflict arose, not 
between science and religion as such, but within the individual minds 
experiencing a "crisis of faith" as they struggled to come to terms with new 
historical and scientific discoveries. ' (1986 p. 8) Nevertheless scientific 
rationalism eventually undermined the Christian faith and in doing so supplanted 
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a religious telos with a secular one, marking a new era of self-confidence in the 
abilities of man. 
Indeed, gone was the innate sinfulness of man's existence and his need to gain 
redemption and access to eternal peace in heaven; and in its place, a secularised 
project of human amelioration through reason and knowledge. Yet in the process 
of dispelling theism, secularists spread, and started to believe, their own 
propaganda and deluded themselves that their success over God was of 
ontological importance, rather than a wholly terrestrial victory over differing 
political ideologies. This oversight resulted in man failing to question whether he 
should relinquish his Christian title as earth's most important being. 
Anthropocentric theism gave way to secular humanism, and scientific method 
continued in the same human centred fashion as it had been under scripture. 
Having failed to have his moment of ontological clarity, man added insult to 
injury by deluding himself that amelioration through knowledge and reason was a 
material reality rather than an existential fiction. Having set himself up for a fall, 
man then embarked on the process of systematicaRy undermining his new and 
self-appointed raison d'etra. 
Lyotard argues: 'Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity 
towards metanarratives. ' (1984 p. xxiv) Having inflicted The Voyage of the Beagle 
on the theist metanarrative, it took a little under one hundred and fifty years for 
scientific endeavour to wield an analogous deathblow to the metanarrative of 
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modernity. However in doing so, man lost not only the belief that rational thought, 
allied to scientific reasoning, would lead inevitably towards social and ethical 
progress, but also the self-confidence he had, admittedly erroneously, attributed to 
himself having banished theism. 
The rejection of metanarratives renders all life, including human, without point or 
meaning. Whilst this is not a new thesis, its philosophical history can be traced 
back through Eastem philosophy and the relativism, scepticism and pragmatism 
taught by the sophists of Ancient Greece; revisiting a world without a telos after 
the conceited self-confidence of modernity and the Christian faith, has resulted in 
a period of social malaise. 
In response to this many anthropocentrics, both theist and secular, believe the 
obvious solution is to regain meaning and self-confidence by retuning either to 
theism or modernity. However Gray attacks such thinking as fanciful and 
ultimately doomed: 
ID- 
Religious fundamentalists see the power of science as the chief 
source of modem disenchantment. Science has supplanted religion as 
the chief source of authority, but at the cost of making human life 
accidental and insignificant. If our lives are to have any meaning, the 
power of science must be overthrown, and faith re-established... 
[they] see themselves as having remedies for the maladies of the 
modern world. In reality they are symptoms of the disease they 
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pretend to cure. They hope to recover the unreflective faith of 
traditional cultures, but this is a peculiarly modem fantasy 
Scientific fundamentalists claim science is the disinterested pursuit of 
truth. But representing science in this way is to disregard the human 
needs science serves.... Today, only science supports the myth of 
progress. If people cling to the hope of progress, it is not so much 
from a genuine belief as from fear of what may come if they give it 
up. The political projects of the twentieth century have failed, or 
achieved much less than they promised. ' (2003 pp. 18-19) 
Interestingly, the posthuman debate can be seen as emblematic of the struggle to 
reassert anthropocentrism; regaining meaning and self-confidence either by 
revisiting man as the image of God, or man as ameliorating through scientific 
endeavour. 
For Kass, meaning is to be found in spiritual wisdom, God's presence and 
redemption; and happiness, in the fulfilment of goals towards which our souls 
"naturally point"'. Salvation from meaninglessness is thus achieved via the 
rejection of scientific method and the acceptance of God: 'The implication for 
human life is hardly nihilistic: once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we 
can concern ourselves with living well, and care first and most for the well-being 
of our souls, and not so much for their mere existence. ' (2004 p. 270) 
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In advocating theism as the only true path to meaning and fulfilment, Kass also 
attacks the technophile's attempts to fabricate meaning by creating the 
posthuman. Exposing the irony that it was the modernists who destroyed meaning 
in the first place: 'It is probably no accident that it is a generation whose 
intelligentsia proclaim the death of God and the meaninglessness of life that 
embarks on life's indefinite prolongation and that seeks to cure the emptiness of 
life by extending it forever. ' (2004 p. 271) 
In a more caustic attack, McKibben utilises the nebulous rhetoric of modernists to 
pour scom on their posthuman desires: 
'The men who propose this leap into the unbounded future don't 
seem to know themselves quite why they want to jump. Because "it 
will allow us a deeper understanding of what truly we are", says 
Rodney Brooks. Because, says Gregory Stock, as our new biology 
allows us to "pierce the veneer of inside things, we [too] may reach 
the naked soul of man. "' Because, says I Hughes, reengineered minds 
will "permit us to think more profound and intense thoughts. " These 
sound like things that people say to each other in the parking lot at a 
Phish concert, before they drop acid. ' (2004 p. 231 - Brooks 2002 
p. 23 9, Stock 2002 p. 198, Hughes 1996) 
It is interesting to note that both theists and those who advocate the posthuman 
hold the belief that humanity needs salvation; salvation from the contingency and 
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meaninglessness of its existence. For the former, the solution to meaninglessness 
is one of paternalism: the creation of meaning via recourse to a fairytale, and its 
perpetuation t ough the strict adherence to scripture that is specifically designed 
to protect against enquiry into its spurious foundations. For the latter, the solution 
is one of temporal protection, deferring the revelation of meaninglessness until 
humans are capable of grasping its portent. In the meantime, humans should find 
meaning in the pseudo-modernistic belief of human amelioration, through 
devotion to science and technology, rather than knowledge and reason. 
The irony here is that when Brooks, Stock and Hughes talk about: the 'deeper 
understanding of who we are', 'the naked soul of man', and 'more profound and 
intense thoughts', the higher understanding they appear to be referring to is that 
which undermines the whole posthuman telos - the ultimate triumph of scientific 
enquiry over meaning. 
However when Mazlish speaks of an unhealthy attitude towards technoscience: a 
"frightened rejection7, or a "blind belief', these standpoints are reflected not only 
in the conflicting positions of the Church of God and the religion of technology, 
but also in the public's response to the posthuman science fiction narrative. As 
McDougaR argues: 
'The United States, and the world, is caught in a Flucht nach vorn, a 
flight into the future. What do we fear most, that technocracy will be 
perfected, or that it won't be? Americans delight in such futuristic 
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epics as Star Trek and Star Wars precisely because the human 
qualities of a Captain Kirk or Han Solo are always victorious over the 
very technological mega-systems that make their adventures possible. 
We want to beheve that we can subsume our individuahsm into the 
rationality of systems yet retain out humanity still. I (1997 p. 449) 
Indeed Bukatman argues: 'it is not technology per se that characterises the 
operations of science fiction, but the interface of technology with the human 
subject. The narration of new technological modes of being in the world 
represents a significant attempt to grapple with, and perhaps overcome, the fourth 
discontinuity that Mazlish described. ' (1994 p. 8) 
This said if humans are to achieve the balanced relationship with technology 
Mazlish desires; this process has little to do with accepting that humans are 
machines. Indeed, it appears to have more to do with man transcending the need 
to worship at the altar of utopia, and the acceptance of life without the need for 
meaning. The irony with this conclusion is a project facilitating the transcendence 
of idolatry and the acceptance of meaninglessness has already been successfully 
completed, and is the ultimate legacy of scientific enquiry. 
To this end, the rejection of metanarratives can be perceived is a social 
emancipator, freeing the human mind from the subjugation of ideology and 
religion. For Ancient Greek physician and anti-foundationalist Sextus Empiricus, 
the suspension of belief is one of the cornerstones of transcending judgment and 
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achieving "ataraxid',: 'an untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul. I 
(c. 200CE/I 933 Bk. I§ 10 p. 18) 
However while, for Sextus, the transcendence of dogmatism is the key to mature 
reasoning, Naess worries whether it is compatible with positive mental health: 'A 
practical problem very germane to the issue of scepticism arises here in 
confronting the Hellenic sceptic with modem teaching on positive mental health. ' 
(1968 p. 61) 
Nevertheless, Naess appears relatively confident that anti-foundationalism is 
compatible with a positive mental outlook, although he appears to undermine this 
conclusion somewhat. Firstly, by using a modernistic concept of mental health: 
'the criteria listed in... Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health' (1968 p. 61), 
Naess incongruously offers-up the anti-foundationalist to the dogmatist for 
measurement. Secondly, by focusing on those who have successful achieved 
ataraxia, Naess appears to overlook the sceptics that are the most susceptible to 
mental health issues Le., those who have failed to transcend meaninglessness. 
Unfortunately here is where things become circular, for it will be argued that the 
First-World's degeneration into mindless consumerism and its ever increasing 
assortment of mental health issues is indicative of society's inability to transcend 
meaninglessness. Indeed many will advise that the only solution to this situation is 
to return to mythology. That is, even if anti-foundationalism is the means of 
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transcending telos dependency, human are, as a species, not mature enough to 
achieve this and thus must go back to believing in fiction: 
'Because human consciousness is a recent development, we are still 
an adolescent species, particularly in terms of our need for immediate 
gratificatiorý our need for authority in our lives and our susceptibility 
to turbulent emotions. While it is no disgrace to be adolescent, the 
longer we survive, the greater our chances of maturing into a lineage 
which understands itself and takes responsibility for its own flature. ' 
(Cocks 2004 p. 114 1) 
Ironically having rejected both the theist and modernist telos, Cocks then 
concludes with the seemingly contradictory argument that if humans are to 
survive, into the "distant future", they will need an existential telos: 
'History and the historical sciences offer Darwin's children a 
". creation myth7% but where is the "destiny myth" in modem secular 
societies?... the art of managing our lineage's life cycle is to see it as 
an existential challenge fully comparable to the challenge of 
constructing a successful human life. That means envisaging and then 
attempting to live out a scenario script in which the actor playing the 
lineage, let us call her Posterity, moves through a program of big 
challenging projects towards fulfihnent. Whether it is something 
called quality survival that becomes humanity's telos, its inspirational 
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imagine, is less important than that there be one. ' (2004 pp. 1144- 
1145) 
Already Posthuman? 
Film: Videodrome (1983) 
Sleazy "Max Renn" is the president of a local cable 
television station: "Civic TV" that caters for a 
predominately male, late teens/early-twenties, after 
the pub demographic. SPecialising in bawdy late night 
titillation, as their promo boasts: 'Civic TV, the one 
you take to bed with you. ' [1: 46] Renn's main tasks 
revolve around material acquisition and executive 
broadcast decision making, both made under the ethos 
of: 'What do you think? Can we get away with it? Do we 
want to get away with it? ' [5: 061 
Musing over the latest piece of soft-core pornography, 
Renn muses: 'It's soft. There's something too soft 
about it. I'm looking for something that will break 
through. Something tough. ' [5.361 Fortuitously for 
Renn,, "'Harlan" a member of his technical staf f- who 
275 
has been covertly tasked with intercepting "grotesque" 
satellite transmissions in the search for potential 
broadcast material - has happened upon "'Videodrome" a 
violent, studio based torture programme, with seemingly 
no plot. 
Later Renn appears as a chat show guest with radio 
personality "Nicki Brand" and media prophet "'Professor 
Brian Of Blivion" (a character widely believed to be 
based on Marshall McLuhan) who only communicates 
through video recordings. During the show, the host 
asks Renn: 'your television station offers its viewers 
everything from soft-core pornography to hard-core 
violence. Why? f [09: 38] This question then provokes the 
desired short debate on the effects mass media has on 
society. 
Whilst Harlan is locating the Videodrome signal to 
Pittsburgh, Renn is entertaining Brand. Back at Renn's 
f lat, Brand, looking f or pornography, f inds a copy of 
Videodrome. Renn warns her of its content but she finds 
it stimulating, and having admitting to enjoying a 
little low level masochism in the past, Brand 
propositions Renn to some. 
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Later Brand declares that she is going on assignment to 
Pittsburgh,, in an attempt to audition for Videodrome. 
Renn urges Brand not to go because it is too dangerous, 
but soon finds himself repudiating similar warnings 
about Videodrome, that: "What you see on that show, 
it's for real. It's not acting, itfs snuff TV. ' [25: 15] 
Arguing that there seems little point in making a real 
torture programme when it is easier and safer to fake 
it,, Renn is informed that Videodrome is different 
"Because it has something that you don' t have Max. It 
has a philosophy and that is what makes it dangerous. ' 
[25: 38 ] 
Given O'Blivion's name as associated with Videodrome, 
Renn meets O'Blivion's daughter "Bianca" at her 
father's "Cathode Ray Mission". Here, the homeless are 
given access to televisions as a form of treatmento 
Bianca argues that they suffer from 'a disease forced 
on them by a lack of access to the cathode-ray tube 
Watching TV will help patch them back into the world's 
mixing board. ' [30; 001 
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Having failed to meet with O'Blivion, Renn goes home 
where he suffers a momentary violent hallucination when 
his secretary arrives to drop off a package from the 
Professor. The package contains a video that Renn 
watches whilst hallucinating further,, in it 0, 'Blivion 
seems to warn Renn of the carcinogenic and 
hallucinogenic dangers of watching Videodrome. 
Resuming his search for O'Blivion, Renn revisits Bianca 
only to be informed that O'Blivion died eleven months 
previously from a Videodrome associated brain tumour. 
It transpires that Bianca has been "keeping him alive" 
in the eyes of the media by splicing together old video 
material f rom 01 Blivion' s personal collection. Bianca 
also admits that her father 'helped to create 
Videodrome. He saw it as the next phase of the 
evolution of man as a technological animal. When he 
realised what his partners were going to use it for, he 
tried to take it away from them and they killed him, 
quietly. ' [41: 421 
Hallucinating again, Renn visualises a video-sized 
opening appearing in his belly, which he then explores 
with the item at hand, a Walther PPK; but unfortunately 
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in the process he loses the handgun in the cavity. Renn 
then receives a telephone call informing him that 
"'Barry Convex" wants to meet him to discuss Videodrome. 
Convex, describing himself as "Chief of Special 
Programmes", explains that he works for NATO and makes 
Videodrome, which he admits '%can be a giant 
hallucination machine and much, much more. ' [47: 121 He 
then places a contraption on Rennfs head that he states 
will record Renn's hallucinations, something Convex 
wishes to have analysed. However the machine results in 
Renn hallucinating further, this time that he and Brand 
are participating in Videodrome. 
Back in the engineering laboratory, Renn asks Harlan 
whether he is also suffering from hallucinations. 
Harlan says he is not, but then admits that "I was 
playing you tapes,, MaxF pre-recorded cassettes. 
Videodrome has never been transmitted on an open 
broadcast circuit. Not yet. ' [59: 50] The sudden 
appearance of Convex confirms that Harlan is also a 
NATO agent and that the pair are working on research 
and development, their plan to use Civic TV for their 
first transmission of Videodrome. At this point Convex 
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produces a video, which, Renn hallucinates, is inserted 
into the hole that has re-materialised in his belly. 
The video appears to programme Renn, via schizophrenic 
voices, to kill his work partners, and thus enable 
Convex to take control of station. 
Back at Civic TV, Renn retrieves the Walther from his 
belly cavity and shoots the other members of station's 
executive. He then sets off to kill Bianca, his 
secondary objective. However, Bianca's knowledge of her 
father's work allows her to deprogramme and then, 
reprogramme Renn to destroy Videodrome. 
Seeking Convex, Renn runs into Harlan who asks him 
whether Bianca had caused him any trouble. Renn's 
response implies that he has killed her, as which point 
Harlan attempts to give Renn a new task via the 
insertion of a new cassette. However whilst inserting 
the video, Renn transforms it into a stick grenade 
fused to Harlan's hand, which detonates moments later 
killing Harlan. 
Having tracked Convex to a trade show, Renn's hand and 
pistol f use together and he shoots Convex, his body 
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radically transforming as he dies. Renn then retreats 
to the harbour and takes refuge on a derelict ship. 
Renn hallucinates that there is a television onboard, 
on which Brand materialises and tells him that: 
"Videodrome still exists. It' s very big, very complex. 
You've hurt them but you haven't destroyed them. To do 
that you have to go on to the next phase .... To become 
the new flesh you first have to kill the old flesh. ' 
[84: 03] Renn then watches an image of himself on 
television, in which he places the fused pistol to his 
head and shoots himself having recited the phrase: 
"Long live the new flesh. ' [85: 32] Renn then re-enacts 
this process for "real". 
Videodrome centres on 'the pervasiveness of the media-dominated spectacle in a 
postmodern world' (Bukatman 1994 p. 85) and appears to vilify mass media, 
predominately in the form video and satellite television, accusing it of being a 
corruptive and brutalising influence of Western society. However, while 
sociological debate concerning whether passive (television, cinema, etc. ) or 
participant (computer games etc. ) representations of violence serve to brutalise 
society is incomplete; the film's narrative implies it is afait accompli- Indeed, the 
film makes an overt statement suggesting that this is already happening and 
possibly irrevocably so i. e., Brand's chat show declaration on the effects of 
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television: 'we live in over stimulated times. We crave stimulation for its own 
sake. We gorge ourselves on it. We always want more, whether it, s tactile, 
emotional or sexual. ' [10: 20] This idea is then built upon with Renn's rejoinder 
regarding Brand's "'stimulating" red dress, for it allows Brand to acknowledge that 
she wore it because: 'I live in a highly excited state of over stimulation' [10: 52], 
QED. The inference is that Brand's actions are already a product of such 
stimulatiom 
The idea of media brutalisation is of course nothing new, Plato clearly worries 
about the ethical and social effects of art, specifically poetry: 
'Like one who gives a city over into the hands of villains, and 
destroys the better citizens, so we shaR say that the imitative poet 
likewise implants an evil constitution in the soul of each individual 
poetry is not to be taken seriously, as though it were a solemn 
performance which had to do with truth, but that he who hears it is to 
keep watch on it, fearful for the city in his soul'. (c. 360BCE/1866 
Bk. X 605 pp. 308-309,608 p. 312) 
Indeed, Videodrome appears to be making a contemporary version of Plato's 
argument, only this time regarding the effects of mass media representation on its C7-- 
audience i. e., that the portrayal of violence brutalises the viewer and helps to 
Ccontribute to a social climate of violence and sexual malaise'. [9: 59] 
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However, having made the case against television and then accepted it as a given, 
O'Blivion, following a McLuhanesque rationale, argues: 'The television screen is 
the retina of the mind's eye. Therefore the television screen is part of the physical 
structure of the brain. Therefore, whatever appears on the television screen 
emerges as raw experience for those who watch it. ' [35: 21] Videodrome then 
transcends the contemporary question of receptivity and moves onto the issues of 
affectability, O'Blivion later declaring that: 
'I believe that the growth in my head... is not really a tumour, not an 
uncontrolled, undirected little bubbling part of flesh, but that it is, in 
fact, a new organ, a new part of the brain. I think that massive doses 
of Videodrome signal will ultimately create a new outgrowth of the 
human brain, which will produce and control hallucination to the 
point that it will change human reality. After all, there is nothing real 
outside our perception of reality, is there? ' [42: 53] 
While O'Blivion sees the body's physiological adaptations to Videodrome as 
benign and 'the next phase in the evolution of man as a technological animal' 
[41: 45], it is portrayed as a dangerous enabler for direct control over the viewer. 
As Bukatman notes: 
'In Videodrome the body literally opens up - the stomach develops a 
massive, vaginal slit - to accommodate the new videocassette 
"ProgranY'. Image addiction reduces the subject to the status of a 
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videotape player/recorder; the human body becomes a part of the 
massive system of reproductive technology'. (1994 p. 89) 
Having undergone this process, Renn. is informed by Bianca that: 'You"re an 
assassin now, for Videodrome. They can programme you; can play you like a 
videotape recorder. They can make you do what they want. ' [70: 28] 
Although seemingly disparate, these events come together to form a cogent 
allegory regarding man's evolutional future. Firstly, there is the proposition that, 
if humans can be affected by representations of reality in an analogous fashion to 
how "reality" affects them, then it follows that prolonged interaction with media 
technology will influence behaviour, both from the perspective of desensitisation 
towards violence, and suggestibility to act-out violence. '%Ule this may initially 
be seen as a mere by-product of media technology; the very act of revealing such 
effects exposes them to power issues and the intentional manipulation of the 
individual, and beyond this societies as a whole, by controlling media output. As 
Dinello argues: 
'Cronenberg reveals Videodrome as the tool of a military-funded 
corporation. He calls attention both to the madness of utopian 
Technologism and to the ways in which such blind fanaticism can be 
approPriated by the technocratic order of the state. Videodrome .-- 
indicts corporate and military support for technological autonomy 
while showing how utopian/religious propaganda is used to 
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manipulate society's acquiescence and addition to the forces of 
technological expansion. ' (2005 p. 153) 
Secondly, if media representations affect the human as if they were real events, 
and humans adapt to environmental influences, then it follows that prolonged 
mteraction, with media devices and media representations could influence 
evolutionary mechanisms and produce structural, behavioural and physiological 
adaptations, both within individual lifetimes and over geological time. Thirdly, if 
humans adapt to media devices and their representations, this wifl not only create 
increased compatibility between the two, it will also result in the gradual blurring 
and eventual 'dissolution of all boundaries which might serve to separate and 
guarantee definitions of "spectacle", "subject" and "reality" itself' (Bukatman 
1994 p. 85) 
As already stated, Bostrom characterises the posthunian as: 'possible future 
beings whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to 
be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards. ' (2003b p-5) He has 
since amended this definition, in response to Hayles (1999), to state: 'I define a 
posthuman being as one who has at least one of these capacities [health-span, 
cognition, and emotion] in a degree unattainable by any current human being 
unaided [my emphasis] by new technology. ' (2007 p. 12) Unfortunately Bostrom's 
alteration appears to confuse rather than clarify his position, as he clearly does not 
mean to imply the posthuman will be achieved without the aid of new technology, 
in fact he means the very reverse. His use of "unaided" is an attempt to demarcate 
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entity boundaries. For Bostrom, humans that utilise technology that is outside the 
bodily membrane, for example using a computer via a keyboard, should not be 
considered posthuman. This is even if said computer has cognition that "radically 
exceed those of present humans". This is because, for Bostrom, the human cannot 
become posthuman vicariously i. e., by being only associated with such 
technology. However a human capable of two-way communication with the same 
computer, via a neurological interface, would be considered posthuman, for this 
linkage is tantamount to man and machine becoming a new single entity. Stock 
attempts a similar piece of taxonomy when he tries to differentiate between 
cyborgs andfyborgs - "functional cyborgs" (Chislenko 1995): 
Tyborgisation incorporates machine components into our bodies. 
Fyborgisation fuses us functionally, rather than physically, with 
machines. Some cyborgisation already exists, of course, since we do 
incorporate devices inside the envelope of our skin. [my emphasis] 
But the physical boundary between our internal and external worlds 
has changed little except for dental fillings and the occasional 
prosthetic limb, heart valve, or artificial hip. ' (Stock 2002 p. 25) 
The pedant will note that Stock seems to undermine his internal/external 
boundaries when he appears to list prosthetic limbs as "inside the envelope of our 
skin". Nevertheless, if technology, without a neurological interface, can affect the 
human both psychologically and physiologically, within a lifetime and over 
geologic time; and humans can gain access to, and utilise, the same technological 
286 
information, via vision and audio etc., that they could via a neurological interface, 
then humans appear already to be posthuman. Indeed the human senses already 
appear to be neurological interfaces between technological information and 
human brain information. 
The irony here appears to be the desire, for those advocating the posthuman, to 
illustrate the compatibility between man and machine, and then, to rush to re- 
separate the two the moment the dissolution of boundaries becomes too 
persuasive. However, this behaviour may be indicative of the incompatibility 
between the belief that human salvation will come in the form of the posthuman, 
and its apparent denouncement, the claim that humans are already posthuman. 
That is, to proclaim one is already posthuman, and thus self-evidently not saved 
by technology, is tantamount to heresy against the posthuman faith. As Jonathan 
Meades says of the ideal socialist state, although equally applicable to all utopian 
visions: 'Because the dream is so much more potent than the actuality, the 
actuality must be postponed. Indefinitely. ' [10: 37] 
It is interesting to note that Bostrom uses the term "any current human7 when 
referring to the yardstick a would-be posthuman is to be offered up to. This may 
be a tacit acceptance that the "human7" is a dynamic concept and without such a 
stipulation his taxonomy threatens to become meaningless. An example of this is 
when he declares: 'Since at least some human beings already manage to remain 
quite healthy, active, and productive until the age of 70, one would need to desire 
that one"s healthsPan were extended greatly beyond this age in order that it would 
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count as having a desire to become posthuman., (Bostrom 2007 p. 7) From this 
statement it would not appear overtly assumptive to suggest a doubling of human 
healthspan to 140 - heahhspan being difierent from life expectancy due to its 
proviso of remaining "healthy" throughout life - would constitute, for Bostrom, 
having become posthuman, that is having a healthspan which "radically exceed 
those of present humans". However from a diachronic perspective, some First 
World humans probably already enjoy a doubled healthspan. Vaupel and 
Kistowski state: 'Over most of the course of human existence life expectancy 
hovered between 20 and 30 years.... Even in Western Europe, life expectancy did 
not reach age 40 until after 1800 and age 50 until after 1900. ' (2005 p. 8) This 
suggests the healthspan of those in antiquity was substantially shorter, even in 
extreme cases, than it is today. If so, and an analogous classification of the 
posthuman had been used at the time, then it would appear, contrary to Bostrom's 
position, that some twenty4irst century humans are already posthuman. 
Videodrome uses violence and television to convey its narrative, but it is evident 
that the specifics of both message and media device are unimportant to the film's 
posthuman hypothesis: that it is unnecessary to develop sophisticated comective 
technology for there to be a marriage of man and machine. Aping Plato, 
Baudrillard argues: 
'But one must watch out for the negative turn that discourse imposes: 
it is a question neither of disease nor of a viral infection. One must 
think instead of the media as if they were, in outer orbit, a kind of 
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genetic code that directs the mutation of the real into the hyperreal, 
just as the other micromolecular code controls the passage from a 
representative sp re of meaning to the genetic one of the 
programmed signal. ' (2004 p. 30) 
While Baudrillard's attention, like that of Videodrome, is directed primarily at the 
television, his hypeffealist sentiments can be attributed to all manifestations of 
communication, including the non-electronic, such as: art, literature, architecture 
etc.. This said mass media, such as radio, television and now the internet etc., has 
made the dissemination of information more accessible and pervasive than ever. 
The contemporary exemplar of this was Hitlerian demagoguery, which instilled, 
in elements of the German populous, a unifying hyperreal emotional intoxication. 
Indeed, with a different notion of subject boundaries, Bostrom might have to 
conceding this unified hyper-emotion, was a posthuman capacity, for it was 
clearly: 'more excellent than that which any... human could achieve. ' (2007 p. 11) 
However, as Readings caustically remarks of the idea of excellence: 'the general 
application of the notion is in direct relation to its emptiness. ' (1999 p. 23) 
The ability of current media information to programme and reprogramme the 
human clearly undermines the necessity of a direct link between human and 
machine to result in the posthuman. Surely a human is both analogously 
cognitively enhanced, and equally aided by new technology, with a pocket 
calculator, as with an implanted microchip. The only tangible difference between 
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the two, beyond the laboriousness of the process, is the illusion that the former 
constitutes two entities, whilst the latter constitutes only one. 
Videodrome functions as a reminder that the human is an evolutionary being that 
adapts to its environment, and proposes that humans could evolve and eventually 
merge with seemingly heterogeneous technoscience simply through prolonged 
interaction. Indeed our dependence on technology and addiction to media devices 
has probably resulted in the commencement of this process. 
290 
CHAPTER VI 
(RE)APPRAISING HUMANISM 
In an attempt to understand and expose the nature and consequences of the 
posthuman, the last three chapters have thrown into question the value and 
legitimacy of humanism as the dominant metanarrative. Indeed it may appear that 
contemporary humanism's inability to answer coherently the question of the 
posthuman is symptomatic of, not only the erroneousness of its conception and 
adherence, but also - in the apparent absence of a more successful account - the 
need to reject all metanarratives. 
To this end there has been the suggestion that local and contingent "a-humanist" 
methodologies and the rejection of metanarratives may offer a fuller description of 
man')s relationship with modem technology, and thus, ipso facto, with the 
posthuman. However, Whilst these positions may be successful in producing a less 
biased account of man's relationship with technology, the value of such 
descriptions in advancing the posthuman debate appears somewhat limited. 
Actor-Network Theory 
. 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT), sometimes known as the "sociology of 
translatiorf'), is an a-humanist analytic framework designed to facilitate the study 
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of technological innovation, knowledge-creation and 'the role played by science 
and technology in structuring power relationships. ' (Callon 1986 p. 196) The 
strategy of ANT is to adopt a standpoint that enables the creation of a "more" 
neutral description of actor-networks i. e., how they are formed, interact, are 
subverted, and can collapse; and thus to reveal the power issues that tend to 
remain hidden when such networks are described from the perspective of 
humanism. 
To achieve this goal, Actor-Network Theory incorporates the principle of 
generalised symmetry i. e., the assumption that the actors, or rather "actants", of a 
netWOrk enter it with an equal ability to influence. The basis for this is the 
assumption that nothing exists prior to, or outside of, the network association. 
A d- 
Actants, within Actor-Network Theory, are not limited to man, or even animals, 
but also include inanimate objects. However, in doing this ANT appears to be 
assimilating non-humans into man, rather than man into non-humans, for it insists 
that non-humans having agency. Admittedly this agency is not meant to 
presuppose intentionality, but even in this form it is a concept usually reserved 
exclusively for man. 
Nevertheless, Latour believes: 'Critical sociologists have underestimated the 
difficulty of doing politics by insisting that the social consists of just a few types 
of participants' (2007 p. 250); and he argues that by dissolving the assumed 
boundaries between who/what is, and who/what is not, deemed an actor within a 
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network, Actor-Network Theory can make critical sociology 'sensitive again to 
the sheer difficulty of assembling collectives made of so many new members once 
nature and society have been simultaneously put aside. ' (2007 p. 259) 
Latour emphasises his point by arguing that: 'For instance, fishermen, 
oceanographers, satellites, and scallops might have some relations with one 
another, relations of such a sort that they make others do unexpected things'. 
(2007 p. 106) In doing so he makes a passing reference to Callon's seminal article 
on the scallops and fishermen of St. Brieue Bay. Here Callon utilises 'a new 
approach to the study of power' (1986 p. 196), which he refers to as the sociology 
of translation, to describe the scientific and economic interrelationship of 
fishermen, scallops, and conservational biologists, surrounding the decline of the 
scallop populations in coastal Brittany. 
Employing three main principles: 'those of agnosticism (impartiality between 
actors engaged in controversy), generalised symmetry (the commitment to explain 
conflicting viewpoints in the same terms) and free association (the abandonment 
of all a priori distinctions between the natural and the social)' (Callon 1986 
p. 196), Callon describes the scallop's interaction within the network in 
anthropomorphic terms: 
'In principle the larvae anchor, in practice they refuse to enter the 
collectors. The difficult negotiations which were successful the first 
time fail in the following years. Perhaps the anchorages were 
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accidental! The multiplicity of hostile interventions (this at least is the 
mterpretation of the researchers in their role of spokesman for the 
scallops), the temperature of the water layers, unexpected currents, all 
sorts of predators, epizooty, are used to explain why the interessement 
is being inefficient. The larvae detach themselves from the 
researchers' pr ject and a crowd of other actors carry them away. The 01 
scallops become dissidents. The larvae which complied are betrayed 
by those they were thought to represent. The situation is identical to 
that of the rank and file which greets the results of Union negotiations 
with silent indignation: representivity is brought into question. ' (1986 
pp. 219-220) 
Callon believes that ANT enables a fuller description of the power relationships 
within this network because it highlights that if the network controversies are to 
be resolved, 'the complicity of the scallops is needed as much as that of the 
fishermen. ' (1986 p. 222) 
In an analogous move Parker uses Actor-Network Theory to 'make connections 
between a post-foundational epistemology, science fiction films and "critical 
management"... [in] an attempt to examine how modes of organisig ight be 
judged' (1998 p. 503) from the apparent paralysis of an anti-foundational position. 
A crucial of his work is the notion of "cyborganisation7', the merging of man and 
machine, although this concept is in stark contrast to that of the ', posthuman7,. 
Here cyborganisation is more flexible and highlights humanism's dependency on 
294 
boundaries. Indeed, having dissolved the taxonomy surrounding man, nature and 
machine, what constitutes the "cyborg" is simply a matter of how the term is 
conceived. Parker's use of cyborganisation appears to have more to do with an 
intimate connection between man and technology, in the sense that a man using a 
computer, or driving a car, is a "cyborg", rather than the idea of man and machine 
joining to become the posthuman. 
However, while combining Actor-Network Theory with cyborganisation 
facilitates a fuller description of the power issues surrounding the changing 
relationship between man and machine, it unfortunately binds this description to 
post-foundationalism's inability to judge. For if, as Protagoras argues, man is the 
'measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that 
they are not' (c. 200CE/2000 Sextus Bk. 1 §216 p. 56), but ANT's a-humanism 
denies man's legitimacy to measure, then - in the absence of any alternative 
arbiter of measurement - there can be no judgment. Indeed, without judgment all 
output utilising ANT is necessarily rendered hermeneutic. 
Parker acknowledges this limitation, but counters by arguing that Actor-Network 
Theory can still be used as an impediment against man's hubris and his tendency 
to rush to judgment: 
'Indeed, it is an obvious point for those who will bemoan what they 
see as the fatal limitations of this kind of writing in critical 
organisation theory - that is to say that I am now incapable of 
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mounting a sustained attack on capitalist multinational practices, 
gender discrimination, the managerialisation of the lifeword or 
whatever. But then that is exactly the point. The a-humanism 
suggested by actor-network theory and the metaphor of the cyborg 
could be used as an effective resource to make that rush to judgment 
mto a stumble'. (1998 pp. 515-516) 
Unfortunately inhibiting man's rush to judgment in this manner is not, in itself, a 
sustainable position; for as post-foundational in nature, its legitimacy is predicated 
on a standpoint that is corrosive to all positions, even to its own. Consistently 
applied it will not only undermine man's rush to judgment, it will also undermine 
the legitimacy of undermining man's rush to judgment. Indeed having undercut 
the foundational, the post-foundational will then undercut the local and 
contingent. When Haraway combines, in her critical feminist utilisation of the 
cyborg metaphor, the post-foundational argument that: 'the production of 
universal, totalising theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality, probably 
always, but certainly now' (1991 p. 18 1), with her belief that: Tyborg imagery 
can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our 
bodies and our tools to ourselves.... It means both building and destroying 
machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories' (1991 p. 18 1), she is 
clearly alluding to the destruction and re-drawing of boundaries and identities 
that, from her position, cannot have a legitimate basis. The reason why Haraway's 
position is not self-undermining is because it is intended to function (akin to 
ANT) as purely methodological. It is a call to arms, an attempt to provoke critical 
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feminists to think and engage beyond the assumed norms. It is not., however, an 
attempt to generate or legitimise the destruction or creation of new metanarrative 
boundaries. 
While a-humanist network descriptions can illuminate hidden power issues and 
thus are useful in social policy making, these descriptions function as a 
commentary on humanism rather than an alternative to humanism. That is, ANT's 
methodological nature ultimately limits its sphere of influence to descriptions that 
either facilitate humanist policy, or inhibit it in a parochial and short-term sense. 
This said applying Actor-Network Theory, or a similar a-humanist methodology, 
to the posthuman debate has sociological value beyond its ability to dictate policy 
making. The US posthuman debate has highhghted that entrenched positions, 
vested interests and hidden agendas, have resulted in a dialogue awash with 
misinformation and hyperbole. In addition, an analysis of the posthuman utilising 
the science fiction narrative has illustrated that while certain narratives appear 
inherently positive/negative/or neutral, these are illusory, a simple function of 
assumed, usually indoctrinated, standpoints. As a result, any device that draws 
attention to, and allows the public and policy makers to see beyond, the power 
issues surrounding the posthuman, is surely laudable. 
To this end, the science fiction narrative has a role to play in influencing public 
opinion, and possibly public policy, with regard to the posthuman. For it has a 
unique ability to convey, in an exoteric fashion and to a wide audience, the power 
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issues and unforeseen consequences of such policy decisions. However, science 
fiction is also subject to analogous power issues and can function as little more 
than propaganda. Clearly science fiction has paymasters and, in a bid to stay 
financially viable, tends to depict self-selected scenarios that pander to the tastes 
of its target demographic. Whilst these issues and others, such as overt product 
placement etc., appear reasonably benign to a sophisticated audience, there are 
more covert power issues, for example, that 'science consultants use fictional 
films as promotional devices for their research. ' (Kirby 2003 p. 23 1) Indeed, the 
next step may be for lobbyists, multinational corporations and possibly even 
governments to commission science fiction narratives that reflect their vested 
mterests, and then use these systematically to promote future visions that benefit 
themselves. Unfortunately it would be a little naive not to assume this process has 
already commenced. 
The Question Concerning Technology 
In stark contrast to ANT's methodological descriptions, Heidegger attempts to 
challenge humanistic modernity at a more fundamental level. Rather than wishing 
to contrast humanist and a-humanist descriptions of technology, Heidegger 
attempts to replace modernity with, what many would hesitate to call, a different 
metanarrative, specifically, one grounded in man's authentic interaction with 
Being. 
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Heidegger believes that the problem with modernity is that it is both enabling and, 
by its very nature, facilitating, the instrumentalisation of man. Writing in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, Heidegger could not deny the technological 
progress that had enabled the eugenic and selective breeding programmes of Nazi 
f"I - -- Germany; although as a card carrying member of the National Socialist German 
Workers' Party he may have liked to. This said, in his essay entitled The Question 
Concerning Technology, Heidegger gives an overtly general attack on modem 
technology, one that is conspicuously absent of the paradigmatic examples of the 
technological instrumentalisation of man. 
Heidegger opens his essay by clarifying his intentions: 
'We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in so doing we 
should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will 
be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. 
When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience 
the technological within its own bounds. ' (1977 pp. 3-4) 
Indeed, having stated man does not at present have a "free" relationship with the 
essence technology, Heidegger clarifies that 'we are delivered over to it 
[technology] in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; 
for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes 
us utterly blind to the essence of technology. ' (1977 p. 4) 
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Heidegger argues that the essence of technology has two common descriptions: 
'One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a 
human activity. ' (1977 p. 4) Having done so he concludes that '-the cuffent 
conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, 
can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of 
technology. ' (1977 p. 5) It is at this point that Heidegger reveals what appears to 
be the very crux of what he believes to be the task at hand: 
'Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper 
manner as a means. We will, as we say, "gef' technology "spiritually 
in hand". We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more 
urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control. ' 
(1977 p. 5) 
In context, Heidegger appears to be stating that if man wishes to have a free 
relationship with technology -a relationship that he believes at present is 
commonly and erroneously perceived as neutral - man needs to reveal the essence 
of technology, and then put it back in its place as simply a means. For Heidegger, 
putting technology back in its place is a matter of manipulation; man must 
manipulate technology so that he can master it. Indeed mastering technology is of 
prime importance to the spirituality of man, for if man does not return to being the 
master of technology, technology will soon become the master of man. 
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Heidegger attempts to reveal both the essence of technology and man's true 
relationship with it via an etymological argument founded on ancient Greek. Of 
course this argument should not simply be dismissed - for it is Heidegger's 
method of explaining both why man has developed an unhealthy relationship with 
technology and how he may be able to break from it - but nevertheless three 
details must be noted. Firstly, as ostensibly unfalsifiable, etymological arguments 
from antiquity can suffer from, what might be politely called, "artistic licence". 
This said, O'Brien argues 'from the consultations which I have had with Greek 
scholars concerning this particular essay, the etymologies here do not trespass as 
unashamedly beyond the boundaries of acceptability as some of his more radical 
interpretations. ' (2004 p. 8) Secondly, Heidegger's position in highly unlikely to 
be contingent on his etymological argument, that is if his interpretations were 
falsifiable, and then deemed false, it is nigh inconceivable that Heidegger's 
response would be to unilaterally concede the spirit of his argument is unsound. 
Thirdly, Heidegger's style of writing is notoriously obscure and difficult to grasp, 
especially for the non-German speaker; indeed it appears all too easy to get lost, 
in the exercise of understanding Heidegger's rhetoric, sufficiently to overlook the 
simplicity of what he is attempting to achieve. 
Clarifying what he believes to be the effect of modem technology, Heidegger 
states: 
'Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on caH for a finther 
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ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. 
We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The word expresses here 
something more, and something more essentiaL than mere "stock". 
The name "standingre serve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. 
It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences 
that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands 
by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as 
object... The fact that now, wherever we try to point to modem 
technology as the challenging revealing, the words "setting-upon7', 
"'ordering", "standing-reserve", obtrude and accumulate in a dry, 
monotonous, and therefore oppressive way, has its basis in what is 
now coming to utterance. (1977 p. 17) 
Although not mentioned by name in Heidegger's essay, his etymological 
argument appears to build on his "dasein" - the concept he uses in an attempt to 
uncover the primal nature of man's "Being". For Heidegger, Western philosophy 
has, since Plato, assumed the nature of Being to the extent that it has been deemed 
undeserving of a fuller examination. As a result, Western philosophy has 
erroneously preoccupied itself with investigating what it is to be man, his essence, 
from which his purpose is then to be extrapolated4 rather than his Being. In doing 
so Western philosophy has failed to acknowledge that existence precedes essence, 
and thus an investigation into existence can be argued to have primacy over that 
of essence. 
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Heidegger believes that the erroneous focusing on essence rather than existence 
has resulted in man developing an unhealthy relationship with technology, 
specifically in its modem guise. Unlike earlier interactions, man's relationship 
with modem technology is one that is predisposed to systematise nature into the 
instrumental, the result of which is nature then being revealed back to man as 
mere utility. Nature, viewed through the lens of modern technology, has or lacks 
value dependent on its usefulness and thus man has become embroiled in a 
relationship with nature that is far from neutral. Yet this ordering, Heidegger 
believes, is increasingly being reflected back on man, as he, through scientific 
endeavour, re-assimilates himself back into nature. The worry here is that if this 
process is left unchecked, it will eventually result in the total systematisation of 
man's life. 
As already stated, one outcome of modernistic technoscience has been the 
whittling away of man's self-confidence, specifically the belief that he is superior 
to nature. Where once man assumed, either scripturally or self-evidently, that he 
was ontologicaBy more important than nature, scientific endeavour has 
undermined this belief and reordered him as, at best, only relatively different from 
T-T- 
nature. However, if nature is ordered by modem technology as nothing but utility 
and man has now been downgraded, via scientific investigation, to nature; then 
consistency dictates that man should also be ordered by modem technology to be 
nothing but utility. 
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Writing in the mid-twentieth century, Heidegger is primarily concerned with the 
social ordering effects of modem technology - that is, the revealing that man 
lacks meaningful agency (something that Heidegger believes is self-fulfilling, if 
man is treated and lives life as if he has no meaningful agency, he therefore ceases 
to have meaningful agency) and the resultant structuring of his life as mere utility 
- rather than any future development of the posthuman. Nevertheless, while those 
who zealously advocate the posthuman appear to have highfalutin delusion - that 
as man reorders himself as commensurate, rather than superior to nature, he can 
reassert his superiority by breaking from the mortal flesh, via association with 
electronic technology - Heidegger reminds man that the most likely motivati 
force behind the move towards the posthuman is instrumentalisation. The pseudo- 
perfecting or tidying of man, in the same fashion as nature, in order to create 
individuals fit for purpose, to serve society as merely employment resources. The 
eradication of disease, aging, disability, genetic inferiority, dffference etc., not 
because of the social delusion that it serves the individual, but because it serves 
society. Modem technology has revealed such traits as of little instrumental value, 
they are a burden to society, and their elimination will increase efficiency. 
T-T-* 
Heidegger"s response to the revealing of man as utility by modem technology is 
to propose, if not a solution, an obscure, convoluted and seemingly implausible 
mitigation: 
'For the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity 
of his essence. This dignity lies in keeping watch over the 
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unconcealment - and with it, from the first, the concealment - of all 
essential unfolding on this earth. It is precisely in enframing, which 
threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the ostensibly sole way 
of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of 
his free essence - it is precisely in this extreme danger that the 
innermost indestructible belongingness of man within granting may 
come to light, provided that we, for our part, begin to pay heed to the 
essence of technology. ' (1977 p. 32) 
This said, how can man watch over what is unconcealed? To this end Heidegger 
suggests, although rather equivocally, that "art" may be the method by which man 
can reveal the truth to himself- 
'Could it be that the fine arts are called to poetic revealing? Could it 
be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so that they for 
their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power, may 
awaken and found anew our look into that which grants and our trust 
in iff (1977 p. 35) 
As stated, man measures nature as valuable contingent on its utility to man, as a 
result nature appears improvable via the increasing of its utility to man. However, 
in the absence of God, man also becomes the measure of his own value, resulting 
in the conundrum of how man should value himself The assumed answer appears 
to be that, as with nature, man's value is to be measured by his utility to man, 
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which in turn results in man also appearing improvable via increasing his utility to 
man. Yet if this is the case, then undermining modern technology's ability to 
order man into standing-reserve appears to be a matter of altering man's current 
valuing process. 
The simple solution to this appears to be the reinstatement of God and his decree 
that man is scared and not improvable; but Heidegger is sceptical whether man 
can reinvent and sustain God. Instead he proposes to abandon humanism via 
altering man's perception of nature; for if man's instrumentalisation of nature is 
the archetype for his instrumentalisation of himself, then altering the archetype 
should, in turn, alter its derivative, and thus castrate modem technology's power 
to order man. 
The art that Heidegger believes can foster these altered perceptions, reveal nature 
as something other than simple utility, is that of romanticisation, the 
representation of nature as having intrinsic value, in and of itself. For example, 
portraying nature as having teleology i. e., that a healthy acom planted and 
nurtured under optimal conditions will yield an exemplary oak tree, irrespective of 
man's interaction or measure. Interestingly, for Heidegger, both the problem of 
modem technology and its solution involves the assimilation of man and nature. 
However, while the "devaluing" of man as mere utility is the re-assimilation of 
man back into the archetype of nature, the inflation of nature as ornamentation is 
the assimilation of nature into the archetype of man as God's creation. 
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The reason why Heidegger proposes to assimilate nature into man is because he 
is, if not a humanist, an anthropocentric; his priority is the protection of a 
meaningful sense of man" s agency, rather than any highfalutin ideas regarding the 
"true" nature of Being. So rather than adoPting the a-humanism of radical 
environmentalism that allows the meaninglessness of nature to reflect on man, 
thus undermining the pedestal he has placed himself on, Heidegger proposes to 
inflate nature, place it on the pedestal next to man and thereby neutralise its 
devaluing effect. The role of the artist is, for Heidegger, the veneration of nature 
via anthropomorphisation, to adom it with the value and sanctity that has been, in 
the past, effoneously applied to man. 
Theoretically speaking, the adoption of Heidegger's strategy may well secure both 
a meaningful sense of man's agency and protect man against being ordered as 
standing-reserve. Indeed it would also appear to resolve the issue of the 
posthuman, for, as with the reinstatement of God, if man is no longer to be 
measured as utility, but rather decreed with inherent value that cannot be 
increased, the very notion of increasing man's utility becomes incoherent. 
However, although Heidegger"s argument is not a direct attack on modern 
technology, it is tangentially, and its success appears to undermine technoscience 
as an existential project. The belief that man's disposition, and nature per se, can 
be improved is the driving force behind the science of Christianity; a situation 
mirrored in secular modernity with the addition that man per se is also perceived 
as improvable. However if nature, man, and man's disposition are not deemed 
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improvable, then what is the motivating force behind the future investigation and 
develoPment of technoscience? 
The lifestyle consequences of undercutting scientific endeavour in this fashion are 
clearly incompatible with the dominant belief systems held by current First World 
societies, sufficiently that only a massive collective epiphany could make it 
palatable, something Heidegger appears to acknowledge: 
'Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the 
present state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of 
all merely human meditations and endeavours. Only a god can still 
save us. I think the only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare 
readiness, through thinking and poetry, for the appearance of the god 
or for the absence of the god during the decline; so that we do not, 
simply put, die meaningless deaths, but that when we decline, we 
dechne in the face of the absent god. ' (Heidegger 1966/1990 pp. 56- 
57) 
A-humanism as Third Wave Modernity 
Heidegger's essay builds on his understanding of man's unique interaction with 
Being, as O"Brien states: 
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'Yet we are, in that same instance, offered the possibility of tapping 
the redemptive quality of that which threatens us in the form of the 
saving power which sustains itself therein since the degeneration or 
regeneration must in the end take effect through human Dasein. ' 
(2004 p. 38) 
An interesting point here is to question whether Heidegger's dasein is contingent 
on his belief that modernity is failing, that is whether Heidegger would have still 
advanced, or even developed, it had he believed modernity served man's best 
interests. Clearly from a historical context, Heidegger's dasein is far more likely 
to have originated as a response to the German population's need for meaning in 
the aftennath of the First World War, than any non-reflexive epiphany of 
etymology. Nevertheless, this does not rule out Heidegger as a naYve emancipator, 
someone who serves, if not the "trutW', what he believes most appropriate, 
regardless of its consequences. Would Heidegger, believing, as he states, that 
dasein is a "more" appropriate interpretation of Being than that currently 
assumed, have championed it with equal gusto, if he believed it did not serve 
man"s best interests? 
Of course having rejected foundationalism, Heidegger is not claiming dasein is 
truth, the way it is; dasein is a mechanism, an illusory perspective, used to 
create/protect a meaningful sense of agency. It is a replacement for, and if 
believed dogmatically, functions analogously as, the false consciousness of 
religious belief in meaning. Nietzsche writes: 
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'God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How can 
we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! ne holiest and 
the mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death 
under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us, what water could 
we clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what holy games 
will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the magnitude of this deed 
not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to become gods 
merely to appear worthy of iff (18 82/2001 Bk. 111 § 12 5 p. 120) 
Heavily influenced by Nietzsche, Heidegger's dasein places man as God of his 
own existence, and potentially the self-deluder that this is the way it "really" is. 
Indeed, Heidegger believes that an authentic interaction with Being will free man 
from ordering; but surely man, the animal, is an inherently regimented being. 
Until very recently in his historical lineage, man was heavily ordered by the 
ecological niche he inhabited. His need for food, shelter, warmth, protection etc., 
coalesced with seasonal variability to create nomadic groups of gather-hunters 
("hunter-gathers" being a self-aggrandising misnomer that erroneously placed the 
role of hunting above that of gathering) with social hierarchies derived from 
survival dynamics. A pertinent question here appears to be, if man's technological 
ingenuity has freed him from one form of ordering by leading him directly into 
another, is this problematic for man? Paradoxically, if man were to crave anything 
from existence, it appears more plausible for him to crave external ordering 
(nature, God, modem technology etc. ) rather than freedom from it. 
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In addition it can be argued that man, as an animal, would be impotent to act if he 
did not filter out extraneous internal and external information. From this 
perspective, the authentic encounter with Being Heidegger refers to, may be little 
more than superfluous noise normally filtered out of life. Whilst attempting to add 
this noise back into life may result in the type of jarring that may create a sense of 
meaning, it could be argued to be a wholly inauthentic encounter with Being. The 
amount of effort needed to sustain this jarring appears analogous to that of 
fighting natural adaptation; for example, atternpting to concentrate on an odour, or 
noise, having already grown accustomed to it. 
While many believe an authentic interaction with Being is man's path out of 
modernity, others, like Strauss, consider it is rather modernity in its most extreme 
form: 
'Strauss's critique of existentialism is that rather than escaping from 
modernity, it forms modernity's third and most radical "wave". 
Strauss argues that Nietzsche and Heidegger have misdiagnosed the 
character of contemporary nihilism. For Strauss, nihilism resides not 
in the loss of an originary or authentic encounter with Being or the 
abyss, but in the loss of contact with nature in our moral and political 
lives - the discovery for modems that no particular way of life has 
inherent worth. The pursuit of authenticity, far from being a road to 
release from modernity, is a sYmPtom of modernity bereft of all 
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connection with nature. The release from modernity, for Strauss, will 
involve a release from the hermeneutic or self-interpreting selt from 
dasein, as the most extreme, and therefore truest, form of modernity, 
Instead of the self-interpreting exister, Strauss points to the human 
being engaged in and structured by civic life, standards, laws. He sees 
that the crisis of modernity is not centrally at the level of meaning or 
significance for the individual exister, but about our capacity to 
engage in a moral and political life that connects citizens to a 
structure of human excellence. The "originary" encounter is, for 
Strauss, not for the human as dasein, but for the human as citizen, as 
a certain "type" structured by a shared moral and political life. To 
recover this form of the "originary", one tums not to the poetic 
musings of pre-Socratic poets and philosophers, but to the dialectical 
rationalism of the dialogues of Plato. ' (Robertson 1999 pp. 2-3) 
As mentioned, some believe the solution to the posthuman issue is the return to a 
more literal interpretation of Christian scripture. By placing God in between man 
and nature it effectively undermines the re-ordering of man as utility because it re- 
establishes man as necessarily ontologically superior to nature. The Christian 
literalist perspective of modern technology is that man has been given nature by 
God as utility and man has developed modem technology to best utilise nature. 
This said, while it is wholly appropriate to order nature as utility, man has been 
imbued, by God, with intrinsic worth sufficient that the ordering of man as utility 
is strictly prohibited. The protection offered by this more literal interpretation of 
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Christian scripture is reflected and demonstrated in the stance taken by the 
predominately Christian fundamentalist, Pro-life lobby in the US. Here, human 
life is been deemed sacred and thus should be protected from termination, even if 
this is contrary to social utility. 
From the Christian fundamentalist standpoint, the explanation behind why man is 
now applying modem technology to himself is because of secularism and man's 
rejection of foundationalism. Rather than modem technology ordering man, 
boundary-less man is blindly applying modem technology to himself in a vain and 
desperate attempt to find/create meaning. For Christians the method by which this 
process can be halted also appears obvious i. e., the re-establishment of meaning 
and boundaries via adherence to scriptural literalism. 
Unfortunately, Nietzsche established the obvious counterargument to the 
Christian fundamentalists position i. e., that God has already been demonstrated as 
unsustainable in the face of scientific endeavour. However it may be argued that 
the undermining of Christianity was the result of mismanagement and a clash of 
personalities, rather than inherent unsustainability. That is, the upper-echelons of 
the Roman Catholic Church may, in the past, have lost sufficient touch with the 
existential nature of Christianity to become inflexible in the face of overwhelming 
empirical evidence. As Shea argues: 
'In fact, Galileo's condemnation was the result of the complex 
interplay of untoward political circumstances, personal ambitions, 
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and wounded prides.... Had Galileo been less devout, he could have 
refused to go to Rome; Venice offered him asylum. Had he been less 
convinced of the truth of his theory, he could have treated it as mere 
conjecture and remained at peace with the church. But Galileo could 
not resign himself to either course. He pressed for a prompt 
acceptance of his theories, and Urban VIII responded with a stem 
reaffirmation of the authority of the pope. Science and religion were 
both to suffer from the clash, and what could have been a fruitful 
dialogue proved to be a bitter feud. ' (1986 pp. 132-133) 
Religious sustainability is grounded in nebulous and infinitely interpretable 
scripture that is specifically designed to enable the accommodation and 
assimilation of any external threats to its authority. As long as this is always 
tacitly understood by high ranking Church leaders, then Christianity should be 
redeemable. Indeed recent radical reinterpretations of Christian scripture may 
already be paving the way for its return. An important example of this is 
Christianity's assimilation of evolution. Whereas it was once suggested that God 
created man in his own image and placed him on earth as a unique and 
ontologically separate entity, it is now suggested that God chose a mammal on a 
dynamic and evolving earth to imbue with a "soul" (God's image), and thus 
elevating it, man, to the position of an ontologically superior mammal. Beyond 
this, Christianity's recent foray into intelligent design may prove fruitful in re- 
A-1- - 
establishing Christianity at the forefront of the natural sciences. 
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Misinterpreting Humanism 
Bertrand Russell accuses Kant of, and then derides him for, reversing the anti- 
foundationalist position he acquired after reading Hume: 
'The first German to take notice of Hume was Immanuel Kant, who 
had been content, up to the age of about forty-five, with the dogmatic 
tradition derived from Leibniz. Then, as he says himself, Hume 
4ý4 
11 
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awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers". After meditating for 
twelve years, he produced his great work, the Critique ofPure Reason; 
seven years later, at the age of sixty-four, he produced the Critique of 
Practical Reason, in which he resumed his dogmatic slumbers after 
nearly twenty years of uncomfortable wakefulness. ' (Russell 1950 
p. 51) 
Russell's apparent distain. for Kant focuses on the issue of morality; specifically 
that having developed a non-cognitivism moral standpoint in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant appears to revert back to his old dogmatic cognitivism. in his later 
Critique of Practical Reason. However, while it may appear that Kant has 
reverted back to moral cognitivism this may be an illusion. 
As noted, Kant argues that although humans do not have free will, because they 
are physical entities that obey physical laws, it is meaningless to talk and treat 
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humans as if they lack free will because this would fly in the face of their 
intuitions on the subject. Having made such an argument, it appears coherent for 
Kant, in the same vein, to reject moral cognitivism because there is no God to 
create moral knowledge, but at the same time to find non-cognitivism unedifying, 
for morality appears to be a social necessity. Having concluded this, it then seems 
appropriate for Kant to attempt to resolve this paradox by proposing a fictional 
grounding for morality based on the distinction between autonom and GW Y 
heteronomy. 
Apparently building on this interpretation of Kant's work, Fuller argues, in a 
debate with Latour, that Kant's distinction between autonomy and heteronomy 
(something both he and Latour believe is the very basis of contemporary 
humanism) is, and has been acknowledged by many as, intentionally existential. A 
fiction created by Kant and something that forms the grounding of the existential 
project that is humanity: 
'the "human7 or "the social" is demarcated for the normative [my 
emphasis] purpose of creating the project of humanity. Social 
science's founders were not deluded into thinking that there is a prior 
"human essence", especially as that phrase is derided today. Rather 
humanity was a project in the making. It was a political project'. 
(FuRer 2003 p. 84) 
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Confusion surrounding metanarratives such as humanism can stem from the fact 
that there appears to be four basic, and overlapping, philosophical standpoints; 
foundationalism: the claim that truth can be known, scepticism: the questioning of 
whether truth can be known, anti-foundationalism: the claim that truth cannot be 
known, and existentialism (in a loose sense of the term): the claim that truth 
cannot be known, but that man should invent knowledge. Together these four 
standpoints feed back on themselves to form a circularity of perspectives. 
However, the apparent passive stability, when in the dominant, of both 
foundationalism and anti-foundationalism can complicate this situation. VAiile 
scepticism and existentialism are inherently dynamic, necessitating active and 
critical participation at some level (they being destructive or creative processes 
respectively), foundationalism and anti-foundationalism require little or no critical 
participation. Indeed, the passivity of these positions facilitates their social 
indoctrination. Many Eastern sects teach the meaninglessness of anti- 
foundationalism. as dogma and live a peaceful, although somewhat passive, 
existence. The fact that these sects have great longevity, but appear to have little 
or no scientific endeavour, may cement the belief that science is a moral project 
i. e., that without elevating man"s self interests above that of the other, there is 
simply little or no motivation to participate in science. 
The circularity of perspectives can. be illustrated by utilising the nature of 
challenges to moral authority as they appear in the First World, where humanistic 
moral foundationalism is both the assumed and dominant position. Foundational 
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humanists believe that morality is "cognitive" i. e., that there is an inherent 
grounding to moral knowledge. However some cognitivists will be provoked, for 
whatever reason, to question the validity of this claim. If placated, these sceptics 
may return to being cognitivists, but if not they may reject cognitivism all 
together. Now holding the position of "non-cognitivisný' i. e., that there is no 
inherent grounding to moral knowledge, these individuals are left to ponder moral 
relativism; a position that, for many, is considered contrary to the social best 
interest. In an attempt to sidestep this, some non-cognitivists will argue that man 
is better off "inventing" a foundation for moral knowledge than living without it. 
To this end they will propose, either the existential recreation of the humanistic 
morafity, or the existential creation of some other basis for moral knowledge. 
Some "open7' existentialists will argue that man is better off accepting the limits 
of moral knowledge i. e., its fictitious, contingent and local nature should be 
openly divulged, thus allowing it to be challenged, and possibly even superseded, 
by more "appropriate" alternatives. However other, more "paternal", 
existentialists will argue it is in man's best interest to be hidden from the limits of 
moral knowledge. To this end, they will duplicitously represent their moral 
existentialism as having actual foundational grounding. They may even succeed, 
for the sake of mankind, in deluding themselves of this foundation. Indeed, as the 
old aphorism goes, the best way to delude others is by first deluding yourself 
contemporary example of a paternal existentialist (again in the loose sense of 
the term) appears to be Leo Strauss. Strauss, having been indoctrinated into 
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Orthodox Jewry as a young child, soon becomes sceptical of, and then rejects all, 
religious foundations. Yet having done so he proposes - in a bid to save liberal 
society from what he perceives as the destructive influence of relativism - that the 
power elite should covertly strengthen the religious orthodoxy, he, and in most 
cases they, no longer believe in: 'He [Strauss] believes that there is an irresolvable 
conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of society. He 
thinks that the conflict can only be camouflaged by lies and deceptions, and that 
the greatest among these is religion. ' (Drury 1999 p. 12) Indeed, the indoctrinating 
of existential ideas as foundational is surely the propagational mechanism behind 
both religion and ideology. This said, perhaps the only difference between the two 
is ideology's failure to garner greater protection, from challenges to its authority, 
by hiding its origins in infallible mysticisM rather than fallible man. 
Nevertheless, if either open or paternal existentialism is taught, by acolytes, to the 
young and the credulous, as dognia, it will likely result in the creation of new 
foundationalists, completely unaware of the fictional underpinning of their beliefs. 
If this process is allowed to propagate, then eventually the fictional nature of such 
beliefs might be completely lost, as existentialist teachers die out and are replaced 
by foundationalist teachers who perpetuate and indoctrimte beliefs they have 
never known to be fictitious. 
If the circularity of perspectives is applied to Kant then it accounts for Russell's 
comments but without contradiction. Here Kant, as a child, is indoctrinated into 
the dominant belief system of the time and place i. e., Christianity. However Kant 
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later reads Hume and is provoked into questioning his faith. Having become 
dissatisfied with the most compelling contemporary defence of Christianity, that 
offered by Leibniz, Kant then rejects Christianity's foundationalism. Furthermore, 
having rejected the Christian God, consistency dictates that Kant must also reject 
the moral knowledge associated with this God. Nevertheless, having done so, 
dissatisfaction with non-cognitivism motivates Kant to creation of an existential 
account for morality, one divorced from, although highly compatible with, 
Christian scripture and theist cognitivism. 
This said whether Kant's distinction between autonomy and heteronomy is an 
example of open or paternal existentialism appears mute for two reasons. Firstly, 
if Kant were an open existentialist he would probably feel the need to hide this in 
philosophical obfuscation, lest he be persecuted as a heretic. Secondly, the 
ultimate success of humanism may function to disguise its very nature i. e., if 
sufficiently commendable, even open existentialism will, eventually, be taught as 
foundational. 
Nevertheless, the result of this God's eye view of perspectives is to render less 
prosaic any investigation into the humanist account of man. For the moment it is 
acknowledged that humanism is not only de facto existentialism (the rejection of 
foundationalism necessitates that its origins are fictitious), but most probably 
existentialism by design (i. e. not created as an attempt to account for "how things 
really are"), the value and consequences of any emancipation from humanism are 
thrown into question. Firstly, because it undermines a rush to judgment on 
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humanism, based on the nalve assumption that having revealed humanism as not 
accounting for how things really are, it should be rejected and replaced by the 
metanarrative that gives the true account for how things really are. Secondly, 
I- - because humanism is either erroneously or duplicitously taught as dogma, one 
possible solution to the anomalies it throws up might be, rather than 
recommending its replacement, simply to acknowledge it as local and contingent. 
Thirdly, because there is no true account of how things really are, it leaves open 
the possibility that, although far from perfect, humanism is the "best" 
philosophical system man has to offer himself 
Resurrecting Humanism? 
Anti-fomdationalism has a long history, within the Western World, of being an 
ephemeral standpoint. Indeed, current "post-foundationalism7' should not be 
associated with the revealing that there are not rules, but rather the re-revealing. 
Proto man did not start with rules and then lose them; he started without rules, and 
then chose either to live without rules, as with some Eastern civilisations, or 
alternatively to create rules for himself 
Clearly, sometimes these rules have been conceived as local and contingent; 
however the advantageousness of continuity usually dictates that dominant rules 
are to be taught as dogma, and thus eventually believed as foundational. On other 
occasions rules have been imposed on, and indoctrinated into, a population as 
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foundational via oppression and the eradication of alternatives. Nevertheless, once 
fictitious rules are believed to be foundational they are ripe for undermining by 
scepticism and an eventual return to anti-foundationalism; a cyclical process that, 
in the West, has a documented history dating back many millennia. 
Nevertheless there have always been some, in the West, who have wished to make 
a virtue out of anti-foundationalism, and to them the debate surrounding the 
posthuman will offer as another example of the inherent failings of metanarratives 
such as humanism. However, whilst the rejection of humanism would resolve the 
posthuman debate by undermining the motivation behind its creation, it would 
also undermine man's impetus towards all forms of modem technology. Indeed, it 
appears difficult to understand most of man's distinctive contributions as a species 
if humanism's active, and often organised, resistance to nature is not taken into 
account. While Burroughs' famously writes, in a letter to Ginsberg, that: 'Human, 
Allen, is an adjective, and its use as a noun is in itself regrettable' (1994 p. 68), 
therefore suggesting that it may be more appropriate to perceive man as a 
becoming rather than a thing. This has, in the West, been a "becoming against" 
what would otherwise envelope man in an amorphous nature. The pertinent 
questions here appear to be the extent to which a-humanism would return man to 
this nature; and if it did, would this be a pyrrhic victory. As FernAndez-Armesto 
argues on the last page of his systematic attack on humanist mythology entitled So 
You Think You're Human?: 
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'That humans are uniquely rational, intellectual, spiritual, self-aware, 
creative, conscientious, moral, or godlike seems to be a myth - an 
article of faith to which we cling in defiance of the evidence. But we 
need myths to make our irresoluble dilemmas bearable. And our 
claims for our nature are more: not mere myths but also aspirations, 
still waiting to become true. By the standards of the Utopian hopes 
Justin Stagl identifies, we are bestial creatures indeed; but those 
glimpses of self-elevation to a genuinely different category - to the 
level of angel, or god, or comic-book super-hero - give us precious 
self-dissatisfaction, which we can build on. ' (2005 p. 170) 
Ironically, having accepted that while metanarratives are not foundational this fact 
is unimportant, and having dismissed the rejection or replacement of humanism as 
inherently unpalatable; the retention of humanism and the confinement of the 
posthuman to the humanist metanarrative, appears to return the account full-circle. 
However this is illusory. As argued, the US posthuman debate of the late 
twentieth century has all the halhnarks of a phantom, emotive and ephemeral 
apocalypse narrative, rather than a serious critique of future technologies. The fact 
that posthuman technologies failed to generate public debate prior to, or even 
after, such dialogue, adds weight to its phantom nature. Indeed, the lack of 
vociferous debate appears indicative of a tacit and widespread acceptance of 
posthuman technologies. That is, First World societies realise the technological 
development they crave, will ultimately include movement towards the 
posthuman, and that this is something they do not find unappealing per se. 
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Nevertheless the process towards the posthuman is, and will increasingly become, 
a matter of public policy, and social research will play an important role in 
examining who is dictating such policy i. e., whether it serves some highfalutin 
humanistic existential project, or the vested interests of politicians, scientists and 
their financiers. To this end Actor-Network Theory's a-humanist methodology, 
grounded within the framework of humanism, appears to have a role to play in 
examining the power relationships within the networks of posthuman 
technoscientific innovation. VAiilst, as has already been mentioned, ANT's role is 
highly unlikely to be associated with the creation of policy, its commentaries will 
be useful in the refinement and regulation of policy. As Law argues: 
science is powerful it is because it has created a network of 
locations where there is some agreement about warrantable 
connections: where the same types of docile bodies, text and machines 
are all available to localise what had been delocalised. And this 
network of agreement is, at least in part, embodied in machines. ' (Law 
1986 p. 34) 
For it is within the realm of the posthuman, that machines, and other non-human 
actants such as genes and nanotechnology, wilL more than ever, be imbued with 
power, both literally and narratively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Posthuman technologies are portrayed, by both sides of the US posthuman debate, 
as being eminent, having epochal potent, and being a credible threat to the very 
existence of the human species. Indeed these technologies have been positioned 
within a contextual frarnework analogous to that of nuclear and biological 
weaponry. However, having placed the posthuman debate in a historical context 
and offered up its dialogue to other avant-garde socio-political narratives that deal 
with species-altering technologies, there appears to be an incongruity between the 
subjects' portrayal and the realpolitik of such technologies. 
Clearly, the whimsical and speculative notion of improving man via self- 
intervention is an age old phenomenon. However, the idea that man's fate may 
hang in the balance, if he were to refrain, or fail to refrain, from utilising self- 
altering technoscience appears to have its origins in the mid ninetieth century. The 
notion that man may need to intervene in his own evolution appears to have been 
a response to the increasing popularity of Darwinism, and the worry that having 
ostensively broken from natural selection, man may need to replace the process 
with artificial selection. 
Nevertheless, even if it is conceded that the rapid increases in investment, 
resources, and the speed of technological advancement, has served to undermine 
temporal projections for a number of posthuman technologies; from a historical 
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perspective these technologies appear to be many years behind "initial" 
expectations. This technological time lag was due to the Nazi eugenics of the 
Second World War, which effectively halted, temporarily of course, man's 
appetite for self-alteration. Nevertheless, having pushed beyond what is now 
considered an unfortunate historical incident, these technologies are again on the 
menu. However this change in perspective is not a recent event. The technology 
used to perfect the first successful human conceived via in vitro fertilization 
(Louise Brown, bom on the 25hof July 1978) was a de facto, and very public, 
statement of intent regarding posthuman technology. Indeed, as Chen argues, it 
was nearly a decade earlier, in 1969, when Edwards and Steptoe first: 'reported 
that they had fertilised a human egg in a Petri dish. Commentators conjured Brave 
New World scenarios. One British newspaper reporter warning, "The test tube 
time-bomb is ticking away. " The research, he wrote, brought scientists closer to 
someday cloning "a cohort of super-astronauts or dustmen,, soldiers or senators. "' 
(2004 pp. 1-2) 
Indeed, having investigated the emergence, in the US, of a pre-millennial 
posthuman debate, the phenomenon appears not to be a novel manifestation but 
rather the recycling of a much earlier socio-technological debate, with the addition 
of an end-of-days demagogic rhetoric. The popularity of this appears to be 
directly related to the temporal, and spatial, susceptibility of certain elements of 
the US public to such rhetoric. VVhile its apparent "emergent" nature can be 
accounted for by the rebranding of its narrative, and because the previous social 
debate has, after a century, become one of general indifference. 
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The reasons why the posthuman debate materialised in the US during the late 
1990's appears to have more to do with the psyche of certain elements of the US 
populous, than the sparking of new debate caused by the revealing of previously 
undisclosed revolutionary technology. Indeed, the reason why this debate appears 
to be fading out of the public interest may reflect the ephemeral nature of end-of- 
days narratives i. e., eventually their focus becomes redirected elsewhere. 
This lack of originality and contemporary input becomes increasingly evident 
when the posthuman narrative is offered up to the science fiction allegory. Here 
the posthuman debate appears wholly unable to acknowledge, let alone offer 
meaningful commentaries on or solutions to, the frequently unpalatable and 
contradictory scenarios proffered by contemporary science fiction. 
The reason for this quietism appears to centre on the posthuman debate's 
metanaffative bias i. e., the continuity between the conceptions of the human 
offered by humanism and Christianity. Here, man is seen as self-evidently both 
the pinnacle of creation and possessing an inherently improvable disposition. As a 
result, the posthuman debate revolves solely around the main issue of contention 
between these viewpoints i. e., whether man is himself improvable. 
Ironically it is the homogeneity between humanism and Christianity that enables 
the posthuman debate to exist, for the dialogue is analogous to a first-order 
conflict regarding the rules within a single metanarrative, rather than a second- 
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order conflict between two competing metanarratives. Indeed, there is 
considerable cross-over, with Christians utilising secularised concepts of the 
44good life" to argue against the posthuman, whilst humanists argue the posthuman 
is merely a function of the ingenuity God gave to man. 
Consequently, the posthuman dialogue appears wholly dismissive of 
contemporary science fiction representations that question whether man is the 
pinnacle of creation, or challenge his belief regarding the improvability of his 
disposition. Indeed, the extent to which these science fiction scenarios jar with the 
self-limited sphere of the US posthuman narrative is overwhelming to the point 
that their lack of representation, within the debate, appears to be a fundamental 
oversight. 
However, while the posthuman. narrative appears so fimdamentally different when 
glimpsed through the lens of a-humanism that it is difficult not to assume such 
repositioning must have value, this is unfortunately an illusion. For examining the 
posthuman debate from outside of humanism only serves to undermine the 
narrative's coherence. Clearly the "posthuman7' is an empty concept without the 
"humaW', but the rejection of humanism also undermines the posthuman telos; for 
without humanism man lacks the impetus to participate in any technoscience, 
including the posthuman. 
Indeed the strategy of applying a-humanism to the posthuman debate appears 
analogous to applying non-cognitivism to a debate on applied ethics i. e., it 
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undermines the whole process. For debating whether actions are "right"' or 
"wrong" is rendered incoherent the moment the possibility of moral knowledge is 
rejected. Similarly, debating the value of the posthuman, or posthuman policy, is 
rendered incoherent the moment humanism is rejected. This is because first-order 
calculations are necessarily predicated on second-order assumptions. 
Nevertheless, like non-cognitivism's role in ethics, a-humanism has a roll to play 
within the posthunian narrative. Firstly, by exposing power issues that would 
otherwise remain hidden by humanist assumptions. Secondly, by reminding man 
of his limitations, undermining his blase hubris, and offering up scenarios that 
give him pause for thought and thus impede his rush to judgment. 
This said applying a-humanist argument to the posthuman narrative may also 
serve as an effective method of directing participants out of both the posthuman 
debate and its grounding humanist metanarrative. 
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